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Abstract
This project examines how uncertainty is rhetorically deployed in healthcare contexts.
Investigating four major healthcare contexts, I study how different forms of uncertainty
produce distinct rhetorical effects and consequences. In Chapter 1, I explore how the
haphazard use of Agent Orange during the Vietnam war makes it difficult for veterans to
prove their exposure to this deadly chemical. In Chapter 2, I examine the rhetorical
strategies of mental illness skeptics and denialists, looking at how each deploys
uncertainty in different and related ways. In Chapter 3, I investigate the intersection
between design, emotion, and uncertainty as it appears in the patient experience
process. Finally, in Chapter 4, I look at different methods of theory-building in addiction
science, and argue that how theories wrangle with uncertainty lends them different
virtues and vulnerabilities. Concluding, I suggest that the rhetorical use of uncertainty
has “pharmaceutical” qualities, an argument that ups the stakes for both rhetoric and
healthcare practice and theory.
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1. A History of Aporia
What is uncertainty? Where does mere hesitancy end and real uncertainty
begin? Is it problematic that the very question “What is uncertainty?” is predicated on
an understanding of uncertainty, since all questions presuppose some relative
uncertainty? One thing is certain: these philosophical problems have not stopped
scholars, thinkers, and researchers from postulating and theorizing on what uncertainty
is and how it affects human behaviors. This project is no exception. Specifically, this
project examines the rhetorical use of uncertainty, or “aporia.”
Aporia is a rhetorical device that refers to the use of uncertainty, either feigned
or authentic, as a means of persuasion. For instance, the question “Is there enough
evidence to prosecute?” has certain rhetorical effects. It could make an investigator
reflect on the surety of their chances in court. It could place a modicum of doubt in the
minds of a jury. It could even be straightforwardly interrogative, without the pretense of
an explicitly rhetorical purpose. Aporia is the rhetorical use of uncertainty. Aporetic
rhetorics are the tactics, strategies, and counter-measures that use or defuse the
deployment of uncertainty for persuasive purposes.
To better understand aporia, we can look to its use in ancient Greek texts, where
authors use it to describe places, things, people, and thoughts. In Xenophon’s Anabasis,
a Sinopean ambassador named Hecatonymus advises the Greek armies to avoid a trip
through the lands of ancient Paphlagonia, located on the southern coast of the Black
Sea. He uses the term “aporia” to describe the trip as “not merely difficult…but a thing
2

of utter impossibility.”1 In book 3 of Plato’s Laws, the Athenian describes how a great
flood wiped out civilization on the plains. Plato deploys the term “aporia” to describe
how supplies of metal would be “virtually impossible” to recover until the art of mining
was “rediscovered” by the remnants of civilization.2 In Herodotus’ Histories, he uses
“aporia” when describing how Artabanus tries to dissuade Darius from making
preparations against the Scythians by telling him how “hard that people were to deal
with.”3 Finally, in the Protagoras, Plato uses the term “aporia” when describing
Prometheus’s creation of humankind, and what tools we were to be given. Aporia is
used to describe Prometheus’s “perplexity” when faced with deciding what gift to give
humans. This perplexity that would lead to the pilfering of Athena’s and Hephaestus’s
endowments of practical wisdom and fire.4 Read together, these different applications
of aporia are revealing.
Applied to a variety of situations, use of aporia in ancient Greek texts helps us
distinguish uncertainty from the rhetorical use of uncertainty. For instance,
Hecatonymus uses aporia as a stand-in for “impassable,” but does so in the context of
advisement of the Greeks. In Plato’s Laws, the Athenian uses aporia to describe the
difficulty of recovering the art of mining after an apocalyptic flood, but as with many
Platonic dialogues, does so in the context of making a broader dialectical argument. In
Herodotus, aporia gets deployed when describing the straightforwardly rhetorical
attempts of Artabanus, who is trying to convince Darius not to move against the
“difficult” Scythians. Finally, in Plato’s Protagoras, aporia is used as a justificatory state
of mind, a kind of mental perplexity that so affects Prometheus, he decides to pilfer the
3

gifts of Athena and Hephaestus. In each case, the concept of “impassibility,” “difficulty,”
“obscurity,” and “perplexity” is not used in an isolated instance, but instead, deployed
for specific rhetorical purposes.
Furthermore, the diverse use of aporia, such as a stand-in for “impassibility” or
“difficulty,” removes us from the realm of epistemology. Aporia is a state of being, and
not just a state of mind. When Hecatonymus describes the trip through Paphlagonia as
being “impassable,” aporia serves as both a description of the place and how the
structure of that place produces certain cognitive states. If we describe a labyrinth as
“aporetic,” we mean that its structure is complex, confusing, or poses navigational
difficulties. What underlies this complexity is nothing other than uncertainty, not just as
a state of mind conjured by language, but as a type of environment as well. This project
will address both the linguistic and lived dimensions of aporetic rhetoric. As a shorthand
for either the linguistic or material rhetorical deployment of uncertainty, we can simply
use the term “aporia.”
Aporia takes on a communicative dimension that discussions of uncertainty
sometimes miss. We do not have to travel far to find studies on how uncertainty affects
decision-making, or how uncertainty about a specific subject can be mitigated through a
variety of strategies. These perspectives are invaluable in understanding what
uncertainty is, but they do not necessarily reveal much about what uncertainty does,
and how it accomplishes its effects. In other words, it is important to know that
conditions of uncertainty can distort our sense of value, perception of risk, or emotional
state. However, knowing these facts about uncertainty does little to elucidate how
4

uncertainty is used. It is one thing to know that uncertainty can make us less willing to
take risks, it is another to understand how different organizations, individuals, or objects
can leverage this fact to achieve a goal or purpose.
This makes aporia sound manipulative, a tactic used to distort the truth for
ignoble purposes. This is a fair critique. Aporia is “manipulative.” An aporetic approach
is a rhetorical strategy not known for straightforwardly convincing with “the facts.”
However, like all rhetorical techniques, the ethics of aporia are best assessed depending
on the context of its use. If you are wrongly accused of a crime, you should hope that
your legal representation uses an aporetic strategy against an expert witness, thus
convincing the jury their testimony is not as persuasive as it seems. On the other hand,
unjustifiably prolonging the use of a dangerous drug by suggesting that the risks “need
further research” is the sort of rhetorical tactic that is likely unethical in many cases.
This project seeks neither to laud nor to vilify aporia. Rather, we will examine cases
where uncertainty is used for a variety of noble and contemptible purposes. The
important point for our investigation is how it is used, not what ends it is used for. To
learn more about aporia, including when and where it is used in healthcare situations,
we need to first learn more about what uncertainty is.

2. A Typology of Uncertainty
To get to the heart of aporetic rhetoric, it is helpful to traverse how different
academic disciplines approach the concept of uncertainty. For philosophers, uncertainty
is a central question stretching back through the Western tradition, and appears in
Platonic dialogues, Cartesian mediations, and modern analytical epistemology.
5

Psychologists have been increasingly focused on the topic in the twentieth and twentyfirst century, especially in decision-making research and behavioral economics, where
classical notions of self-interested rationality have been upturned. In the sociology of
medicine, clinical uncertainty plays a vital role in contextualizing, understanding, and
communicating healthcare information. Philosophy, psychology, and the sociology of
medicine play a central role in this project, thus how these fields understand and deploy
uncertainty will be important background for our continuing investigation.

Philosophy: Uncertainty as Skepticism
Philosophers in the western tradition have long been preoccupied with
uncertainty. For example, the tried-and-true allegory of the cave is interpretable as a
short treatise on uncertainty. The central punchline of Plato’s famous story is simple:
why are we so certain about what our senses tell us? Mystery (uncertainty) abounds.
More generally, philosopher’s long-standing devotion to knowledge is a misattribution.
No doubt, knowledge in the philosophical tradition is seen as one of the highest virtues.
However, in practice uncertainty is likely the more dominant value.
The Platonic dialogues are an instructive example. Socrates “pretends” to be
uncertain of a basic notion, often infuriating his interlocutors through feigned
ignorance. However, rather than come to a “better” version of knowledge by the end of
each dialogue, many end in a standstill or state of uncertainty. For example, the Apology
ends with a poetic flourish of uncertainty: “Now the hour to part has come. I go to die,
you go to live. Which of us goes to the better lot is known to no one, except the god.”5
6

After a lengthy discussion on the etymology of names, Plato concludes the Cratylus by
having Socrates admit that “…whether I’m right about these things or whether the truth
lies with Heraclitus and many others isn’t an easy matter to investigate.”6 In the
Theaetetus, Socrates spends a great deal of time providing a theory of knowledge, only
to undercut his position at the end of the dialogue: “I do not know any of the things that
other men know – the great and inspired men of today and yesterday.”7 At the end of
the Symposium, Socrates and his companions become too intoxicated to finish their
debate.8 Plato’s dialogues frequently deploy uncertain conclusions in these ways, or
otherwise end abruptly without reaching any agreement.
For Plato, uncertainty functions on two levels. First, in the dialogues Socrates
deploys uncertainty to complicate preconceived notions. Second, Plato deploys it
against readers by reaching conspicuously few conclusions about the nature of virtue,
justice, or reality. Plato’s dialogues are thus thoroughly aporetic. They do little to bring
knowledge to the reader. Instead, they offer a blueprint for a method of deploying
uncertainty. If we accept Whitehead’s notion that all of Western thought is a footnote
to Plato, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Western thought is less about thought
and more about uncertainty. Additionally, this uncertainty is not only a topic of debate,
it fuels debate itself.
Plato’s dialogues are certainly interested in questions of uncertainty. However,
stylistically, the structure and rhetorical features of the dialogues is part of an aporetic
strategy. Those familiar with the Platonic dialogues know how questions raised during
the course of debate between Socrates and his interlocutors rarely, if ever, end on solid
7

conclusions. In fact, one of Socrates’ primary rhetorical strategy is substantially aporetic.
Socrates frequently feigns uncertainty in the dialogues, like he does in 495b-c in the
Gorgias:
Socrates: Do you really assert these things, Callicles?
Callicles: Yes, I do.
Socrates: So we’re to undertake the discussion on the assumption that you’re in
earnest?
Callicles: Most certainly.
Socrates: All right, since that’s what you think, distinguish the following things
for me: There is something you call knowledge, I take it?
Callicles: Yes.
Socrates: Weren’t you also saying just now that there is such a thing as bravery
with knowledge?
Callicles: Yes, I was.
Socrates: Was it just on the assumption that bravery is distinct from knowledge
that you were speaking of them as two?
Callicles: Yes, very much so.
Socrates: Well now, do you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same or
different?
Callicles: Different of course, you wisest of men. 9
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Notice how Socrates feigns ignorance in this passage. In his first two questions above
(“Do you really assert these things Callicles?” and “So we’re to undertake the discussion
on the assumption that you’re in earnest?”), Socrates is not likely puzzled by Callicles’
position. Instead, he is deploying uncertainty to lock Callicles into an argumentative
position. He pretends to be uncertain about Callicles’ earnesty not because he is
uncertain, but because he wants to close down any future hedging or argumentative
revisionism. In other words, Callicles cannot suddenly claim that he was “not serious”
about his argument once Socrates has him cornered into admitting the earnesty of his
position. This is a clear-cut example of an aporetic tactic. Socrates is using uncertainty to
produce argumentative leverage.
Once he has Callicles cornered, Socrates launches into his characteristic
argumentative style, a different but equally effective aporetic strategy. Socrates likely
knows that Callicles believes in the existence of knowledge, and this question acts as a
bridge to the next rhetorical tactic: getting Callicles to admit a distinction between
knowledge and bravery. This move is subtle and cloaked in aporia. Socrates lures
Callicles into agreeing on a distinction between bravery and knowledge by feigning his
uncertainty. This is the very core of Socrates’ aporetic strategy: he deploys feigned
ignorance, luring arrogant interlocutors into agreeing on positions he can leverage
against them. Does Callicles really believe that bravery is distinct from knowledge? If he
had any sense of Socrates’ aporetic method, he would not have so readily agreed to the
distinction. Socratic aporia thus hinges on the arrogant certainty of an interlocutor. This
illustrates the basic contours of aporia.
9

Philosophers may take on any number of topical challenges in their work, but the
core of their continued relevance is aporetic in nature. The style of philosopher’s
aporetic strategy has certainly changed from the time of Plato’s dialogues, but an
intense need dominates the substance of philosopher’s rhetorical lives. To persist as a
profession, they must deploy uncertainty to further their own arguments. Aporetic
rhetoric is not only encouraged in the philosophical tradition, it is constitutive of its
continued practice. We can further investigate this claim by examining debates in
modern analytical epistemology.
In contemporary analytical epistemology, knowledge acquisition is premised on
having a justified true belief. To a classical epistemologist, someone possesses
knowledge if they have a justified true belief. Any wrinkle in this equation accounts for a
condition of uncertainty. Of the three conditions, justification is the most discussed,
followed by the belief and truth condition. The justification condition is also where we
can distinguish between traditional and non-traditional epistemologies. Traditional
epistemological stances, like evidentialism, hold that a true belief is justified if there is
evidence to justify the truth of that belief. A non-traditional epistemology, like
reliabilism, holds that knowledge is only acquired when a belief is formed from reliable
cognitive processes.
For our purposes, uncertainty in epistemology exists as a type of skepticism.
Strangely preoccupied with placing their organs in aqueous containers, epistemologists
have long debated the “Brains in Vats” (or BIV) argument, a thought experiment central
to their understanding of skepticism. The BIV argument goes something like this:
10

1) I’m uncertain that I’m not a brain in a vat.
2) If I’m uncertain that I’m not a brain in a vat, then I’m uncertain that I have hands.
3) I’m uncertain that I have hands.
For epistemologists, the challenge of this thought experiment is that it is particularly
difficult to refute premise 1) and 2), making the conclusion, 3), seem unacceptably
sound. Why epistemologists have decided to center their skeptical preoccupations on
the relative existence of their hands is a fascinating sociological question in its own
regard. However curious their framing, the BIV problem is legitimate. If we assume our
hypothetical brain vats are wired to sufficiently simulate the experience of possessing a
body, then premise 1) and 2) seem highly plausible. We cannot be certain we are not in
a hand-centric version of the Matrix. Furthermore, the sophistication of our brain vats
precludes our awareness of the situation.
Epistemologists have considered many possibilities to resolve the apparently
unacceptable state of being uncertain about the existence of their hands. Some have
suggested “closure,” essentially reframing the argument to say that if I know I have
hands, and I know that having hands means I am not a BIV, therefore I know that I am
not a BIV. This argument falls short, since in the original formulation we begin with the
premise that we cannot know that we are not a BIV, thus defeating the second premise
of closure (“I know that having hands means I’m not a BIV”). Another approach,
deployed by epistemologists who employ a “contextualist” view of knowledge,
preserves closure by suggesting that the standards for knowledge can be “low” or
11

“high.” Premise 1) of the BIV argument is thus true only in cases where our standards
for knowledge are preternaturally high. We can be sufficiently sure we are not in the
Matrix, perhaps not completely sure, but sure enough to conclude that we know we are
not a brain in a vat. This view has elicited many objections from other epistemologists,
who remain convinced that they do not have hands.
The interesting point of this debate is not that epistemologists have a strange
preoccupation with the relative existence of appendages. Rather, the fascinating
dimension of this preoccupation is that it involves a significant amount of debate,
discussion, and argument generated from deploying uncertainty about the existence of
hands. The key takeaway is not that we are ignorant about our hands, it is how
rhetorically efficacious the deployment of uncertainty has been in this debate. Hundreds
of pages, years of thought, and piles of articles have been devoted to avoiding the
conclusion that we cannot be certain we have hands, all by plausibly suggesting we are
uncertain that our brains are not suspended in science fiction goop.
More importantly, the aporetic dimensions of epistemology are not of secondary
importance to epistemologists. Uncertainty is the primary preoccupation of these
philosophers. Epistemologists never convene to express their mutual agreement about
the nature of knowledge. One can surmise that epistemology would no longer exist if
this were the case. Rather, epistemology is not about knowledge at all, but uncertainty.
Every argument and counter-argument, every treatise and response, is an aporetic
perpetuation of doubt centered on which conditions need to be met to obtain
knowledge. Even if there were to be some hypothetical essay in which the author
12

completely agrees with a colleague on every facet of their epistemological theory, it is a
foregone conclusion they will cast doubt on an alternative theory to bolster the veracity
of their position. In doing so, every epistemologist is essentially casting doubt on a
theory of how humans come to know facts about the world, perpetually suggesting that
no, we cannot actually be certain we have things like hands. It is this condition of
uncertainty that drives continued debate, and “casting doubt,” a thoroughly aporetic
notion, is one of the central levers through which this debate (and conceivably, all
debate) is sustained in the philosophical tradition. The aporetic preoccupations of
epistemologists are not reserved to this philosophical subfield. The history of Western
philosophy is predicated on how well philosophers cast doubt on one another. Western
philosophy is stylistically aporetic, while epistemology is both substantially and
stylistically aporetic.
This illustrates that aporetic rhetoric is not necessarily manipulative or unethical.
Many academic fields are predicated on the practice of deploying uncertainty against
already-existing theories, and through this process, assumptions are challenged and
interesting questions are raised. Not only does aporetic rhetoric sustain the continued
work of reflection and inquiry, it also underpins the value of humanistic thought and
scholarship. We will encounter cases where aporetic rhetoric is used nefariously, but it
is important to keep in mind that it is also used to liberate, question, and sustain critical
thought.

13

Psychology: Uncertainty in Behavioral Economics
To get to how uncertainty has carved out its own increasingly important niche in
psychology, we need to first tease out how the idea first appeared in economics, thus
tracing out how these two fields have productively collided on the topic of uncertainty.
Economist Frank Knight wrote his doctoral dissertation in 1916, during a time of relative
economic instability following the first World War. Published as the book Risk,
Uncertainty, and Profit in 1921, Knight’s major contribution to economic theory is his
distinction between risk and uncertainty. To Knight, the former is characterized by
known probability distributions, the latter, by probability distributions that are unknown
at the moment of decision-making. However, Knight is careful to distinguish between
two kinds of uncertainty: measurable and unmeasurable.
Measurable uncertainty and risk are close cousins. In fact, Knight considers them
so close that measurable uncertainty in his paradigm is not a type of uncertainty. “True”
uncertainty is the incalculable unknown. This is the same conceptual breakdown that
Donald Rumsfeld famously deployed in a 2002 news briefing on the existence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq: “…there are known knowns; there are things we
know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there
are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we
don’t know we don’t know.”10 The first are risks, the second, measurable uncertainties,
the third, unmeasurable uncertainties or what economists refer to as “Knightian”
uncertainties.

14

Knight’s novelty derives from seeing that the issues dogging economic theory
can only be unraveled by addressing the nature and function of consciousness. Knight
spends a great deal of his 1921 work delving into the particularities of profits, utility,
supply and demand, and other economic preoccupations. In the last third of his
remarkable work, however, Knight casually treads into murky philosophical questions
about the nature and function of knowledge and uncertainty, including their relation:
“We live only by knowing something about the future; while the problems of life, or of
conduct at least, arise from the fact that we know so little. This is as true of business as
of other spheres of activity.”11 For Knight, conscious behavior is nothing other than
“action designed to change a future situation inferred from a present one.”12 The
novelty of Knight is not his theory of action, however, but his insistence that the notion
of stable inference from the present is not as stable as it seems.
For Knight, the question is not whether the world is obscured from human
rationality (it is), but to what extent the world is obscured from rationality. As he
explains: “We have, then, our dogma which is the presupposition of knowledge, in this
form; that the world is made up of things, which, under the same circumstances, always
behave in the same way.”13 The “chief logical problem” with this formulation, in Knight’s
mind, is the conception of a “thing.” Knight’s central inquiry is “how far and in what
sense the universe is really made up of such ‘things’ which preserve an unvarying
identity (mode of behavior).”14 In sum, things are more complicated than philosophers
and economists seem to believe in the early twentieth century. Compounding this
complication, Knight believes that people inconsistently react to these amorphous
15

conditions: “It probably occasions surprise to most persons the first time they consider
seriously what a small portion of our conduct makes any pretense to a foundation in
accurate and exhaustive knowledge of the things we are dealing with.”15 To Knight, the
seeming irrationality at the heart of human consciousness is “very liable to be
misunderstood.”16 Knight’s continuum of uncertainty, from risk, to measurable and then
immeasurable uncertainty, is a reasonable way to pin down the problem. Thus, poor
economic forecasting is a result of a confusion between risk, the known unknown, and
the unknown unknown. To Knight, we fail to predict future events not because the
future is impenetrable (a belief very much in-vogue in early twentieth century
philosophy), but because we misidentify whether and to what extent a situation is
predictable in the first place.
At the time, Knight’s insights into these simple cognitive processes were of little
interest to psychologists. However, nearly fifty years after Knight’s influential work,
psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman began to rigorously investigate the
types of questions that Knight had in mind in 1921. Their work on heuristics and biases
tested research participants on simple probability questions, revealing consistent biases
that emerged from the use of decision-making heuristics. In other words, Kahneman
and Tversky were interested in how people make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty. They found that otherwise intelligent college students would make simple
probabilistic errors. Take, for instance, this question from Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974
essay, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases”:

16

A certain town is served by two hospitals. In the larger hospital about 45 babies
are born each day, and in the smaller hospital about 15 babies are born each
day. As you know, about 50% of all babies are boys. The exact percentage of
baby boys, however, varies from day to day. Sometimes it may be higher than
50%, sometimes lower.

For a period of one year, each hospital recorded the days on which more than
60% of the babies born were boys. Which hospital do you think recorded more
such days?

-The larger hospital?
-The smaller hospital?
-About the same (i.e., within 5% of each other)? 17
Most respondents selected “about the same.” As Kahneman and Tversky speculate,
“presumably because these events are described by the same statistic and are therefore
equally representative of the general population.”18 However, sampling theory dictates
that the expected number of days in which more than 60% of the babies born are boys
is more likely in the smaller hospital than the larger one, because the larger sample is
less likely to stray from the 50% average. Because the question established predictive
expectations (50% of all babies are boys), the resulting answer to the question becomes
biased, based on these expectations.

17

Another example taken from Tversky and Kahneman shows how framing can
affect prediction-making processes:
Imagine the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which
is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease
have been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the
consequences of the program are as follows:
(Problem 1)
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved.
If Program B is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be
saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved.
Which of the two programs would you favor? 19
The majority (72%) of respondents chose Program A, demonstrating risk aversion. Being
certain that 200 people would be saved is more attractive than a 1/3 probability of
saving 600 lives. A second group of respondents were given two different options:
(Problem 2)
1. If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die.
2. If Program D is adopted there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die,
and 2/3 probability that 600 people will die.20
Although Problem 1 is essentially identical to Problem 2, the majority (78%) in the
second group of respondents chose program D in Problem 2. Tversky and Kahneman
explain: “Choices involving gains are often risk averse and choices involving losses are
often risk taking. However, it is easy to see that the two problems are effectively
18

identical. The only difference between them is… a pronounced shift from risk aversion
to risk taking.”21 In Problem 1, the choice is framed by lives saved, in Problem 2, by lives
lost. Framing makes all the difference.
Tversky and Kahneman’s work held important implications for economists. If our
perceptions of risk could be altered, or if our ability to determine whether something is
measurably or immeasurably uncertain, then economic decision-making based on a
purely self-interested rational model would need revision. Kahneman and Tversky’s
article “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” puts these rational
economic preconceptions to the test. For instance, economic decision-making under
conditions of risk can be viewed as a choice between gambles. A gamble is simply a
contract that yields a probabilistic outcome. Expected utility theory, a long-standing
explanation of how rational actors make choices between gambles, is based on three
tenets. First, a gamble’s utility is based on the expected utility of its outcomes, or the
relationship between the gamble’s “payoff” and its probability. Second, a gamble is
acceptable if the utility resulting from the gamble exceeds the utility of a person’s
already-existing assets. Or, a gamble’s utility is based on a person’s final asset position
rather than gains or losses. Third, a person can be risk averse, risk neutral, or risk
seeking, which will affect the perceived utility of a gamble either concavely, linearly, or
convexly.
Using French economist Maurice Allais’s criticism of expected utility theory,
Kahneman and Tversky put together a series of psychological tests that cast doubt on
this theory. They found that people generally tend to overweight outcomes that are
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considered certain, relative to outcomes that are probable, a phenomenon they call the
“certainty effect.” Here are two modified examples from their 1979 study:
Question 1:
Which gamble do you take?
A: An 80% chance of winning $4,000
B: A 100% chance of winning $3,000

Question 2:
Which gamble do you take?
C: A 20% chance of winning $4,000
D: A 25% chance of winning $3,00022
In question 1 (N=95), 20% of respondents chose option A and 80% chose option B. In
question 2 (N=95), 65% chose option C and 35% chose option D. The respondents’
answers to these two questions violate expected utility theory. According to the
substitution axiom of utility theory, if option B is preferred to option A, then any
probability mixture with B must be preferred to a mixture of A. In other words, expected
utility theory states that because respondents chose option B in Question 1, they will
choose option D in Question 2. This did not occur, leading Kahneman and Tversky to
conclude that people tend to be biased towards certain outcomes in a way incompatible
with classical expected utility theory. In particular, being certain of an outcome (or
feeling certain of an outcome) tends to be overvalued when weighed against other bets
(even bets with minimal risk) that present larger rewards.
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Knight’s, Kahneman’s, and Tversky’s work on behavioral economics, an extension
of psychological research on biases and heuristics, are important pieces of the aporetic
puzzle. On its surface, aporetic rhetoric is no more than the claim that uncertainty can
be used rhetorically. This claim should not strike us as particularly earth-shaking. Rather,
what Knight, Kahneman, and Tversky reveal is that aporetic strategies are neither
homogenous nor unclassifiable. There are measurable, observable, and discrete
aporetic strategies that produce equally distinct results. Knight’s contribution to this
thesis is his insistence that psychology is a critical dimension of decision-making under
conditions of uncertainty. In addition, Kahneman and Tversky’s research further
suggests that uncertainty is not solely the purview of rationality, as some decision
theorists and economists have suggested. Thus, the psychological ramifications of
uncertainty begin to align with our rhetorical intuitions. Uncertainty can be used,
altered, and modified to produce specific psychological (and by extension, rhetorical)
effects that demonstrate the full range of logos, ethos, and pathos.
Take, for instance, the two above examples drawn from Kahneman and Tversky.
In the disease outbreak example, the exact same amount of uncertainty is present in
both Problem 1 and Problem 2. Yet, by framing one decision as a matter of saving lives
and the other as a matter of losing lives, Kahneman and Tversky were able to show a
powerful and measurable rhetorical manipulation of uncertainty, an aporetic strategy all
the way down. In the gambling example we see a similar phenomenon. Based on
expected utility theory, respondents should have selected choice D if they selected
choice B. Yet they did not. Instead, Kahneman and Tversky are able to isolate what they
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call the certainty effect, which biases decision-making towards options that are (or
seem) certain. Convincing someone that a result is completely certain thus has powerful
rhetorical effects. Let’s put this concretely.
Imagine a physician provides two treatment options for a loved one’s illness.
Treatment A is framed as certain to succeed, but the process will be somewhat painful,
lengthy, and reasonably expensive. Treatment B is framed as extremely likely to
succeed, but the process is almost painless, fairly quick, and cost-effective. Based on
Kahneman and Tversky’s research, many will be swayed to select Treatment A, because
the result of this choice has been framed as certain. Let’s imagine a second scenario:
Treatment A is 90% likely to succeed, but the process will be somewhat painful, lengthy,
and reasonably expensive. Treatment B is 85% likely to succeed, but the process is
almost painless, fairly quick, and cost-effective. Which do you choose? Framed in this
way, Treatment B appears as a much more viable option than in our first scenario, even
though in our first scenario, the likelihood of both Treatment A and Treatment B might
be quite close to 90% and 85%, respectively. Thus, how a physician frames the likelihood
of success for Treatment A or Treatment B is deeply influential on the patient decisionmaking process. When we begin to take into consideration physician conflicts of
interests, personal commitments, overconfidence in particular research programs, or
other confounding factors that influence how physicians frame treatment options, the
impact and prevalence of these subtle framing problems are intensified. Aporetic
rhetoric is thus a critical dimension of understanding healthcare.
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Medicine: Clinical Uncertainty
Largely the purview of sociologists, the term “clinical uncertainty” describes the
different facets of uncertainty in medical practice. The medical community understands
the stakes of mismanaging uncertainty in the clinical setting. For instance, medical
authority is largely premised on the superior knowledge of physicians and medical
science, creating incentives to obscure or distort the extent of clinical uncertainty
expressed between doctors and patients. Clinical uncertainty can also exist between the
physician and their diagnostic tools, like laboratory tests and therapeutic research
results. Finally, clinical uncertainty rests directly between the patient and physician.
Being unaware of patient needs – both physical and psychological – is detrimental to the
therapeutic process. For example, if physicians tend to communicate more poorly with
certain racial or ethnic groups, this “uncertainty gap” will have measurable impacts on
the quality of care these communities receive.
Sociologists became increasingly interested in questions of medical authority in
the 1970s, when they began to collect information on doctors’ perceptions of what
accounts for a “good” patient and a “bad” one. As Michael Calnan summarizes this
work, “the best patients, in terms of patient behavior, were those who seldom
consulted, those who are able to judge when a consultation is needed, those who trust
the doctor and do not expect too much and those who accept the doctors’ judgment
and comply.”23 Alternatively, “bad” patients were those who were critical of diagnosis
or questioned a physician’s judgment. From the perspective of clinical authority,
patients who put physician expertise into question were a threat and burden to clinical
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autonomy. Pediatrician Richard Hayward has explored what contributes to this
defensiveness.24 As Hayward postulates, physicians frequently have perceptions of
themselves that relate to their accomplishments, and this perception is shaded by “the
assumption that whatever they do has been done for the good of the patient and, as
such, requires no further justification.”25 Uncompromising in his assessment, Hayward
notes how “doctors require particular mental strategies if they are to cope with what
could be perceived as regular personal defeats,” the two most tempting of which are
“assumptions of authority and infallibility…linked to each other in a mutually supportive
relationship.”26 From the perspective of uncertainty, there is a strong psychological
incentive for physicians to manage uncertainty amongst themselves and their patients.
Their very professional identity, in some respects, hinges upon the authority we
commonly associate with certainty.
These sociological factors also interact with the important shift in medicine to an
“evidence-based” model. Evidence-based medicine (EBM) refers to the “conscientious,
explicit, and judicious use of the best available evidence in health-care decisionmaking.”27 Transparently rhetorical (after all, even alternative medicine practitioners
will say they make decisions based on the best evidence), in practice, EBM refers to
mainstream medicine’s reliance on modern testing practices and technologies, as well
as an emphasis on examining scientific studies before providing a diagnosis. This
reliance impacts medical specialties differently. For instance, Amit Ghosh notes that
primary-care physicians are more tolerant of clinical uncertainty that orthopedists,
urologists, and anesthetists.28 Thus, primary-care physicians were less likely to deploy
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extensive medical testing. As Ghosh explains, high levels of uncertainty have very real
economic impacts: close to 17% of needless cost in medical management is the result of
anxious physicians who order tests because they are uncertain of a diagnosis.29
Ironically, technological advances “will not eliminate uncertainty and may actually
increase it.”30 This finding resonates with Stefan Timmermans and Alison Angell’s
sociological examination of uncertainty, which argues that EBM does not necessarily
reduce uncertainty, as much as it provides a new form of uncertainty in the diagnostic
process.31 Interviewing over a dozen medical residents, Timmermans and Angell found
that these inexperienced physicians doubted their ability to find appropriate evidence in
existing literature, to distinguish between a good and bad epidemiological sample, or to
determine what was an appropriate level of statistical significance.32 Complicating
matters, many residents questioned the interests behind the studies, noting that
economic incentives can affect the quality of medical knowledge.33 Clinical uncertainty
is thus a thorny problem for the EBM paradigm. It also has consequences for ethnic and
racial minorities.
Uncertainty is also a primary cause of racial and ethnic minorities receiving
inferior medical care. When insurance status and other measures of access are
controlled using statistical methods, racial and ethnic disparities remain.34 When
researchers control for patients’ clinical characteristics, racial and ethnic disparities
remain.35 In attempt to discover why, Ana Balsa and her fellow researchers found that
the diagnostic implications of symptoms and tests, lack of information about the
effectiveness of particular interventions, and debate over what counts as a valuable
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clinical outcome all functioned as central contributors to clinical uncertainty. When
these types of clinical uncertainty are prevalent, they create a wide berth for physicians
to use “clinical discretion” towards the treatments and tests they use. As Balsa et al.
argue, this clinical discretion becomes colored by subjective influences, including
“unfavorable stereotypes and attitudes about social groups,” which shapes “the
exercise of this discretion.”36 Essentially, Balsa et al. argue that clinical uncertainty
creates conditions where biases and stereotypes can influence physician decisionmaking. Physician and patient communication is a second problem located at the
intersection of ethnicity, race, and clinical uncertainty.
Two types of experiments show that clinicians respond differently to patients of
different races. One type of experiment is based on priming effects,37 where clinicians
were “primed” with words relating to Black American stereotypes or “neutral” words.
Clinicians were then asked to group rate hypothetical Black American patients on
multiple hostility-related attributes. Groups of clinicians who viewed the Black American
stereotypes rated hypothetical patients of this ethnicity as significantly more negative
than clinicians who viewed neutral words.38 In a second kind of experiment, a group of
medical students viewed a video of either a Black American woman or a white man with
the same symptoms. Minority and female medical students perceived both groups of
patients as possessing similar qualities of life, but male and white medical students
perceived the Black American woman’s quality of life as lower than their white male
counterparts.39 Both experiments show, at least preliminarily, that in conditions of

26

clinical uncertainty prejudice and bias are plausible explanations for healthcare
disparities.
Uncertainty, and by extension aporetic rhetoric, is a critical problem for
healthcare. Part of this criticality derives from the sheer stakes: not knowing whether a
treatment option will work can literally mean the difference between crippling pain and
total recovery, or even between life or death. Complicating these stakes, there will
always be a non-negligible level of uncertainty when it comes to diagnosis and
prognosis. Unlike other scientific endeavors, however, where uncertainty can be
managed or somewhat ignored (no one will perish by being uncertain of string theory),
in medical science these uncertainties are rightfully taken seriously. So seriously, in fact,
that there are strong sociological incentives to obscure or mitigate the communication
of uncertainty to maintain professional authority. Admittedly, physicians have gone to
great lengths to realistically manage these uncertainties (for example, by using EBM),
but the more that physicians have fought back against uncertainty, the more new types
of uncertainty appear. Finally, clinical uncertainty has observable systemic effects on the
quality of care. Because subjectivity is amplified in conditions of uncertainty, biases and
stereotypes can influence diagnostic decisions, leading to potentially poorer outcomes
for minorities. From the perspective of aporetic rhetoric, the practice and theory of
healthcare is an indispensable site for understanding both how uncertainty performs
rhetorical work, and how this rhetorical work of uncertainty is a constant and
constitutive dimension of medical treatment.
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3. Aporetic Rhetoric
My central claim in this project is that medicine and health are implicated in
aporetic rhetoric, and vice versa. Healthcare contexts tend to amplify the use and
management of aporetic rhetoric, and aporetic rhetoric has a “pharmaceutical” quality
that mimics the functions of medicine. Because the stakes of communication in
healthcare settings are so high, aporetic rhetoric is both widespread and potent in
healthcare contexts. The widespread appearance and importance of aporetic rhetoric in
healthcare contexts is due to a fundamental tension between humankind’s desire to
eliminate the uncertainty of illness and death, and the limits of our intellectual,
technological, and physical ability to do so. In other words, aporetic rhetoric is deeply
entwined in practice, research, and communication in healthcare settings because
humans possess an instinctual and deep desire for continued life, vitality, and health,
coupled with an equally fundamental inability to determine how to prevent death,
incapacity, and illness. Despite our species’ best efforts, Spinoza’s claim in 1677 that
“nobody as yet knows the structure of the body so accurately as to explain all its
functions” holds true today.40 These epistemological limits, coupled with our desire to
overcome the pains and failures of bodies, enables the theory and practice of healthcare
to be inundated by aporetic rhetoric.
Flipping this claim on its head, aporetic rhetoric is also a pharmaceutical.
Deriving from the Greek term “pharmakon,” which broadly refers to drugs, the term
“pharmaceutical” is an apt way to describe the function and form of aporetic rhetoric.
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The connection between pharmakon and language is made in section 14 of Gorgias’
Encomium of Helen, where he describes logos as a pharmakon:
The power of speech has the same relation to the disposition of the soul as the
application of drugs on the disposition of the body. For just as different drugs
draw different juices out of the body, and some end disease but others end life,
so also some speeches produce pain, some enjoyment, some fear; some instill
courage in hearers; some drug and beguile the soul with a kind of evil
persuasion.41
Gorgias’ connection between communication (logos) and pharmakon is not simply one
of healing, but of displacement. In the above passage, it is not that drugs and speech
change the soul or the body, rather, they alter the disposition of the soul or the body.
Aporetic rhetoric functions as a pharmaceutical by altering the state of our “souls,” or
cognition, through an act of displacement. When a medicine helps alleviate the
symptoms of a cold, the cold remains, but the symptoms are displaced. The cold is
“beguiled,” to flip Gorgias’ analogy. Alternatively, when a drug intoxicates our minds,
our ability to think and perceive remain, but are displaced by the effects of the drug.
Drugs are “mind-altering,” not “mind-changing.”
Aporetic rhetoric functions in debate in the same way that medicine displaces
symptoms or drugs alter minds. Deploying aporetic rhetoric does not close down,
eliminate, or settle disputes, it displaces them. For example, the claim that “more
research needs to be done” on a drug does not imply the drug is dangerous or not,
rather, it displaces questions of value. Thus, each chapter of this project will investigate
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how aporetic rhetoric is deployed in different healthcare settings. In these settings,
aporetic rhetoric is functioning pharmaceutically.
In Chapter 1, I use actor-network theory to examine how different organizations
and individuals leverage and resist uncertainty surrounding Agent Orange. Many
Vietnam Veterans were exposed to one of the most dangerous chemicals ever crafted
by human hands during the occupation of Vietnam. Furthermore, how, where, and to
what extent Agent Orange was used in Vietnam is largely uncertain. In this chapter, I
argue that the CDC and other governmental research agencies deploy spatial
uncertainty to cover their inability to determine the dangers of Agent Orange. In
addition, I explore how veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange have managed to
overcome these uncertainties and receive remuneration for their injuries.
In Chapter 2, I examine different forms of the anti-psychiatric movement.
Differentiating between mental illness skepticism and denialism, I suggest that what
separates these two rhetorical positions is their deployment of uncertainty. Mental
illness skeptics tends to undermine concepts of diagnostic objectivity, positivism, and
the stability of mental health categories, but denialists often avoid concrete evidence
and argument, instead opting to circumvent traditional argumentative strategies by
conflating hypotheticals with realities. Walking through different modes of mental
illness skepticism and denialism, I identify how different types of uncertainty lend
different characteristics to aporetic rhetoric.
Chapter 3 argues that the connection between design, affect, and uncertainty
impairs patient outcomes. Often eliciting negative emotional affects from patients, I
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suggest that the systems, structures, and designs that dominate patients’ experiences
with medical professionals alter their decision-making processes, leading them to
overestimate either risks or rewards in clinical settings. Using psychological research, I
make two central connections between uncertainty and patient experience design. First
is the “uncertainty intensification hypothesis,” which states that uncertainty during an
emotional experience makes unpleasant experiences more unpleasant, and pleasant
experiences more pleasant. Second is the “affect heuristic,” which posits that in
situations where someone possesses a positive emotional affect, it is much easier for
them to overlook high risks and low benefits. The opposite is also true. If someone has a
negative emotional affect, they are more likely to infer high risks and low benefits. Thus,
positive affects tend to push people to overlook the risks of uncertainty, while negative
affects tend to accentuate the risks of uncertainty. Both the uncertainty intensification
hypothesis and affect heuristic illustrate conditions in which aporetic rhetoric is
amplified. Since most healthcare experiences are neither positive nor pleasant, and
since many healthcare designs lead to patient uncertainty, the average patient
experience design prevents patients and physicians from maximizing the effectiveness
of healthcare decision-making.
Chapter 4 unpacks the debate over what counts as an addiction. Here, I argue
that the gap between theory and reality, especially as it pertains to human behaviors, is
a persistent form of uncertainty that haunts addiction science. Furthermore, how
addiction researchers engage with this uncertainty will alter the rhetorical efficacy of
their addiction theories. Expeditious addiction theories tend to manage, constrain, or
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“wrangle with” uncertainty. These theories are rhetorically functional because they are
comprehensible, easily tested, and allow quick categorization and rapid comparison.
Expeditious theories also tend to fall victim to counter-examples, tend to gloss over
specifics in their search for rigid categories, and tend to produce representations of
reality that are more intuitive than realistic. On the other hand, fastidious addiction
theories tend to embrace, precisely describe, or otherwise account for uncertainty.
These theories are rhetorically efficacious because they are exhaustive, applicable with
high levels of accuracy, and tend to draw on the strengths of multiple perspectives.
Fastidious theories are also unwieldy and difficult to explain. My central claim in this
chapter is that both theory-building strategies are rhetorically workable means of
managing uncertainty, but their efficacy is context-dependent.
Reaching the final conclusion of this project, I expand and elaborate on my claim
that aporetic rhetoric is a pharmaceutical. First, I turn the central argumentative thrust
of this project upside down, and instead of examining how aporetic rhetoric is
prominent in healthcare settings, unravel how healthcare is implicated in aporetic
rhetoric. Exploring rhetorical scholarship on the concept of pharmakon, I synthesize the
concept of pharmaceutical with each chapter, explaining how aporetic rhetoric’s effects
can be seen in a pharmaceutical light, since uncertainty displaces rather than settles
argument and debate. By way of conclusion, I argue that the implications of this claim
are two-fold. First, given the potency and efficaciousness of pharmaceutical rhetorics,
rhetorical scholarship should begin to examine sites besides aporetic rhetoric. Second,
healthcare theorists and practitioners need to assess the implications of viewing
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language and communication as indistinguishable from other drugs they administer. In
both cases, aporetic rhetoric becomes one example of a much wider universe of
pharmaceutical rhetorics, imbuing rhetoric and medicine with new and higher stakes.
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Chapter 1
Agent Orange and Aporetic Resistance
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1. The Deadliest Chemical on Earth
Its full name is 2,3,5,8-tetrachlorodibenzoparadioxin, or TCDD for short. The 55gallon shipping containers that contained TCDD had an orange ring painted around the
top edge, lending it the notorious moniker, “Agent Orange.” Of the 75 known forms of
dioxin, TCDD is the most toxic.1 Few chemicals on Earth are deadlier.
Continuing scientific research has demonstrated a range of diseases and
disorders connected with exposure to TCDD. Exposure increases risks of birth defects2
and has been conclusively linked to non-Hodgkins lymphoma,3 soft tissue sarcoma,4
chloracne,5 and other acneform diseases.6 Although the research is still preliminary,
exposure has also been linked to diabetes,7 prostate cancer,8 and endocrine disorders,
even at very low concentrations.9 TCDD was one of many “rainbow” herbicides liberally
sprayed over the jungles of Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s, each deriving
their names from the colored ring around the edge of their containers. Over 6 years of
the Vietnam war, 45 million liters of the substance was sprayed, and some estimates
suggest that roughly 10% of Vietnam was directly hit.10
Herbicide use in Vietnam was a military decision. The dense vegetation of
Southeast Asian jungles provided strategic cover for the revolutionary forces in Vietnam,
and the elimination of this tactical advantage benefited the more conventional warfare
used by the United States military. When herbicides did not work, the United States
used other chemical agents to modify the landscape, even igniting large areas of jungle
to make it easier to locate, track, and attack guerrilla forces. These operations were
ubiquitous failures. The dense canopy of the jungle refused to be destroyed. As Edwin
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Martini suggests, military commanders “treated the natural environment less as a
combatant to be destroyed than as an object to be pacified and, ultimately,
controlled.”11 However, even using most advanced military technologies the United
States could not control nature.
It is difficult to tell just how many individuals were exposed to TCDD. Personnel
in large bases located in cities received very little exposure, while those in defoliated
areas were exposed through a combination of direct and indirect methods, such as soil
contact, drinking water, or bathing. Importantly, there is a lack of understanding when it
comes to how defoliants traverse the environment. This makes determining how
personnel were exposed to TCDD almost impossible. Those who were most exposed to
TCDD were in direct contact with herbicides through the mixing, loading, spraying, or
clean-up activities associated with the chemical. This variety of dangerous encounters
with TCDD complicates scientific, medical, and legal questions pertaining to exposure.
The science behind Agent Orange remains unsettled, and this uncertainty poses
challenges for veterans suffering from the effects of exposure. In 1979 Public Law 96-15t
directed the Unites States Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to conduct
epidemiological studies of Agent Orange health effects, but was a massive failure.12
Researchers at the VA had to announce they were unable to perform the study because
of inadequate data. Congress then told the VA to turn over control of the study to the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Tens of millions of dollars and several years later, the
CDC reported that the military records available could not provide useful exposure data.
They determined that an epidemiological study of Agent Orange was simply infeasible.13
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A 1987 CDC study of dioxin levels in Vietnam veterans who served in heavily sprayed
regions, compared to those who did not serve in Vietnam, was unable to distinguish
between the two groups. However, veterans who were directly involved in Operation
Ranch Hand (the name of the defoliation operation) had negative health effects that
were proportionally distinguishable from other groups of veterans. By 1991, scientific
evidence conclusively linking a range of illnesses with Agent Orange exposure began to
emerge, thus prompting the creation of the Agent Orange Act, which has been the basis
for disability compensation for veterans. Nonetheless, many veterans succumbed to the
effects of Agent Orange exposure long before the Agent Orange Act, in part because of
the uncertainty surrounding its effects.
Following the institution of the Agent Orange Act, the VA began accepting claims
for disability based on exposure. Current VA regulations have a “reasonable doubt”
doctrine, meaning that the VA adjudicates each veteran’s claim individually and
determines if any illness or injury is more likely than not to be caused by the exposure.
In this system, a veteran’s claim must meet the following four criteria: 1) There is
credible evidence that the exposure involved is scientifically accepted as being
associated with their specific injury/illness, 2) there is evidence that the relevant
exposure happened during active military duty, 3) the illness or injury was initiated or
exacerbated during active duty, and 4) there is evidence of an unusually large or
prolonged exposure, demonstrating that it was at least as likely not to be the cause of
the illness or injury.14
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Veterans face significant problems trying to satisfy these four conditions. It can
be difficult or impossible for a veteran to marshal the evidence needed for exposure
occurring decades earlier, especially if the military misplaced their service records.
Before the widespread implementation of computer record-keeping, this posed a
serious problem. One veteran I spoke to for this chapter explained how easily his
records had been misplaced:
I had to go to Washington to talk to our legislators and congressmen and
everybody. I hand you the paper. You’re the clerk, you give it to the second in
charge, then he gets it to the ladies, whoever’s in charge. That’s four people
handling it. In case the clerk misplaces it, it’s in a file somewhere else. It’s not
computerized…I go down there now, she just gets my name in right on the
computer, pops up. Don’t have to look at no files. But before, I know they lost
my file the first time.
Before computerized record-keeping, document hand-off posed a problem for many
veterans applying for disability compensation from injuries sustained from Agent
Orange exposure. Even if their records made it through this complex system unharmed,
these veterans still faced other evidentiary hurdles. For example, evidence
demonstrating minimal exposure might be enough to argue that exposure relates to an
associated health problem, but not enough to clear the threshold of being at least as
likely as not to have been the cause, compared to all other possible causes (Brown,
2011).15 Mark Brown provides a useful example: A veteran who served for 2 years is
diagnosed with leukemia at age 50, and could have had as much as 30 years of exposure
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to benzene as a civilian.16 Because benzene is only a single and minor cause of leukemia
and because leukemia is not an uncommon disease, to prove that exposure to benzene
during military service was more likely than not to be the cause of their leukemia, this
veteran would need to prove an unusually large or prolonged period of benzene
exposure during military service. How this veteran would substantiate this claim is
unclear, nor is it clear what the threshold for “unusually large” exposure is. A veteran
can only bypass these criteria if they suffer from a “presumptive” service connection,
giving them the benefit of the doubt if they have a specific set of illnesses.
This network is rife with uncertainty. First, it is almost impossible to tell where
the US military sprayed Agent Orange, although researchers have made some noble
attempts at using geographic information systems to determine exposure
opportunities.17 Therefore, it is difficult to run experiments to determine exposure
effects when it is unclear how much exposure occurred, how long this exposure
occurred, or the way exposure occurred. Unlike other wartime injuries, many military
personnel are unaware of how their exposure took place, making first-hand accounts
highly speculative. This was the case for one veteran I talked with for this chapter:
It’s hard to say [how often I was exposed]. I’d say in 13 months, I’m guessing
they probably sprayed a couple, three times in the tour of duty I did. And now
whether they sprayed while we were on patrol or not, that I don’t know. That I
don’t remember.
Another veteran expressed the same uncertainty during our conversation for this
chapter:
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At the time, I didn’t even know what it was and you would think, as the
information officer, I would have had a clue, but they didn’t even tell me.
Veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange can usually piece together a rough
estimate of when and how they were exposed, but few are able to thoroughly
document the extent of their exposure.
In addition to these difficulties, because even basic information like flight
patterns for the planes that sprayed TCDD are spotty and slim at best, a strong scientific
basis for determining how much exposure produces negative health effects is difficult to
determine. Researchers continue to make progress on this front, but it remains
problematic to make credible determinations as to whether exposure or other factors
cause Agent Orange veterans’ health problems. Many exposed veterans are in their 50s
or 60s. Thus, it can be difficult to for researchers to ascertain whether health problems
like certain kinds of cancer are related to exposure or not, since this population is more
likely to face health problems in general. In other words, there are innumerable
confounding factors that make attempts to prove direct exposure difficult for many
veterans, especially faced with the intricate system in place for VA disability
compensation.

2. Aporetic Rhetoric and Spatial Uncertainty
This interconnected system of problems and uncertainties lends communicating
uncertainty as a rhetorical strategy a great deal of persuasive power. Both the VA and
the CDC use this strategy in the late 1970s through the 1980s when they argued that
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epidemiological studies were impossible to perform based on poor records, delaying
and further confounding researcher’s ability to draw sound conclusions. It was not until
research on veterans who were directly and frequently exposed to Agent Orange that
those affected were able to make any viable claims for damages. Those who were
indirectly exposed find themselves face-to-face with the presumption of doubt, a policy
that begins with the premise of uncertainty. Uncertainty with respect to exposure is
codified, systematized, and leveraged against the reality of veterans’ illnesses; the only
way to prove a causal link is through proving that their disease is “at least as likely as
not” to have been caused by exposure. Persistent delays, hang-ups, and outright failures
of exposure research have only raised hurdles to proving a connection between service
and sickness.
Uncertainty can help or hinder the ability for an individual, organization, or
community to make both make arguments and be persuasive. Importantly, I do not wish
to suggest that uncertainty is “bad” for rhetorical capacity in every case. On the
contrary, uncertainty’s role in shaping rhetoric is highly situational. Someone falsely
accused of a crime, for example, is relying on evidentiary uncertainty to persuade a jury
of reasonable doubt. Alternatively, prosecutors and police officers do everything in their
power to minimize uncertainty to maximize their rhetorical efficacy. The insight I wish to
draw out in this chapter is that uncertainty and rhetoric are intimately bound together,
that to better understand both uncertainty and rhetoric, we need to examine them side
by side. The vehicle for this argument is the spraying of Agent Orange in Vietnam,
because this situation is so deeply entrenched in unusual and complex dimensions of
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spatial uncertainty, or uncertainty about where an event occurred. This is also a good
case study for better understanding how subjects can specifically resist the rhetorically
limiting capacity of uncertainty in medical situations. I wish to illustrate how uncertainty
plays a major role in shaping rhetorical capacity by tapping into second generation
activity theory.
To achieve this goal, I interviewed veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange,
or as I refer to them in this chapter, “Agent Orange veterans.” The interviews used in
this chapter were conducted at a Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) post, and participants
were asked a series of questions about their service, when they believe they were
exposed to Agent Orange, what their experience with the VA has been like, and how
they generally view their service in the United States military. I interviewed five
veterans, and their interviews ranged in length from ten minutes to thirty minutes. Of
the veterans interviewed, the majority reported negative health consequences from
exposure, but not all interviewed veterans experienced health problems related to
exposure to Agent Orange. However, all the research participants could recall when
they first saw Agent Orange being sprayed, or when they first learned of the dangers
associated with exposure, even if they faced no personal negative health repercussions.
In other words, every veteran interviewed had experience with Agent Orange and its
effects. The relationship between these veterans and Agent Orange is a complex set of
uncertain circumstances.
From an aporetic perspective, this chapter probes how Agent Oranges veterans
contend with a series of increasingly uncertain circumstances and aporetic tactics on the
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part of the VA. Barriers to filing a disability claim with the VA stem from the sheer
unpredictability of Agent Orange use during Vietnam. Because there is so much
uncertainty surrounding its use, it is difficult to tell how much exposure produces
negative health consequences. Because it is difficult to tell how much exposure leads to
negative health consequences, it was difficult for government researchers to make any
determination about Agent Orange exposure. Because it took these researchers so long
to discover they could not make any determination, Agent Orange veterans began to
age and succumb to illnesses, injecting the situation with more uncertainty. This was the
case with one veteran I spoke to, who felt the effects of Agent Orange at a young age
despite being otherwise healthy:
I started having heart problems in my late 20s, and I’m going, ‘This isn’t right.’
And then I had a heart attack when I was 34, and I knew that wasn’t right then. I
was a very fit young man playing competitive tennis… and I did a lot of white
watering, but I was always having these pains that I wasn’t sure what they were.
And then finally I was at my parent’s place, it was a couple of days after
Christmas in 1979, when I just felt like someone parked a Chevy Nova on my
chest or something like that and I’m lying on the couch… they ran blood tests
and found the blood enzymes and said, ‘You had a coronary.’ From then on, it’s
been downhill.
Unlike this veteran, who has survived multiple serious health consequences from
exposure, many Agent Orange veterans have passed away. One after another, more
levels of uncertainty compound this situation, stifling the rhetorical capacity of Agent
43

Orange veterans while providing governmental agencies an aporetic basis for denying
remuneration for damages.
Uncertainty derived from the haphazard spraying of herbicide over Southeast
Asia has affected rhetorical capacity more than any discursive element of this situation.
This is a situation defined by a haphazard activity, using what was a poorly understood
chemical at the time, on a population who had no idea what they were encountering.
Once we learned what TCDD was capable of it opened the door for Agent Orange
veterans to seek a corrective for their exposure. However, spatial uncertainty – who was
sprayed, how much they were sprayed, when they were sprayed – haunts this
endeavor. As I will argue, only the community of fellow Agent Orange veterans, enabled
by their communities as well as the advocacy and high-rapport characteristics of the
VFW, offers a means of countering these aporetic difficulties.

3. Mapping Agent Orange Veterans Using Activity Theory
Activity theory centers analysis on activity as opposed to subjects or objects,
making it a useful tool for unraveling complex situations. As Victor Kaptelinin and
Bonnie Nardi define it, activity theory is “an approach in psychology and other social
sciences to understand individual human beings, as well as the social entities they
compose, in their natural everyday life circumstances, through an analysis of the
genesis, structure, and processes of their activities.”18 In other words, activity theory is
an approach that centers on how subjects purposefully interact with the world around
them. Rather than center analysis on individual beliefs, ideas, or feelings, or on how an
individual directs these psychological features towards an objective, activity theory
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works around the subject-object dichotomy by placing activity as the most basic
category. In fact, activity theory posits that no properties of subjects or objects exist
outside of activities.19 Using this framework, activities are always the first point of
reference used to analyze a situation.
Approaching uncertainty from the perspective of activity theory provides a view
of how uncertainty works, as opposed to simply what it is and how much of it an
individual has. It is tempting to suggest that uncertainty is merely epistemological, a
matter of pure cognition. It would be relatively straightforward to assess how much
veterans exposed to Agent Orange know about their condition, or when and how they
were exposed. A trickier task is ascertaining the necessary preconditions for that
uncertainty to flourish in the first place. By understanding how these conditions flourish
and how people or organizations use or resist these conditions, we stand to gain a much
deeper understanding of uncertainty than measuring it as a static, binary yes/no
proposition. Thankfully, Yrjö Engström’s activity systems model is available to address
the complex ways in which activities unfold, and is an invaluable resource for capturing
a relatively unexplored dimension of uncertainty.20 Engström’s activity system model is
a useful point of departure for beginning to unravel how uncertainty influences multiple
dimensions of activity, in our case, veterans exposed to Agent Orange and their
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subsequent search for a corrective for themselves, their friends, and their comrades. I
have recreated the basic elements of Engström’s activity system model in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 – Activity Systems Model
The “subject” refers to the person or people involved in an activity. Since I am
analyzing how Agent Orange veterans manage uncertainty with respect to exposure, my
subject in this model would be veterans who were exposed, construed broadly, to the
chemical. We could just as easily fill the “subject” area in with the doctors who diagnose
these veterans, the nurses who treat them at the VA, or any other subjects implicated in
this situation. Doing so would dramatically change the structure of our activity system
model. Importantly, how we select the subject in this model is an influential aspect of
using activity theory, and is as important as selecting how we begin filling in the above
model. For example, doctors and nurses participate in different communities, different
divisions of labor, and have different objectives and goals than veterans. Hence, as I fill
in the components of this model it is important to know that Agent Orange veterans are
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both the central foci and the starting point from which all other dimensions of the
model derive. They were the primary focus of my interviews.
The “object” refers to what connects individual actions to a wider activity, but is
perhaps best interpreted as the “objective.”21 The objective is essentially the motive
behind the activity under investigation. In our case, the objective that drives veterans
exposed to Agent Orange varies from person to person. Some of the interviewed
veterans expressed a desire to receive disability compensation for their injuries, since
they can no longer work due to the health effects of exposure. Others expressed
concerns about how their exposure would affect their childrens’ health:
I think it’s unconscionable that they exposed us to that, and then for years,
denied that it was a problem. In fact, it was a big problem. I think some poor
people, genetically, are even passing some of that stuff on to their offspring, the
problems they had with Agent Orange. I think, like I said, it’s unconscionable the
way the government treated us as far as that goes.
One veteran who had no negative health repercussions from exposure expressed the
same sentiment:
As you start to get older, you start to think, ‘Is this really something?’ Because
you have children and it can affect children. And it doesn’t have to be first
generation. It’s second generation is also affected. And now, you think about it
and you think, ‘Will any my grandchildren be affected?’ And I think, you know
what? It plays on your mind…

47

This group of veterans do not necessarily engage with the same end-goal as those who
suffered directly from exposure, but their community involvement lends them similar
broad desires, mainly, that Vietnam veterans are treated with fairness and justice by the
United States government. The objective of their activity is seeking a corrective for the
government’s wrongdoing. One Veteran I interviewed expressed his views of this
wrongdoing explicitly:
I’m a bit upset about all the readings that I’ve done, that have shown that there
was some knowledge at the very beginning before they even sprayed that shit,
that it could be harmful to people coming in contact with it. And that’s tough to
swallow, that they knew. If they thought that there was no damage after it dried
up and defoliated, then you can understand that, maybe they didn’t know. But
to shove people like me and others into a jungle hours after they sprayed, I don’t
think that was right.
This Agent Orange veteran suffered from the health effects of Agent Orange exposure,
and sought remuneration because he was unable to work. In other cases, seeking a
corrective for wrongdoing simply takes the form of encouraging fellow veterans to apply
for disability compensation. Therefore, the outcome of this corrective will vary from
case to case, but based on my interviews with these veterans, the notion that the Unites
States government should “right their wrong” was a common theme.
We can characterize “mediating artifacts” as “tools,” or the means that people
use to address the objective of an activity. In this case, the tools used to achieve the
objective are modes of communication and argumentation. Some veterans became
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aware of exposure through friends who also served. One veteran I talked to heard about
Agent Orange from his next-door neighbor, who in turn had read about disability
compensation through a newsletter:
My next-door neighbor here, he was with an infantry unit, but he was also a
company clerk. We were there at the same time, relatively close in area where
we were in country. He says, ‘Have you gotten anything from the VA about Agent
Orange?’ I said ‘No?’ I said, ‘Why?’ He says, ‘I get a newsletter every once in a
while.’ And so, he showed me what it was and I said, ‘That’s interesting.’
Others performed their own independent research, examining documents that describe
the health effects of Agent Orange. Some simply read the VA newsletter, which
provided updated information for veterans. Additionally, we can consider the systems in
place for processing disability to be “mediating artifacts” in some respects, since the VA
requires veterans to use specific mediums and tools to make their claim or appeal a
denial for remuneration. The specific artifacts within this system include written
statements, photographs, service records, and oral testimony. Agent Orange veterans
use a wide variety of formal and informal written and oral communication techniques to
achieve their objectives.
Rules, which we can characterize as the formal and informal guidelines or norms
that guide activities, severely complicate how Agent Orange veterans try to seek a
corrective. For instance, the Agent Orange Act only applies to veterans who were in a
“combat zone,” which includes Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and surrounding coastal
waters. Thailand, where bases in Korat, Ubon, and U-Tapao experienced ground attacks
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and were involved in Operation Ranch Hand, is curiously absent from this list. Thus,
veterans stationed in Thailand who were exposed to Agent Orange were only able to
apply for disability for their exposure after the declassification of the Contemporary
Historical Examination of Current Operations (CHECO) report for Southeast Asia in 2010.
The CHECO report was the first admittance by the government that defoliation
chemicals had been sprayed outside of the designated combat zone. Other regulations
include specified “levels” of disabilities based on a labyrinthian set of criteria. For
example, chloracne (a presumptive condition of exposure to Agent Orange) disability
compensation is less if the skin disease is not prevalent on the face and neck.
Regulations are a critical dimension of this activity system, and complicate the
relationship between Agent Orange veterans and their pursuit of justice.
We can characterize the division of labor as the different roles or jobs that
compartmentalize and fragment the activity system. In this case, veterans who were
exposed to Agent Orange occupied different roles during their service, which we might
initially assume would significantly change their likelihood of exposure. However, based
on my interviews of Agent Orange veterans it is difficult to suggest that any one
position, role, or duty exempted a veteran from exposure. From officers to “grunts,”
exposure to Agent Orange seems to have affected a wide variety of veterans. However,
those who directly handled the substance were most likely to have deleterious health
consequences because of their exposure. Additionally, veterans who assumed
responsibilities in dense vegetation or on base perimeters were far more likely to be
exposed as well, because troop movement would be significantly hindered or bases
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would be more vulnerable to covert operations by the Viet Cong unless these areas
were defoliated. In any case, specific military roles are not causally linked to mere
exposure, but there does seem to be an association between the type of job one held
and the extent of exposure. Hence, the division of labor in the military is an important
dimension for better understanding this activity network.
The final component of the activity theory model is community. Communities
are one of the most important dimensions of this activity network, an argument we will
return to later in this chapter. The most notable characteristic of community in an
activity model is that it is emic as opposed to etic. A distinction first made by
anthropologist Kenneth Pike in the 1960s, an etic community is defined by qualities that
are outside the cultural or social activity of that group. Demographic criteria, for
instance, are etic because most communities do not organize themselves into
behavioral units that match these characteristics. In contrast, emic criteria are based on
social interactions in cultural contexts. Since activity theory is all about purposeful
activity, we can better understand the communities implicated in an activity network if
we take an emic as opposed to etic approach. The veterans interviewed for this chapter
belong to a community not merely defined by their status as veterans, but by their
participation in the local VFW post, where they exchange information, discuss current
affairs, and self-organize for geographic, cultural, and social reasons. An alternative
method of gathering data on Agent Orange veterans could consist of sending out a
survey to assess what Agent Orange veterans think about their exposure. However, the
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data gathered from this method will not be able to capture the emic dimensions of
community that are invaluable for understanding actual activity.
Now that we have a grasp on this activity network, we can assess how
uncertainty is rhetorically implicated in various dimensions of the activity model. To do
so, I have modified Engström’s original model slightly, while overlaying a way of visually
representing the aspects of the activity system that both stymy or amplify rhetorical
capacity. I call this a “rhetorical” activity model not only because this chapter is about
rhetoric, but also because rhetoric always already implicates activity. Since activity
theory is all about purposeful activity, and we would be hard-pressed to come up with
an example of purposeful activity not driven by some form of rhetorical activity,
emphasizing the rhetorical dimension of activity is a logical extension of Engström’s
original model. Uncertainty is also an essential component of rhetorical situations, so
mapping how uncertainty shapes rhetorical activity is an appropriate way to assess the
conditions of rhetorical capacity in an activity. In addition to these changes, one major
addition I have made is the inclusion of connections between rules, division of labor,
and mediating artifacts. The lack of these connections is one major drawback in
Engström’s original model. Visually, this revised model looks like the circumscribed
triangle in Figure 1.2. Finally, I have plugged in rough descriptions of the components of
the activity system described above. The best way to read Figure 1.2 is to begin with the
Agent Orange veterans and trace out different paths to the outcome. To ameliorate the
sheer complexity of this model, we will examine each of the three uncertainty valences,
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synthesizing interview data and other modes of research to better explain which factors
increase, decrease, or do not affect the aporetic dimensions of this activity system.

Figure 1.2 – Rhetorical Activity Network

4. Rhetorically Limiting Activity Network
Figure 1.3 highlights areas of this activity network that limit Agent Orange
veterans’ rhetorical capacity. Or, these are the areas that increase the capacity for
organizations or individuals to use aporetic rhetoric. However, if we began with a
different subject (such as the CDC or VA), we could completely invert these pathways.
Uncertainty can be a problematic feature of any activity system, but organizations or
individuals can also use uncertainty to help achieve an objective, depending on what
that objective is. For instance, if the goal of the United States military is to minimize the
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amount of compensation dispensed to veterans affected by Agent Orange, complicated
regulations, highly technical filing procedures, or even how aging confounds
associations between exposure and health difficulties all present aporetically useful
uncertainties for adjudicating individual veteran’s cases. As mentioned above, how we
position the elements of an activity network profoundly affect its composition. We will
now examine the rhetorically limiting model in greater detail, beginning with the
connection between Agent Orange veterans and the division of labor.

Figure 1.3 – Rhetorical Activity Network (limiting)
Today, the division of labor in the United States military is largely based on
educational performance, both at the enlisted and officer level. However, because of
the draft the makeup and division of labor during the Vietnam war took on a different
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pattern of organization. Aptitudes were as much a part of the process as informal
knowledge or chance. For instance, one interviewed veteran originally intended to work
on a tank crew, but decided to switch to a job more suitable for long-term enlistment:
“I’m gonna make a career of this,” he explained, “I gotta last 10 years… I can’t be in the
boondocks.” He followed the advice of a friend who worked in personnel, who
suggested he go to school for medical supply. A second veteran with some college
education became an information officer due to a specialization in intelligence. Another
veteran was fresh out of high school and taking data processing classes when he was
drafted. On his aptitude test he scored unusually high on the aviation portion of the
exam after recalling a comic book from his childhood about World War II fighter planes:
When I was a kid back in the 50s, I read a comic book about a World War II
British fighter that was shot to hell and back over France. Each little frame in that
comic book showed his instrument panel. So when I saw them in front of me at
that aptitude test, that was it, I knew what it was saying. When I came out of the
room, the guy said ‘How many hours you got flying?’ And I said, ‘Well does it
count that my grandfather put me on an airplane from Cleveland to Pittsburgh
when I was seven years old?’
This veteran went on to become a helicopter pilot.
The first and third veteran had little higher education experience, while the
second had some college. The first veteran suffered a stroke, the second, a heart attack
in his early thirties, and the third was relatively healthy. Exposure to Agent Orange
affected a range of military personnel, from those in seemingly “safe” jobs like being a
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medical supply officer, or those in positions of rank like the information officer, to those
who simply did well on an aptitude exam or those with perimeter defense jobs. Despite
the difference in education, aptitude, or job duty, all the interviewed veterans had some
experience with Agent Orange. For instance, the pilot who was unaffected by exposure
explained his first encounter with the substance:
I was an aircraft commander, and they stuck some booms on the side of my
aircraft. I didn’t know what it was all about, and I asked them, I said, ‘What’s in
that big barrel?’ Or whatever they used. And they said, ‘Agent Orange.’ And I
didn’t know a damn thing about Agent Orange… And my gunner and crew chief
would’ve gotten the bulk of it on them, because we didn’t fly with the doors on
the cargo bays… And so the wind stream would blow right in on them. I know
they had to be coated with that shit.
Because of his physical positioning in the helicopter, this veteran was relatively
unexposed to Agent Orange. His fellow comrades on the helicopter fared worse due to
the design of the aircraft, which allowed Agent Orange to enter the fuselage. Despite
their proximity, both in station and duty, the mere design of the aircraft played a larger
than expected role in terms of exposure.
The information officer describes a different scene from the ground, where he
first encountered Agent Orange:
I went in and we were let off the helicopters. They didn’t have any landing zones
because of the canopies, so we repelled in off the sides of choppers and got
down there and were walking around and all this stuff is dripping down off the
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leaves, and so at first, I just thought it was rain or whatever and, until you
started feeling it, it was oily. It was Agent Orange. They had sprayed it there
before we got there, and then dropped us in on it…
In contrast to the pilot, this veteran was exposed because of the environmental features
of Southeast Asia, which did not lend themselves to landing zones. Regardless of his
rank, this veteran was exposed to vast quantities of Agent Orange, literally “dripping
down off the leaves” so heavily that he mistook it for jungle rainwater. Because of the
widespread and somewhat unpredictable nature of how Agent Orange was sprayed, this
veteran was exposed despite his relative rank. Stationed on a river patrol boat, another
interviewed veteran describes his run-in with the notorious chemical:
Our job was to stop and search sand pans, moving contraband down the rivers,
part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. But most of the problems we had with combat
were from the villages along the river. So what they did, is they did a lot of
spraying along the river banks. They could spray one day and you could come by
about three days later and everything was dead.
This veteran also suffered from the negative health effects of exposure, although these
health problems had only appeared recently. Of the veterans mentioned in this section,
only the pilot had no negative health repercussions. The sheer uncertainty and
haphazard nature of spraying Agent Orange therefore complicates and obscures any
correlation we might draw between rank or duty and exposure.
However, the jobs that Agent Orange veterans hold also interact in impactful
ways with rules and regulations. The VA classifies veterans who were directly in contact
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with Agent Orange, such as those who handled the barrels, sprayed the chemical, or
were perimeter guards, as having jobs that increase the likelihood of health effects from
exposure. My father, who was exposed to Agent Orange in Thailand, was an aircraft
mechanic and therefore had no clear direct interaction with the substance. However, he
believes that his exposure came from Agent Orange runoff in the river near his base.
Often, soldiers would pay local villagers to wash their clothes in the rivers, as it was
cheaper than having them washed on base. Planes spraying the substance
contaminated these rivers. The location of his chloracne would support this conclusion.
However, because of his job and his placement in Thailand, his exposure to Agent
Orange was difficult to substantiate based on VA regulations.
Randomness is inevitably involved in the association between job duty and
chance of exposure, but the VA regulations in place complicate and exacerbate
uncertainty in this activity network. By delineating that certain jobs are more likely to
receive exposure than others, VA regulations successfully ignore the randomness of
exposure, aporetically deploying this uncertainty to make it more difficult for veterans
to file a disability claim. In some respects, this is an understandable way to limit “false
positives,” or veterans who have illnesses associated with exposure to Agent Orange but
little evidence directly connecting their illness to exposure. In fact, one interviewee
noted how he believed these regulations were justified:
I think now, they make you go through hoops as far as applying for [disability],
but I’m not really upset about that ‘cause I don’t think that they should just start
throwing money around just ‘cause someone said they did something.
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Although the goal of Agent Orange veterans may be to seek a corrective for exposure,
the notion that the United States government should more liberally remunerate
veterans was not evident. At least in the case of the veteran quoted above, regulations
were more useful than a hindrance. Deservedness plays a vital role in the relationship
between subject and object in this activity network.
In fact, despite the hurdles that VA regulations pose, all the interviewees who
discussed the VA expressed positive sentiments. One veteran expressed his appreciation
for several recent changes to the VA:
The one that really stands out to me is, if you go to the VA for whatever, eyes,
ears, throat, some kind of illness, and you can’t get an appointment for 30 days,
you can go to another doctor, a civilian doctor, and the VA will pay for that claim.
That was good… And then, another one that was good was, if you live 40 miles
from a medical facility, A VA, you can go to a civilian which is closer in your town.
Based on this Agent Orange veteran’s experience, the VA’s increasing attention to
flexibility and convenience was viewed very positively. Another veteran was overall
satisfied with the VA process:
The VA’s been, for the most part, pretty good to me, and in all instances. They’re
a little slow in some things and you run into some people that just go through
the motions, but for the most part, I think 95% of them are good people and
mean well.”
A third veteran, despite a series of unfortunate experiences with the VA unrelated to
exposure to Agent Orange, thought highly of them:
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The [local] VA I think is a pretty good facility. I don’t know that anybody has any
real complaints about it… My wife has a bigger reservation about me going there
than myself. Her feeling is that there’s better medical care than the VA and I
said, “I don’t know about that.”
Despite how VA regulations may complicate the ability for Agent Orange veterans, views
expressed on local VA facilities, doctors, and treatments were overwhelmingly positive.
The final component of this rhetorical activity network affected by uncertainty
are mediating artifacts, in this case, the written and oral arguments that veterans use to
achieve their objectives. Looking carefully at Figure 1.3, notice the line between written,
oral, and visual arguments and seeking a corrective for Agent Orange exposure remains
rhetorically neutral, even though the activity in this location is marked as “limiting.” This
seeming contradiction is a result of the difference between formal and informal modes
of communication. Formal means of applying for disability often require evidence that is
hard to acquire, appeals processes that are long and complex, and rules that make selfrepresentation or non-technical appeals difficult. On the other hand, many of the
interviewees explained how they sought remuneration because of informal arguments
made by their family members or fellow veterans, which we will revisit later. Rules and
regulations diminish the effectiveness of Agent Orange veterans’ appeals using written,
oral, and visual arguments. However, with respect to wider community, these same
modes of arguments increase the likelihood that a veteran follows through on the
objective. Like other nodes in this activity network, the uncertainty that underlies
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written, oral, and visual arguments has mixed effects on the capacity for Agent Orange
veterans to seek a corrective for Agent Orange exposure.
Overall, the factors that most impact Agent Orange veterans’ rhetorical capacity
are VA regulations and job duties. Combined, these two factors significantly impact
uncertainty in this rhetorical activity network. Because VA regulations and disability
compensation are dependent on the different jobs that Agent Orange veterans held,
Agent Orange veterans who do not fit the pre-conceived connections drawn between
their jobs and their exposure face rhetorical difficulties. Despite the uncertainty
surrounding who was exposed, how much exposure is detrimental, or which health
effects are caused by Agent Orange, VA regulations nonetheless impose certain
restrictions that overlook this fundamental uncertainty. Overlooking uncertainty in this
way is a powerful aporetic strategy. The VA can effectively respond to veterans who do
not fit their preconceived notion of the relationship between job duty and exposure
likelihood with the aporetic claim: “You did not have a job where you were likely
exposed to Agent Orange, therefore your illness is not related to exposure.”
This is the argument my father received when I helped him file his VA claim for
disability. He received compensation for one of his conditions, chloracne, because it was
presumptive. However, he was denied compensation for his diabetes, another condition
associated with exposure. In the VA’s determination, because his job was not one likely
to be exposed, his diabetes was not caused by exposure, even though his chloracne was
already determined to be associated with exposure. You can imagine the frustration
that he and many others who contend with the VA’s rhetorical strategy must feel
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towards these aporetic tactics. Perhaps most interestingly, however, is how little these
regulations seemed to bother the veterans I interviewed. Despite knowing that adhering
to VA regulations was like “jumping through hoops,” no veteran complained about the
process. The lesson we can draw from this reaction is intriguing. The perception of
limited rhetorical capacity is not necessarily negative. Given the right conditions,
individuals can view the impositions of rhetorical limitations as completely justified.
Hence, no veterans that I interviewed called for changes in VA regulations in any way,
despite the rhetorical challenges these regulations pose.

5. Rhetorically Amplifying/Neutral Activity Network
Before examining the rhetorically amplifying effects found in this activity
network, I would like to briefly explain the rationale behind rhetorically neutral
connections. There were two major reasons I opted to label an interaction in my model
“neutral.” First, if there were conflicting forces at play, like the example of mediating
artifacts discussed above, then the resulting activity is rhetorically “neutral” because
there are both limiting and amplifying effects at work. This is the case between the rules
and the objectives in this activity system. VA regulations confound the ability for Agent
Orange veterans to seek a corrective for their exposure, but there is evidence that
fellow veterans served as a “check” on one another. In nearly half of my interviews,
Agent Orange veterans became aware of official filing announcements or were
encouraged to file from other Vietnam veterans. One Agent Orange veteran filed after
discussing it with a fellow veteran:
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I was telling [about filing] to another veteran friend of mine. He was a classmate
of mine in high school…We were over there at the same time, actually. And he
was telling me that he was gonna file for it too, ‘cause he was having problems,
and he was really fit. We couldn’t figure out what the hell was wrong with us,
but he filed and I said ‘I’ll file too,’ and then I went through the process. You
apply, they deny you, you appeal it.
This Agent Orange veteran’s friend did not mitigate the uncertainty involved in filing for
a claim. However, both veterans were uncertain what had caused their health problems,
and after hearing that his old friend was filing, this Agent Orange veteran decided to
follow through with the filing process. Thus, the community amplified his rhetorical
capacity by encouraging him to file in the first place.
The second reason behind a “neutral” designation is that some connections
lacked any identifiable underlying uncertainty. There was no detectable uncertainty
around whether Agent Orange was sprayed during Vietnam, no question that exposure
to Agent Orange has demonstrable negative health outcomes, and no debate over
whether exposing thousands of veterans to a highly toxic chemical is wrong.22 The
uncertainty in this activity network pertains to identifying which veterans have health
problems because of exposure, what duration or quantity of exposure causes health
problems, or which health problems are caused by exposure. Consequently, uncertainty
does not directly affect the rhetorical relationship between the subject and objective.
The government has admitted fault, and the danger of Agent Orange is indisputable.
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With these clarifications in mind, we can now turn to examining how different
components of this activity system amplify Agent Orange veterans’ rhetorical capacity.
Figure 1.4 below highlights those areas of this activity network where amplification of
rhetorical capacity or rhetorically neutral connections exist. The first noticeable feature
of Figure 1.4 is how much community affects Agent Orange veterans’ rhetorical
capacity. In the interviews I conducted, one of the central and overarching themes was
how much support and information flowed through local interactions with other
veterans. Cross-generational interactions reinforce this effect.

Figure 1.4 – Rhetorical Activity Network (amplifying)
At the time, the public disparaged, physically insulted, or otherwise criticized
Vietnam veterans for their service. Few of the veterans I interviewed openly discussed
their treatment by the public, except for one, who did broach the subject:
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It’s funny because my son, he’ll tell me they were going some place and
someone bought them their meal. I said, ‘Really? You’re kidding.’ I feel that what
people are doing now [for veterans], they’re either Vietnam vets doing it
because they know what it is or it’s the people that know that they were wrong
in how they treated the Vietnam vets. It wasn’t our choice at the time. At the
time, everybody was all wrapped up into one ball and we were all bad. Didn’t
matter what you did, you could have been a medic, you could have saved lives, it
didn’t matter…I know that in talking to friends that were there, they don’t even
wanna talk about how they were treated. It brings up bad feelings.
Several of the veterans I interview were also relatively uninvolved in the VFW until their
children, often veterans of Desert Storm, the Iraq war, or the Afghanistan war,
encouraged them to become more involved. This was the case for one veteran I spoke
to, whose son encouraged him to go to the VA and file for disability very recently:
Everyone [at the VFW] urged me and people urged me, so I finally about eight
months ago registered and got in the VA system and got my card. I didn’t even
have a card. My Son who’s an Iraqi veteran just kept hammering at me, saying,
‘Come on Dad. What are you nuts?’ And he’s probably right because I think… I
always think that veterans that were exposed to Agent Orange, I think we’re all
just ticking time bombs.
These veterans’ connections to their fellow soldiers were weakened by public
sentiment immediately following the conflict, but their re-involvement in the
community seems to have shifted in part because of the change in public attitudes
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towards veterans, and in part because of their interactions with younger veterans. The
dispute over United States involvement in Vietnam was inseparable from the soldiers
who participated in the conflict, they were “all wrapped up into one ball,” very unlike
post- 9/11 opinions towards military service, when service and soldier became
conceptually separable. The Agent Orange act was passed in the early 1990s, which
coincides with when some of these veterans were beginning to “rediscover” their
community of fellow veterans, often motivated by their children’s involvement in
overseas conflicts. It is not altogether shocking that the VFW would serve this sort of
purpose, as historically, it has functioned as both a formal and informal site for veteran
community, advocacy, and policy-making.
Formally, the VFW and other veterans’ services organizations like the American
Legion, the Disabled American Veterans, and the American Veterans have long served as
advocates for legislative activities and health policies, although their influence has
waned in recent years.23 As Jahnke et al. explain, there is current concern over the lack
of leadership among veterans service organizations. They cite four primary reasons for
this lack of leadership: 1) a decrease in the number of World War II veterans, who were
very active in policy-making, 2) limited involvement of recently discharged veterans
because of lack of interest, resources, or leadership, 3) limited definitions of veterans’
status or disagreement over who “counts” has having served in a war or conflict, and 4),
the increasing push for privatization of veterans’ benefits programs. 24 Despite these
challenges, many veterans service organizations remain nonetheless legislatively active
on health issues. Performing a meta-analysis of legislative priorities across all the major
66

veterans services organizations, Jahnke et al. found that 65% of these organizations
address the topic of disability benefits and pay for veterans.25
The VFW where I conducted my interviews was actively involved in these goals,
like all VFWs. With over 1.7 million members, the VFW is one of the largest veterans
services organization active in the United States. Through their legislative efforts, $7
billion have been recouped from the VA in earned benefits, and efforts on the part of
the VFW helped 116,791 veterans submit new VA claims in 2016 alone.26 In other
words, the VFW is an invaluable formal asset for Agent Orange veterans seeking a
corrective for their exposure, especially if they suffer from negative health
consequences.
Informally, based on my experience conducting interviews within a VFW and
from what the interviews revealed, spaces like the VFW offer a unique opportunity for
veterans to share health information and support one another. The VFW I attended was
quite active, based on the number of people at the bar and those who had decided to
eat dinner in the surrounding booths. Walking in, the first visible space you encounter is
for drinking, smoking, and eating, in order of how likely each activity was, based on my
observations. As I briefly discuss in chapter 4, throughout history, alcohol and tobacco
have helped create and sustain shared spaces of community interaction. The VFW is no
exception. Additionally, the room where I conducted the interviews served a very
different, yet parallel purpose. In it, historical maps and images crowded almost every
inch of the walls, each depicting or honoring veterans who have served overseas. In this
space, there was a large meeting table with upholstered leather chairs all around it,
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probably used for small meetings. The table was located near the front of the room, and
the rest of the room was crammed with old chairs, all facing the large table. Part
archive, part meeting room, part forum, this space could have easily served multiple
communicative functions for Agent Orange veterans. From a purely environmental
standpoint, the VFW I observed seemed to maximize the conditions of communication
and community for veterans. Therefore, Figure 1.4 illustrates rhetorically amplifying
connections between community and almost every other aspect of the rhetorical
activity network.
The VFW acts as reinforcement for rapport, encouraging veterans who may have
no direct experience with Agent Orange to nonetheless act as conduits for the flow of
important health information. Examined closely in criminal justice and medical settings,
rapport is a type of communication that emerges from conditions of empathy and
mutual understanding. Revealing information about oneself, making jokes, using active
listening, and demonstrating general interest in the speaker are all techniques used to
build rapport.
Psychological research on rapport-building between investigators and witnesses
has been fruitful in helping to better unpack rapport’s effects. For example, Jonathan
Vallano and Nadja Schreiber Compo found that rapport-building improved the quality of
cooperative adult witness’s recollection of events, reduced the percentage of incorrect
details reported, and mitigated the susceptibility to post-event misinformation.27
Additionally, intelligence operatives and law enforcement both use rapport for
interrogation purposes. In the U.S. Intelligence Interrogation Field Manual, rapport68

building is one of three common features of all interrogation approaches, alongside
establishing and maintaining control over the interrogation and manipulating the
source’s emotions and weaknesses to gain cooperation.28 In law enforcement, the Reid
Technique is one of the most widely used set of interrogation approaches, and
encourages law enforcement to use rapport-building as a component of the “nonaccusatory question and answer section,” or the Behavioral Analysis Interview.29
Military and law enforcement officials use the rhetorical effects of rapport to elicit
information from both cooperative and resistant individuals.
In health settings, researchers have studied how rapport can alter the
relationship between healthcare providers and patients. Judith Hall et al. found a
correlation between rapport and better scores on patient-centered interviewing, a more
fluent speech style, less anxiety, more dominance, and more self-confidence for
physicians in training.30 Jonathan Tandos and Arthur Stukas found that psychotherapists
who used rapport and were “primed” for an expected diagnosis of depression, led
clients to act significantly more depressed than when a depression expectation was
absent.31 In the no-expectation condition, Tandos and Stukas hypothesize that
therapists told to use rapport-building somewhat abandoned attempts to diagnose their
clients, thus eliciting more typical, undepressed behavior. In the expectation condition,
Tandows and Stukas suggest that efforts to build rapport might focus on the
expectation, “perhaps in an attempt to show clients that they do understand them,
which may constrain and influence client responses in an expectation-confirming
direction.”32 Tandos and Stukas’s study shows that rapport is affected by, and affects
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according to, expectations held by those engaging in rapport. In both the research of
Hall et al. and Tandos and Stukas, rapport-building shows profoundly rhetorical effects.
Thus, environments that support, encourage, or lend themselves to rapport-building will
alter the rhetorical capacity of people who are in these environments. The VFW is one
such “high-rapport space.”
The VFW I visited functions as a high-rapport space because it amplifies the
conditions of communication. Alcohol has mixed effects on social interaction, therefore,
drinking alcohol is not solely responsible for high-rapport spaces.33 However, drinking is
a socially-inflected activity with a strong association to shared spaces, thus lending the
VFW a meaningful function outside of communication. Eating food, also a sociallyinflected activity laden with communitarian undercurrents, lends the VFW a dimension
that encourages the community to enter this space. Because the VFW is a private club,
state laws on smoking tobacco indoors do not apply, thus providing those who smoke
an opportunity they would otherwise not receive in similar spaces. Combined with the
deep respect that veterans hold towards one another, the veneration that veterans now
hold in the collective imagination of the average United States citizen, and the
commiseration very clearly on display at the VFW I visited, this space encourages
rapport, “chit-chat,” and other “vernacular” modes of communication, thus amplifying
the rhetorical capacity of Agent Orange veterans.
In addition, health concerns are exactly the kind of information that will be more
easily communicated in high-rapport spaces as opposed to more formal settings,
especially given this conglomeration of factors, both formal and informal, that
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characterize the VFW. Several of the veterans I interviewed realized they could file for
disability from casual “chit chat” with other veterans, sometimes in the VFW itself. In
addition, some interviewees who had no health repercussions from exposure
demonstrated discrete knowledge of other veterans’ health issues. Generally, the
spread of this type of knowledge through formal mechanisms seems unlikely in this
community, given the details of the information they held. Rather, veterans likely
communicated this health information during rapport, “chit-chat,” or other informal
means of community-building.
The rhetorical effects of a high-rapport space, when considered alongside the
social and cultural connectivity specific to this community, can help us better
understand how maintaining a shared meeting place can mitigate aporetic rhetoric. A
high-rapport space will encourage discussion of shared communal issues and concerns,
based on my observations and interviews. Thus, if there is information circulating about
Agent Orange, it is likely to pass through this space directly or indirectly, in the form of
official information and advocacy on the part of the VFW, or informally, through
rapport. The rhetorically amplifying features of the VFW can help dispel uncertainty
surrounding VA rules and regulations by providing informal and formal assistance. The
VFW does not directly help Agent Orange veterans use mediating artifacts to reach their
objective, but the community supports and encourages filing claims. As excerpts from
my interviews have already demonstrated, several of the veterans I spoke with would
not have filed a claim with the VA without other veterans encouraging them. The VFW
functions as a critical component of Agent Orange veterans’ rhetorical activity network.
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Beyond the walls of the VFW, the community at large is likely a vital dimension
of this activity network as well, but it is also difficult to capture within the boundaries of
a discrete activity system model. Because community could be very broadly construed
to mean almost any interaction between Agent Orange veterans, and these interactions
could occur in unpredictable spaces at unpredictable times, I was unable to fully capture
the scope of community activities. One way to maximize the reach of future studies
grounded in activity theory, like I have done here, would be to visit multiple sites where
community members are likely to meet. In addition, performing more interviews than I
completed for this chapter is ideal for producing a more robust picture of Agent Orange
veterans’ involvement in their communities. Further complicating this study, Agent
Orange veterans are very quickly succumbing to the effects of their exposure. More
than once, interviewees expressed disappointment that I could not conduct this study
earlier, as many of their Agent Orange veteran comrades have already passed from
health complications. This limiting factor presented a significant research challenge.
Nonetheless, as a preliminary investigation into this community, the results of the
interviews were invaluable in ascertaining how these men, bound by an injustice, have
helped one another overcome the uncertainty of Agent Orange.

6. Aporetic Tensions
Governmental agencies and organizations like the VA and the CDC create
systems to balance the management of uncertainty with the costs of correcting past
mistakes, but these entities are not artificially inflating or exaggerating the level of
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uncertainty associated with Agent Orange exposure. Instead, these organizations,
veterans, and systems do not create or eliminate uncertainty. Rather, they deploy it,
resist it, or manage it. We can point to other situations in which this is not the case, for
contrast. For instance, cigarette companies are well-known for manufacturing
uncertainty, as are many climate-change deniers. In the former case, cigarette
companies obfuscate by undermining the science behind studies linking smoking and
cancer. In the latter case, climate-change deniers amplify the inherent uncertainty at
the core of every scientific prediction, ignoring the risks of a rising sea level and the
benefits of transitioning to cleaner energy sources. In both cases, uncertainty itself is
the target of rhetorical efforts. For both tobacco lobbyists and climate-change deniers
these efforts are rewarded when good evidence becomes undermined, probabilities
become plausibly questionable, and quality research appears flawed. When it comes to
Agent Orange, however, the situation is different. The legitimacy of Agent Orange
research is rarely questioned, downplayed, or distorted. Instead, uncertainty is a matter
of who, where, when, and how much, not a matter of if. Unlike climate change denial
and tobacco research, the uncertainty that surrounds Agent Orange has less to do with
what Agent Orange is and does, and more to do with how Agent Orange moves and
affects those exposed to it.
This has a profound aporetic effect on the rhetorical capacity of veterans who
were exposed to Agent Orange during the Vietnam war. The VA lacks either the
motivation or capacity to cast doubt on Agent Orange studies, however, they more than
make up for this lack by centering disability adjudication on service duties and by using a
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policy of presumed doubt. Because Agent Orange affected soldiers with a wide variety
of jobs and positions, centering the disability claims process on specific duties makes it
much easier for the VA to circumvent the high levels of uncertainty found in Agent
Orange dispersal patterns. For those veterans who had jobs most likely to be exposed
and suffer negative health repercussions from their exposure, VA regulations pose few
problems. For veterans who had jobs not likely to have been exposed, yet still have
negative health problems from exposure, receiving disability compensation is more
challenging. The rhetorical activity network used to analyze the veterans interviewed for
this chapter shows how, when factoring in job duty, the capacity for Agent Orange
veterans to make their case for exposure becomes mired in uncertainty. In a sense, by
circumventing the uncertainty of Agent Orange dispersal, the VA has placed the burden
of this uncertainty on the veterans themselves. If a veteran’s former job duty does not
place them in areas where they were likely sprayed, the burden of proof rests on the
veteran.
Complicating matters, the fact that filing for disability often requires veterans to
navigate a somewhat technical, often sluggish bureaucratic system poses additional
problems. Because many Agent Orange veterans pass away from health complications
at an earlier than average age, the time delay between filing for a claim and receiving
remuneration is problematic. No doubt, many veterans have passed from complications
of exposure without receiving any compensation. Additionally, because the CDC and VA
failed to find a conclusive link between Agent Orange and negative health repercussions
in a timely manner, many veterans who were exposed passed away at a young age, their
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families and friends unaware their loss was due to a grievous error on the part of the
United States military. Recall how the veteran I quoted near the beginning of this
chapter was a semi-professional athlete in his youth, yet he suffered from a heart attack
in his early thirties. Even this well-conditioned and physically active veteran succumbed
to the effects of this chemical. Many others were not lucky enough to have survived
these types of devastating health repercussions. There is no evidence that the CDC and
VA purposefully delayed research, or that the Agent Orange Act was purposefully
delayed until decades after veterans were exposed to the chemical, but there is no
doubt these factors have reduced the number of claims (and thus compensation) for
Agent Orange veterans.
As I have argued in this chapter, there are systems in place that help combat this
aporetic activity. Veterans organization like the VFW have done a great deal to assist in
filing for disability and advocating for the needs of veterans. The fact that organizations
like the VFW have seen a marked decrease in participation does not bode well for the
rhetorical capacity of Agent Orange veterans and many other veterans, such as those
who suffer from “Gulf War Syndrome” or those who inhaled numerous toxins from
“burn pits” during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The VFW not only formally assists and
legislatively represents these veterans, it provides an informal, high-rapport space
where relevant information, encouragement, and general comradery are shared. The
physical space of the VFW I visited, including the various functions it served, functioned
to increase community-building and communication. When it comes to combatting the
uncertainty of Agent Orange exposure, these functions provide multifaceted benefits.
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As I discovered during my interviews, the community that grows around shared spaces
like the VFW were the primary mode in which veterans were made aware of disability
filing procedures, in addition to the peer support networks that these spaces encourage.
Supporting these organizations is vital for helping Agent Orange veterans seek their
objective.
My interpretation of activity theory in this chapter helps us better understand
how uncertainty affects rhetorical capacity. Activity theory is a particularly useful tool
for analyzing situations, especially rhetorical situations, since it is so heavily invested in
purposeful activity. Because rhetoric, and by extension persuasion, is primarily
concerned with activity (physical and cognitive), this makes activity theory a natural fit
for performing rhetorical analyses. By tweaking second-generation activity theory, more
specifically the activity theory model created by Engström, I have tried to push this
model into new frontiers, extending the basic principles of activity theory to account for
the way uncertainty shapes rhetorical activity. Hopefully, this modification helps us
better grasp the complicated network of factors that shape rhetorical activity in this
situation.
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Chapter 2
Aporetic Strategies and Mental Illness
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1. Doubting Mental Illness
In September of 2017, former reality show “Big Brother” contestant Andrew Tate
tweeted the following: “Depression isn’t real. You feel sad, you move on. You will always
be depressed if your life is depressing. Change it. Thread.”1 His subsequent Tweets are a
master class in anti-psychiatric argumentation. For instance, suspicion towards the
pharmaceutical industry: “Modern think (sic) bullshit has made trillions giving anti
depressant (sic) pills when all they need is a better diet, exercise and a life purpose.”2
What-about-ism: “How can you be too depressed to work when people in war zones
arnt (sic)? With dead family all around them?”3 Denialism: “Depression as it’s diagnosed
doesn’t exist.”4 The reactions to Tate’s Tweet storm were swift and unrelenting. His
comments drew criticism from a wide range of respondents, including celebrities like J.K
Rowling. This critical response was justified. His claims are based on little to no
evidence. Few mainstream or respectable psychiatrists or psychologists would lend his
position any credence. Actual sufferers of depression would no doubt recriminate Tate’s
poorly-informed position. Anyone with hands-on experience with mental illness is aware
that conditions like depression, anxiety, or Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) are
real, impactful, and often devastating. Yet, his views are not isolated.
There is a vibrant anti-psychiatric community, both inside and outside of
academic circles, who maintain the position that many mental illnesses are conquerable
by sheer will, are conspiracies cooked up by massive pharmaceutical companies who
seek to sell a wide range of psychiatric drugs, or are simply made up, a fiction used to
explain away “personal shortcomings.” These are the most extreme positions found in
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the anti-psychiatric community, but there are less critical positions. For instance, there
is some debate over the effectiveness, applicability, and usefulness of popular drugs like
Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI) for treating depression, or the use of
Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) to address PTSD. This chapter seeks to answer the
following questions: What motivates skepticism or denialism towards mental illnesses
and treatments for mental illnesses, and what divides these two positions? How do the
aporetic strategies of skepticism and denialism differ? How do these strategies affect
one another?
I am interested in which factors allow arguments against both the existence or
severity of mental illnesses and the usefulness of drugs to treat these conditions,
despite scientific agreement that mental illnesses exist as brain disorders and that these
drugs work to help those who suffer from mental illnesses. I am neither a trained
psychologist nor a psychiatrist, so my analysis of mental illness and
psychopharmaceutical drugs is not meant to be an in-depth investigation of the causes
of mental illness or the medical legitimacy of pharmaceutical interventions. I defer to
experts on these important topics. Instead, my interest in this chapter centers on those
who, despite large amounts of evidence, still deny the existence of mental illness or the
efficacy of psychopharmaceuticals. It is rather easy to dismiss interlocutors like Tate as
being ignorant, doltish, or obtuse. However, doing so risks glossing over a potentially
valuable site for understanding how and why persuasion works. The unreasonably
skeptical, in other words, are vital for better understanding rhetoric and persuasion,
since despite near ubiquitous and constant messaging about the realities of mental
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illness and the effectiveness of treatments, they are nonetheless unpersuaded. Their
stubbornness can reveal much about how uncertainty can be leveraged to maintain
extreme positions.
This chapter provides an overview of the strategies various individuals,
movements, or organizations use to criticize psychology and psychiatry. Towards this
end, I make a sharp distinction between skepticism and denialism of mental illnesses.
This division is not always clear cut, like the work of famed psychiatric skeptic Thomas
Szasz, whose cooperation with Scientologists helped formed the straightforwardly
denialist Citizens Commission on Human Rights (CCHR). On the other hand, constructing
this division is also a valuable theoretical and practical distinction, since the aporetic
strategies and goals of skepticism and denialism are often antithetical, or at least
distinguishable.
Starting with mental illness skepticism, I will trace out the major positions that
cast doubt on psychological and psychiatric practices, including criticisms of the
Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM), neuroscientific views on abnormal brain
functioning, and the solidity of mental illness as a conceptual category. Having examined
how these various positions deploy aporetic strategies to critique mental health
practices, I will then look closely at the rise of Scientology and the CCHR. Here, very
different aporetic strategies are used to undermine the usefulness and efficacy of
mental health practices. Finally, I turn towards psychopharmaceutical skepticism and
denialism, and examine how strategies that seek to undermine mental health diagnosis
are used to criticize the widespread use of drugs to treat mental illness.
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2. Skepticism Vs. Denialism
It is both possible and valuable to distinguish between mental illness skepticism
and denialism. Mental illness skepticism does not deny that atypical thoughts and
behaviors exist. Instead, supporters of this position often suggest that the concept of
mental illness is itself a shaky, abusable set of arbitrary characteristics used to
oversimplify the actual experience of mental illness. Critiques from this position usually
deploy a rather narrow range of aporetic strategies. One tactic is to take issue with the
introduction, implementation, and scientific aspirations of the Diagnostic Statistical
Manual (DSM). A second approach is to cast doubt on the increased use of
neuroscientific explanations for psychiatric conditions, a dominant concept in mental
health professions. A third tactic is to use an interpretation of postmodern or
poststructuralist philosophy to undermine the concept of mental illness by criticizing the
increasing tendency to medicalize abnormal thought patterns. Rhetors combine these
tactics as part of a wider argumentative strategy towards mental illness, or isolated
expressions of broader worldviews, like Andrew Tate’s brief Twitter tirade. Additionally,
the line between skepticism and denialism is not always clear. Multiple lines of
argumentation that are skeptical are deployed to promote denialism.
Often conflating mental illness with a “personal weakness,” mental illness
denialism tends to rely on a myth of “personal responsibility” and “mental fortitude,”
and often demonstrates a contempt towards those who live with atypical thought
patterns. Mental illness denialism is much like Andrew Tate’s position: mental illnesses
do not “actually” exist, or they are an artificial diagnosis imposed by those seeking to
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take advantage of the mentally “weak.” Although rarer, this position undermines the
experiences of those who suffer from mental illnesses. Ignoring vast amounts of
evidence for the lived reality of mental illness, denialism poses a problem for skeptics
who use their arguments to critique problematic institutional beliefs and practices. In
other words, while the goal of the mental illness skepticism is often thoughtful
reflection and consideration of those mistreated by mental health practices and
institutions, skeptical critiques can be used by denialists to undermine the experiences
of those who manage mental illnesses. Denialists can use perspectives like social
constructivism to attack persons with a diagnosed mental illness, questioning the
“reality” of their mental states. Believing that artifice is the same thing as illusion, that
the “creation” of something therefore means it is not “real,” denialists often stretch the
logic of poststructuralism and postmodernism to the detriment of persons with atypical
cognitive or affective functioning.
We can differentiate between mental illness skepticism and denialism by
examining their distinct aporetic strategies. Indeed, what seems to separate these two
positions is how they respectively tap into uncertainty in unique ways, and this novelty
holds amongst other forms of skepticism and denialism. Mental illness skepticism
generally undermines concepts of diagnostic objectivity, positivism, and the stability of
mental health characterizations and categories. Skepticism critiques overconfidence. In
contrast, denialism avoids directly addressing concrete evidence and arguments, and
instead circumvents traditional argumentative routes by engaging in conspiratorial
thinking (what I call “what-if-ism”), heterogenium (also called “red herrings,” or “what82

about-ism”), or pure modes of denialism, where emotionally-charged assertions are
made with little support or recognition of evidence. Mental illness skepticism deploys
aporetic rhetoric by critiquing the stability, and thus confidence, in how we view mental
illness. Mental illness denialism deploys aporetic rhetoric by amplifying uncertainty,
intensifying it in situations through the use of fear appeals or rhetorical misdirection. As
we turn to criticisms of pharmaceutical use in treating mental illness, these strategies
hold.
Mental illness denialism is not overwhelmingly common, but it is a potent
aporetic strategy in an economy of attention, which poses a problem for more nuanced
skeptical takes on mental illness. Tate’s tweets, which drew the ire of a vast audience,
rhetorically polarized the debate over mental illness by tapping into the power of the
spectacle. Because little evidence, nuance, or basic facts about mental illness are
necessary to deploy raw uncertainty against it, denialism is amplified because of its
audaciousness. Because of its sheer brazenness, denialism also tends to draw out
copious amounts of criticism. In turn, because denialism tends to subvert more
evidence-based rhetorical strategies, there is little reason or means for denialists to
seriously engage with substantive criticisms of their positions. Hence, denialism subtly
shifts the goalposts of debate while providing few substantive argumentative positions.
We could realistically debate how those with mental illnesses should be served
by institutions, organizations, and communities, but instead, the sheer intensity of
denialism creates an argumentative vacuum, where any criticism of mental illness
becomes pulled into the gravitational force of denialism. Debate begins to center on
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binary, existential propositions: You either believe in mental illness, or you do not.
Legitimate criticisms of mental health practices become viewed as “aiding” mental
illness denialism, and dismissed as at best unproductive, and at worst aiding and
abetting a harmful argumentative position. Denialism polarizes and reinforces binary
logics. From the perspective of aporetic rhetoric, denialism thus subsumes the aporetic
strategies of skepticism. Certain aporetic strategies have the effect of occluding others.
The same phenomenon is visible in debates over other technical topics as well,
including vaccinations and climate change. Any criticism of vaccination practices or
climate change science can become framed as antithetical to the pursuit of truth,
scientific certitude, or good sense. It is perfectly good and reasonable to assert that
vaccinations work and that climate change is real, but the rhetorical field where these
assertions exist becomes distorted and magnetized by the aporetic strategies of
attention-grabbing positions, or potent and pathos-laden aporetic appeals construct a
space in which legitimate and often vital criticisms are engulfed by their more extreme
cousins. Hence, mental illness denialism poses a problem for skeptics. Realistic,
important, and legitimate criticisms of how we treat those with mental illnesses are
occluded by the shadow of denialists’ rhetorical strategies. Skeptics’ aporetic techniques
thus need to be differentiated from the aporetic gravity of denialism.

3. DSM Skepticism
Because modern mental illness diagnoses rely heavily on the Diagnostic
Statistical Manual (DSM), undermining its validity is a common rhetorical strategy of
84

mental illness skeptics. In the early 1980s, the psychiatric profession implemented the
DSM-III. This was a tectonic shift in how psychiatrists and other mental health
professionals conceptualized mental illness. The previous DSM-I and DSM-II relegated
diagnosis to a secondary role, and popular psychiatric theorists between 1900 and 1970
focused instead on maladaptive patterns, personal problems, and character, frequently
drawing blurry lines between normal and abnormal mental processes.5 Scholars
subsequently criticized the DSM-I and DSM-II for being too “subjective,” “unscientific,”
and “overly ambitious in terms of its ability to explain and cure mental illness.”6 During
the 1960s and 1970s, insurance plans began partially covering mental health services,
and they began complaining of psychiatry’s inability to demonstrate effectiveness.
In addition, popular culture had pilloried mental health practices in the 1970s,
most notably in the film One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest, which portrays the
dehumanization of the likable renegade, Randle P. McMurphy, at the hands of a
coercive mental health institution. Winning the top five Oscars in 1975, the popularity of
this film reflected a deep-set public suspicion towards psychiatric practices. The DSM-III
was a response to both academic complaints and broader cultural attitudes towards
mental health practices, and implemented a diagnostic paradigm that introduced
discrete categories of mental illness, importing a diagnostic model from other medical
fields. The DSM-III was lauded by some as an unparalleled scientific achievement in the
field of psychiatry. A vocal and diverse group of DSM skeptics, however, made their case
heard.
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In the mid-to-late 1980s, scholars in social work expressed doubts about the
reliability and validity of the DSM-III. Only seven years after the DSM-III was introduced,
Herb Kutchins and Stuart Kirk noted that the DSM-III had rapidly taken over as the
primary reference for mental health facilities and other programs.7 Public programs
began requiring DSM-III diagnosis before providing services, and perhaps more
importantly, insurance providers began limiting coverage unless the patient was
diagnosed using the DSM-III (and even then, only certain types of mental illness would
be covered). As Kutchins and Kirk recount, overreporting of mental illnesses increased in
an effort for clients to afford services, affecting a wide range of processes like civil and
criminal trials, where a misdiagnosis may have unforeseen and meaningful
consequences.8 Kirk and Kutchin’s 1992 book, The Selling of DSM: The Rhetoric of
Science in Psychiatry stands as a landmark work in the rhetoric of science and medicine
and a vital example of mental illness skepticism.9 Rather than claim that the diagnostic
dimensions of the DSM were flawed, Kirk and Kutchins instead focus on the extradiagnostic factors (like the quick and ubiquitous adoption of the text for financial
reasons) of the DSM-III as a target for critique. Mental illness is quite real for Kirk and
Kutchins, but the system mental health practitioners used to diagnose mental health
problems were too hastily accepted as uniformly valid, incentivizing misdiagnosis.
Another social work scholar, Jerome Wakefield, criticized the conceptual validity
(as opposed to construct or predictive validity) of the DSM-III in 1992.10 Wakefield’s
argument centers on two primary claims: 1) the DSM-III assumes that “a disorder is a
condition that has negative consequences for the person,” and 2) “that a disorder is a
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dysfunction,” or a state in which an internal function is not operating naturally.11 To
support the first claim, Wakefield explains how the DSM-III differentiates between
function and malfunction by using the tendency to seek help as a metric. For instance,
two influential authors of the DSM-III explain how caffeine withdrawal causes distress
similar to caffeine intoxication, but because people generally only seek professional help
for the latter, the former is therefore not clinically significant.12 As Wakefield notes, a
“correct definition of disorder must classify every pathological condition as a disorder
whether or not the condition is currently an object of professional attention.”13
Otherwise, obstacles to treatment like social stigmas come to influence the existence
and classification of mental disorders as true disorders.
Addressing the claim that a disorder is a dysfunction, Wakefield cites the
definition of disorder in the DSM-III:
…a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that
occurs in a person and that is associated with present distress (a painful
symptom), or disability (impairment in on or more important areas of
functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain,
disability, or an important loss of freedom.14
A few lines after this definition, the DSM-III provides the additional addendum:
“Whatever its original cause, it must be currently considered a manifestation of a
behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the person.”15 Wakefield’s
question is simple: what is the purpose of this addendum? As he argues, the dysfunction
addendum counteracts the conceptual broadness of the definition of disorder.16 Grief
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over the death of a parent is a completely normal response. However, it can also be a
“present distress.” It can produce conditions of disability and it can significantly increase
the risk of pain or produce a loss of freedom. The dysfunction clause frames disorders as
statistically unlikely distress or disability.
Wakefield notes the problem with this characterization: “there are many
statistically deviant conditions that causes distress and other harms but that are not
dysfunctions.”17 Selfishness, cowardice, avarice, gullibility, and laziness can all be
“statistically deviant either in the nature of the response or in the response’s intensity,”
yet not be classified as disorders.18 Thus, the definition for disorder in the DSM-III is too
broad. However, it is also too narrow in certain cases. For instance, PTSD is not listed as
a dysfunction in the DSM-III despite fitting the criteria for a disorder (it is now classified
as a “Trauma and Stressor-related Disorder” in the DSM-5). This type of claim is
indicative of Wakefield’s broader argumentative approach, which like Kirk and Kutchins,
deploys an aporetic strategy.
The difference between these two skeptics rests in their aporetic strategies. Kirk
and Kutchins’s aporetic strategy deploys prudential uncertainty while Wakefield uses
conceptual uncertainty. Importantly, Kirk, Kutchins, and Wakefield are not skeptical of
mental illnesses, but instead critique the instrument used to apply the labels like
“depression” or “addiction” to a discrete set of thoughts and behaviors. Thus, it is not
that mental illness does not exist or is not “real” for these critics. Rather, Kirk and
Kutchins’s criticism is that the process of diagnosis, not the diagnosis itself, is distorted
by the DSM’s tunnel vision. For Kirk and Kutchins, the speed and width of the DSM-III’s
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influence was simply excessive, and did not leave room for alternative approaches or
time to assess the consequences of the widespread adoption of the DSM-III. Prudence is
always a combination of both what and when.
To rhetorically deploy prudential uncertainty means tapping into humankind’s
limited ability to predict future value combined with our limited ability to determine
how timing affects that value. The commonplace phrase “in the right place at the wrong
time,” or the inverse, “in the wrong place at the right time,” captures this shortcoming
for rhetorical effect, and when deployed, either ameliorates the pain of failure or the
hubris of success by tapping into our innate inability to know how to do the right thing
at the right time. Thus, Kirk and Kutchins’s aporetic strategy is to critique the DSM-III as
a literal “hasty generalization.” The DSM-III is hasty because of the speed of its spread,
and a generalization because of how wide it spread in this timeframe.
Wakefield, on the other hand, uses an aporetic approach analogous to
poststructuralist criticisms of mental illness institutions, like Foucualt’s approach that
we will discuss shortly. However, while the Foucauldian approach undermines the
historical stability of concepts, Wakefield’s approach undermines the value proposition
and definitional stability of concepts. Wakefield uses counterexamples as a primary
means to accomplish this task, which draw attention to potential sites of uncertainty.
In terms of value proposition, or whether mental illnesses are harmful or not,
Wakefield deploys the counterexample of caffeine withdrawal and intoxication to tease
out the potential short-sidedness of using treatment-seeking as a determining factor in
harmfulness. For Wakefield, the value propositions in this instance are not valid. Since
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there is not a one-to-one overlap between those needing help and those seeking help,
this makes treatment-seeking an inappropriate metric to determine how detrimental a
mental state might be. In other words, since not everyone who needs intervention by a
mental health professional seeks that intervention, we cannot say that seeking
intervention should be the only criteria for needing intervention, which the authors of
the DSM-III suggest by using the caffeine withdrawal/intoxication example.
Similarly, Wakefield’s criticism of the “dysfunctional clause” in the DSM-III works
by suggesting that many statistically deviant conditions are not currently considered
dysfunctional, so calling a mental state harmful because it is not a “normal” response is
too broad of an application of the definition of “disorder.” In either case, Wakefield uses
counterexamples to draw attention to uncertainty surrounding how a concept applies
value, and how a concept applies functional definitions. Counterexamples effectively
draw attention to these sites of uncertainty when used as criticisms of broadly
applicable theories or concepts, because the more a concept or theory attempts to
succinctly capture reality, the more the uncertainty between individual cases and cases
in general becomes available for rhetorical use.

4. Neuroscientific Skepticism
Critiques of neuroscience are a second aporetic tactic of mental illness skeptics.
These critiques usually take on one of two forms. One tactic is to undermine the
reliability or “objectivity” of neuroscientific imaging practices, which lays the
groundwork for the second tactic, a full criticism of the distinction between normal and
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abnormal brain functioning. Both approaches are indirect ways of casting skepticism on
mental illness, because they do not deny its existence. Instead, this aporetic strategy
works by criticizing the modern reliance on an empirical and scientific understanding of
mental illness. Rather than say mental illnesses do not exist, interlocutors who deploy
criticisms of neuroscience do so to question the sole reliance on empirical scientific
inquiry to understand atypical thought patterns.
This aporetic strategy emphasizes the technological limitations and complexity of
interpreting empirical neuroscientific data. Thus, it questions the basis of “abnormal”
brain functioning. Neuroscientific research relies on statistical analyses of data created
through fMRI technologies or positron emission tomography (PET). In an fMRI scan,
researchers present a subject with a stimulus or task while a subject is scanned in an
fMRI machine, which measures brain activity by monitoring blood flow. PET scans work
by introducing a positron-emitting radionuclide (or “tracer”) into a subject, and then
measuring the gamma rays indirectly emitted from the tracer in the subject’s body. In
both cases, neuroscientists isolate the resulting data gathered from these tests to make
claims about specific cognitive functions. Then, researchers take the resulting data and
generalize their findings, and given enough raw data, provide insight into brain
functions.
Like most interpretative tasks, linking data and psychological functions is
“shaped by a series of methodological and conceptual choices made by scientists.”19 As
Jordynn Jack and L. Gregory Applebaum explain, “neuroscientists have not yet
established consensus on these underlying assumptions.”20 These assumptions are the
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ground from which neuroscientific criticisms grow. Perhaps one of the best examples of
this rhetorical strategy is Nikolas Rose and Joelle Abi-Rached’s recent book Neuro, a
powerful model for neuroscientific critique.21 Their approach hinges on three different
sites of dispute: localization, lab practices, and interpretation.
Rose and Abi-Rached’s first aporetic criticism of neuroscience targets
localization, or the belief that brain functions are the result of hard-wired connections of
neurons, often clustered in one area of the brain. This belief is accompanied by the
notion that one-to-one “mapping” of mental processes in particular regions of the brain
is possible, thus building up a picture of what a “normal” brain is. The problem with this
approach, as Rose and Abi-Rached note, is “despite all its increases in acuity, fMRI can
only measure mass action.”22 Because neurological activity occurs on such a small scale,
it is difficult to assess which scale is appropriate for examining mental processes. For
example, it is unclear how researchers should address which proportion of neurons are
responsible for task completion in a specific region of the brain. If they examine the
brain too “closely,” they risk missing how different neural clusters work in tandem,
almost like zooming in on individual pixels on a screen, completely missing how these
pixels make up an image. Alternatively, if researchers examine the brain too “broadly,”
they risk losing the ability to distinguish between isolated functions of the brain, thus
conflicting with their belief in localized processes.
Rose and Abi-Rached also note that the location of scans can make a difference
in their interpretation. Brain scans do not occur in a vacuum. Subjects perform tasks in
artificially constructed environments, often beset by persons, sounds, smells, and other
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unfamiliar and confounding environmental factors. If researchers are testing whether or
not subjects demonstrate fear towards a certain class of stimuli, it may not be clear
whether these participants are responding to the given stimulus, or whether they are
responding to a foreign environment. Brain scans are incapable of distinguishing these
kinds of confounding responses in test subjects. Performing tests in isolated
environments is vital to collecting valid and generalizable data. However, because these
tests take place outside of “natural” settings and elicit responses potentially foreign
from everyday circumstances, environmental factors provide a foothold for aporetic
criticisms of neuroscience.
Rose and Abi-Rached’s final neuroscientific critique concerns the act of
interpreting the results of neuroscientific experiments. They cite David McCabe and
Alan Castel’s research on how brain scan images affect scientific reasoning. McCabe and
Castel found that the presentation of a brain scan in a scientific article can positively
influence how a reader views the authors’ scientific reasoning.23 Rose and Abi-Rached
describe this as the “objectivity effect,” because the mere presence of brain scans lends
persuasive power to an argument, even though images do not speak for themselves.
Alone, brain scans are no more or less “objective” than any other kind of image.
Consequently, the “objectivity effect” of brain scans implies that the surety of
neuroscientific research, its “objectivity,” is disputable. If the persuasive force of
neuroscientific arguments that use imaging are overblown, then neuroscientific claims
about abnormal brain functioning are overblown. At least, this is one potential
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argument made possible by aporetically critiquing the interpretive task of reading brain
scans.
Rose and Abi-Rached’s critiques all interact with uncertainty, rhetorically, in
similar ways. Targeting localization, they use scope uncertainty to critique
neuroscientific findings. Kenneth Burke’s examination of “circumference” and its
corollaries, scope and reduction, capture the heart of this aporetic strategy.24 For
instance, Burke deploys the example of behaviorists using animal experiments to explain
human behavior. As he suggests, such experiments are persuasive only insofar as they
can reduce (“control”) the situation under investigation, thus reducing bias only if
researchers choose a representative act for the animals to complete. Even under these
conditions, however, the gap between animal behavior and human behavior might be
too wide. By reducing the scope of our analytical circumferences to atomistic notions
like “behaviors,” the hope is that these findings, unimpeded by confounding effects or
interferences, will be generalizable. The hope is that by maintaining empirical purity
research findings will infinitely scale.
This faith in empirical purity is observable in neuroscientific research, which
focuses on minute scales of reference. These small scales of reference are used to infer
much larger, more complex brain behaviors by assuming the purity of tiny,
astronomically small observations of brain activity. Between the element and the
compound, between the individual and the community, between the single and many,
lurks uncertainty. It is difficult to determine when a sample is “representative” of a
more general population, because we are uncertain about the scope of what constitutes
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both a sample and a population. This uncertainty, almost innate to every kind of
argument where individual cases are framed as generalizable, is what Rose and AbiRached (amongst others) use as an aporetic strategy. Burke, somewhat sardonically,
draws on the implication of this strategy when he suggests that animal research only
teaches us that “physical sadists who have mastered the scientific method like to
torture animals methodically…ostensibly to prove over and over again that it can be
done (though this has already been amply proved to everybody’s satisfaction but that of
the experimenters).”25 If localized findings are not sufficiently robust to explain larger
phenomena, the work of neuroscientists who subscribe to this belief offers few answers
about the brain itself. This is how mental illness skeptics can leverage scope uncertainty
for aporetic purposes.

4. Poststructuralist Skepticism
Another skeptical aporetic strategy is to undermine the concept of mental illness
by critiquing the historical systems, institutions, and practices that contribute to our
notions of the “mad.” This approach relies heavily on Michel Foucault’s work. In his
canonical book, Madness and Civilization, he elaborates on a theory of the historical
development of madness, beginning in the middle ages and stretching onward to the
birth of the asylum in the nineteenth century.26 Foucault’s work does not deny the
existence of mental illness, but it does attempt to show how our view of the “mad” has
throughout history been inextricably tied to concepts alien to modern constructs of
mental illness. For example, Foucault invokes the wisdom of the “fool” in Medieval
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literature, a time when local towns and magistrates managed the “mad” through forced
itineration, their abnormality shipped from one port to the next, often run out of the
towns and cities in which they landed. According to Foucault, the dawn of
medicalization would produce a profound paradigm shift. Instead of forced itineration,
institutions kept the “mad” contained in prisons and eventually hospitals and asylums.
This shift, from one paradigm to another, is the aporetic fulcrum that mental illness
skeptics use to leverage their doubts.
Foucault’s rhetorical approach, what he calls an “archaeology,” can be a
powerful tool of poststructuralist critique. Part of its power stems from its openendedness, since Foucault makes very few direct criticisms of psychology or psychiatry.
Instead, his historical overview of “madness” shows how our sensibility towards mental
illness, and not mental illness itself, is a social construction birthed from a long chain of
historical coincidences. A Foucauldian aporetic maneuver is more likely to be a critique
of our stereotypes of the “depressed” (or, the “melancholic” to borrow an old term),
than a full-blown denial that depression exists.
However, we do not usually associate Foucauldian critique with a concrete
ethical maxim or argument, as we might expect with a more clear-cut criticism of
stereotypes. Instead, Foucauldian critique functions by undermining the conceptual
stability of mental illness. For instance, Foucault notes how in the classical period the
“melancholy” of the English was “easily explained by the influence of a maritime
climate, cold, humidity, the instability of weather,” in stark contrast to our modern
notion of what causes depression.27 For a Foucauldian mental illness skeptic, if
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depression was thought to be once caused by the weather, then it follows that our
modern conception of what causes depression could very well be as “far-fetched” as
historical accounts of melancholy. The Foucauldian aporetic strategy functions by
undermining the certainty of modern psychological characterizations.
Perhaps no single mental illness skeptic takes Foucault’s premises further than
Thomas Szasz, whose 1961 book The Myth of Mental Illness relies heavily on the notion
that mental illness is a system of purely constructed categories.28 It may seem that Szasz
argues for mental illness denialism, but his argument skirts the notion that abnormal
and deleterious thought patterns do not exist. Rather, Szasz takes the “illness” in mental
illness to task. Szasz argues that thinking of mental illnesses as medical illnesses is
problematic, since this perspective flattens all personal troubles into “physiochemical
processes which in due time will be discovered by medical research.”29 In other words,
Szasz believes that the disease model of mental illness makes a “symmetrical dualism
between mental and physical (or bodily) symptoms, a dualism which is merely a habit of
speech and to which no known observations can be found to correspond.”30 In addition,
Szasz took issue with the sheer power psychiatrists wielded, at least at the time of his
writing in the early 1960s.
Rhetorician Richard E. Vatz wrote on Szasz in the early 1990s, and translated his
basic criticisms into a rhetorical framework. Although more well-known for his piece
“The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation,” Vatz’s foray into the rhetoric of psychiatry is a
notable translation and reimagining of Foucault’s central claims about mental illness.
Writing with Lee Weinberg in a collected volume on the history of psychiatry, Vatz uses
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Thomas Kuhn to describe Szasz’s work as ushering in a paradigm shift in mental illness.31
For Vatz and Szasz, the psychiatrist is a skilled rhetorician, convincing patients of their
mental conditions based on a shaky premise: mental illness is a byproduct of a biological
cause locatable in the brain. Both Szasz’s and Vatz’s positions were highly scrutinized.
Despite their conceptual proximity to arguments like Wakefield’s, the style of their
approach (admittedly uncompromising) detracted from their argument. In Szasz’s case,
the mere title of his first book, “The Myth of Mental Illness,” does not conjure a picture
of healthy skepticism and nuanced criticism. Despite their seeming proximity to mental
illness denialism, neither Szasz nor Vatz qualify as pure denialists. They are simply
poorly-branded skeptics.
Thus, the aporetic strategy of poststructuralism rests in criticizing mental illness
using the uncertainty associated with the historical mutability of concepts. The
Foucauldian approach, visible in the work of Szasz and Vatz, is a condemnation of
overconfidence in conceptual stability, or the extent to which we believe our current
concepts of mental illness will be perpetually valid. The uncertainty inherent in how a
process will unfold, why it unfolds, or how fast it unfolds is a vital aporetic resource, a
concept we will return to when we examine addiction science. For now, we can simply
note that the Foucauldian approach to critiquing mental illness is centered on leveraging
process-related uncertainty to undermine confidence in modern mental health
categories. It is not that depression does not exist for the Foucauldian. Rather, what we
mean when we say “depression” is not historically stable. If this category is not stable,
then describing somehow as having “depression” is not a stable characterization. Thus,
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“lumping together” everyone with symptoms of depression as being a certain kind of
person, who will respond to situations in a certain way that aligns with their mental
state, is through the Foucauldian lens a flawed approach that ignores the historical
instability of mental illness categories and characterizations.
We can better understand this poststructuralist logic by looking more closely at
how the social constructionist argument works. One of the better explanations of social
constructionism in general, and a useful bridge for understanding how mental illness
skepticism can drift into mental illness denialism, comes from the work of Ian Hacking.
Hacking provides the following useful breakdown of the social constructionist argument:
Social constructionists about X tend to hold that:

(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at
present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.

Very often they go further, and urge that:

(2) X is quite bad as it is.
(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically
transformed. 32
Hacking suggests that while many social constructionists advance to premise (2) and (3),
they do not necessarily have to do so. The core of social constructionist arguments is
rather (1), instead of (2) and (3). Mental illness skepticism and denialism exist
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somewhere between premise (1) and (2), yet each perspective has notably different
motivations. The aporetic strategies we have covered in this section could be used to
improve the quality of care for people who suffer from mental illnesses.
For instance, Kirk’s, Kutchins’s, and Wakefield’s criticisms of the DSM-III could
function as important points of reflection for improvement of the DSM. Recall that Kirk
and Kutchin’s central problem with the DSM is its monolithic status. Based on their
claims, one practical suggestion would be to encourage the use of alternative methods
of diagnosis alongside the criteria of the DSM, so that mental health practitioners can
better address complicated situations that the DSM might not be equipped to handle.
Additionally, some of Wakefield’s critiques have already been addressed by newer
versions of the DSM. In the DSM-5, for instance, PTSD now counts as a legitimate
diagnosis. The criticisms of Kirk, Kutchins, and Wakefield can be positive contributions to
improving conditions for those with mental illnesses. Criticisms of neuroscientific
approaches to understanding the mind, as well as poststructuralist takes on the concept
of mental illness, work towards the same goal of improving conditions for neuro-atypical
persons.
In addition, criticisms of neuroscience, especially as they relate to mental illness,
work as a “safeguard” against false positives or negatives. The risk in relying too heavily
on empirical neuroscientific imaging is twofold: either identifying abnormal brain
functioning and associating it with a mental illness when a person exhibits no harmful
behaviors, or not identifying abnormal brain function even when a person exhibits
plenty of harmful behaviors. I call the first the “McMurphy problem,” the second, the
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“Nash problem.” Just like Randal P. McMurphy in Kesey’s One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s
Nest, extreme measures taken on someone who exhibits no extraordinarily dangerous
behaviors is a legitimate problem. And, just like in the film A Beautiful Mind (a very
liberal interpretation of mathematician John Nash’s experience with mental illness),
failing to properly and quickly identify and treat someone with mental illness because
their behaviors are not exceptionally dangerous is also a legitimate problem. Using brain
scans as the sole arbiter of detecting mental illness is particularly susceptible to both the
McMurphy and Nash problems. As a result, aporetic criticisms of neuroscientific
practices help keep a check on the supposed objectivity of brain scans. Assuming the
validity of these scans, much like assuming the validity of the DSM, will always
encounter both the McMurphy and Nash problems. Diversifying the way in which we
assess mental illness is a legitimate solution, often emerging from skeptical critiques of
mental illness.
The poststructuralist approach of arguing for the non-essentiality of conceptual
categories reinforces humankind’s intense responsibility for the categories and
definitions we create, and that to act in the full interest of those who manage and cope
with mental illnesses, we need to reflect on the weaknesses and drawback to the
categories we construct. Foucault’s legacy has been used to make Hacking’s claim (2)
and (3), but Foucault rarely directly advocates for (2) or (3) in his work. A generous
reading of Foucault could consider his later work in his History of Sexuality series,
specifically The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self as a brief foray into (3), leaving
(2) as an unstated assumption. However, the last two volumes of his History of Sexuality
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series do very little to put forth a sustained critique or offer a radical rethinking of
mental health institutions. Foucault was a historian. He was a unique historian, but a
historian nonetheless. Criticisms of poststructuralists like Foucault often neglect this
fact, or more frequently dismiss poststructuralist critiques as defending “relativism.”
There is little evidence this is the case. Arguing for the non-essentiality of conceptual
categories is not to say that conceptual categories do not matter, or do not exist “in
reality.” Just the opposite is true. These criticisms are intended to promote selfdetermination and empower those seeking alternatives to pre-constructed categories.
Like critiques of the DSM or neuroscience, poststructuralist philosophy acts as a bulwark
against both the McMurphy and Nash problems, against both false positives and
negatives. To do so, scholars in diverse camps deploy aporetic strategies as a defense
against overconfidence and surety. This is not the case for mental illness denialists.

5. Mental Illness Denialism
Mental illness denialism uses multiple aporetic strategies to cast doubt on the
existence of mental illnesses. First, mental illness denialists rely on conspiratorial
thinking, or “what-if-ism,” in order to criticize mental health institutions. Combined with
fear appeals, this strategy can be a highly effective rhetorical technique for casting
doubt on mainstream mental health practices. Second, denialists sometimes engage in
“what-about-ism,” a rhetorical technique like heterogenium (“red herrings”), which
diverts criticisms of a practice, institution, or person by accusing the rhetor of “ignoring”
similar cases. For instance, what-about-ism is a common technique for deflecting
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condemnations of serial sexual harassers or abusers, especially in a highly politically
polarized environment when criticisms of abusive men are sometimes framed as
ideologically motivated. This strategy is easily identified, since it usually begins with
some variation on the phrase, “Well what about…” It is also an effective maneuver,
since what-about-ism very closely imitates the structure of counterarguments. Mental
illness denialists deploy what-if-ism and what-about-ism as if the McMurphy problem is
the norm instead of the exception. Hence, mental illness denialists distort the rhetorical
field surrounding mental illness criticism by deploying these powerful aporetic
techniques. There are two identifiable movements that engage in these techniques:
Scientology and the Citizens Commission on Human Rights (CCHR)
As Stephen Kent and Terra Manca have argued, Scientology’s founder L Ron
Hubbard’s war against psychiatry was born from a desire to prop up Dianetics, a novel
which he intended to be an alternative to 1950s health therapies.33 As Kent and Manca
explain, during the 1950s and 1960s, psychiatric practice was at its weakest point of
professional legitimacy. The use of insulin shock treatments and electro-convulsive
shocks to treat severe and chronic depression were common, although psychiatrists
could not explain why these treatments worked. A more controversial practice, 5,000
lobotomies were performed a year in the United States, reaching a peak between 1949
and 1952.34 Hubbard’s Dianetics came during this peak period, and as Kent and Manca
speculate, was a direct response to a 1949 Newsweek article that described how groups
within the psychiatric community were increasingly opposed to lobotomies.35 Because
psychoanalysis was both common and widely considered to be pseudo-scientific,
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Scientology (also a pseudo-science) was a legitimate alternative to the psychiatric
practices of the 1950s and 1960s. To this end, Hubbard deployed a “professional-looking
system replete with journals and doctoral titles,” thus spurring his followers to consider
themselves as being on equal footing with psychiatric and medical practitioners. 36 The
technique of “auditing,” in which a partner directs a patient to revisit traumatic
experiences until they are erased (called “clearing”), is probably the best-known
psychiatric alternative offered by Scientology. In 1952, Hubbard incorporated “Emeters” into the diagnostic program of Scientology, which were intended to measure
emotional responses through small tin cans held in the hands of patients (called
“auditors”).
There has been a significant effort to sort out Scientologist’s core beliefs over
the years, but one central pillar of their platform is their aggressive opposition to
psychiatry. Expanding the premises of Dianetics, Hubbard further developed his quasireligious following of Scientologists over the next few decades. Even though the practice
of electroconvulsive therapy and lobotomies had largely died out by the 1980s, Hubbard
nonetheless began his crusade during this period. As Laura Hirshbein has suggested,
Hubbard’s sentiment towards psychiatry is most on display in his science fiction novel,
Battlefield Earth, published in 1980.37 Battlefield Earth is set on Earth in the year 3000,
an apocalyptic world where humans have been enslaved by the “Psychlos,” a cruel and
sophisticated race of beings who see humans as animals. Hubbard reveals that Psychlos
are descendants of corrupt mental health experts who used psychosurgery and
hypnotism to gain power over society. In other words, in this novel Hubbard expresses a
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deep-seated fear that psychiatry would overtake the Earth, and possibly even destroy
humankind. This may seem like a belief only suitable for the pages of science fiction, but
there are arguably no greater examples of anti-psychiatric aggression than the CCHR
and Scientology. In the eyes of Scientology, and thus by extension the CCHR,
psychiatry’s threat to human existence is of the highest order and magnitude.
The CCHR was co-founded in 1969 by the Church of Scientology and Szasz to
combat abuses of psychiatric patients. Some of their early advocacy programs forced
the field of psychiatry to reflect on their keenness towards extreme, and at the time
rudimentary psychiatric treatments like psychosurgery, shock treatment, and early
psychotropic drugs. There are a few rare instances in which the CCHR has uncovered
real cases of psychiatric abuse, such as in 1978 when they were vital in revealing the
sham practice of deep sleep/sedation therapy at a clinic in Australia.38
The CCHR emerged at a time when many critics of psychiatric practices in the
1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s were responding to real concerns about the power and
reach of psychiatry in post-WWII America, as well as the effectiveness of their
interventions. Recall that the DSM-III was created in the 1980s as a response to these
criticisms. Additionally, by the 1990s a new generation of psychiatric drugs had been
invented, which posed significantly fewer risks or side effects than the powerful and
sometimes dangerous treatments available when the CCHR was founded. Despite these
changes, the CCHR and by extension the Church of Scientology (which essentially runs
the CCHR), have not changed their position. In fact, they now represent the most
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outspoken of mental illness denialists. Their online presence reaffirms this
characterization.
The CCHR website is a robust source of anti-psychiatric aporetic rhetoric, and
gives insight into the aporetic strategies mental illness denialists deploy, reflecting the
deep-seated anxiety expressed in the work of its co-founder, Hubbard.39 Visiting the
landing page of their site, the user is immediately bombarded with an auto-play video in
the top half of their browser. This video is a blunt fear appeal. It consists of a series of
phrases that appear on the screen in the darkened, dirty, 3d-rendered environment of a
mental health institution. Using the anaphora “Imagine…,” usually followed by a statistic
or fact about psychiatric practice colored in an ominous shade of red, the video quickly
bombards the viewer with a series of carefully crafted images. A modified guitar riff
accompanies these images, which nicely accompanies the darkened and gritty “feel” of
the video. Once an intimidating phrase has been displayed, the colors soften to a cool
blue while the video displays positive or happy outcomes.
One particularly representative segment displays the anaphoric “Imagine…”
followed by the statement “19,000 infants with birth defects caused by psychiatric
prescription drugs…,” the italicized words appearing in a dark, bold, red. Immediately
after the appearance of this frightening claim, the video’s guitar sounds stop, and in the
background, we see the shattered pieces of an unidentifiable object. Suddenly, rays of
light appear on the phrase “born happy & healthy” as the shattered, unidentifiable
object begins to “reverse” its destruction, revealing that it was a child’s doll. The video
essentially repeats these elements of “reversal,” where current challenges facing mental
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health services are “imagined” as ameliorated. The visual enthymeme is that by
eliminating psychiatry’s influence, the idyllic imaginings proposed by the video become
reality.
Digging into the textual content of the website, we find a different aporetic
strategy than the video. Their “about” page contains the following illustrative
paragraph:
People frequently ask if CCHR is of the opinion that no one should ever take
psychiatric drugs, but this website is not dedicated to opinion. It is dedicated to
providing information that a multibillion dollar psycho/pharmaceutical industry
does not want people to see or to know. The real question therefore is this: Do
people have a right to have all the information about (A) the known risks of the
drugs and/or treatment from unbiased, nonconflicted medical review, (B) the
medical validity of the diagnosis for which drugs are being prescribed, (C) all
nondrug options (essentially informed consent) and (D) the right to refuse any
treatment they consider harmful.40
The first sentence here uses and frames a hypothetical question (and a good question at
that) to generate ethos and establish the groundwork for a later red herring. We see a
fairly sophisticated rhetorical alley-oop with the phrase “People frequently ask if CCHR is
of the opinion… but this website is not dedicated to opinion.” This technique both
attempts to establish credibility by implying that the CCHR does not traffic in opinion,
while it sets up the conditions for a classic heterogenium. We never get an answer to
what “people frequently ask,” and instead are immediately launched into a corporate
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conspiracy theory. This is followed up with an assertive “The real question therefore is
this:…,” followed by a list of completely legitimate but altogether unrelated series of
questions, further deflecting from the initial hypothetical question.
Both CCHR’s visual and textual arguments are representative examples of the
aporetic strategies of what-if-ism. The video deploys what I call “utopian what-if-ism,”
which establishes an imaginary future that overcomes the problems of the present,
making present problems appear conquerable and inessential (in this case, additionally
positioning the CCHR as the solution to these problems via enthymeme). The paragraph
cited above performs a conspiratorial what-if-ism by suggesting that powerful entities
are “hiding” information they do “not want people to see or to know.”
Both types of what-if-ism rhetorically mobilize uncertainty in almost precisely
the same manner, but through different means. Utopian what-if-ism shades present
circumstances in uncertainty by projecting a “what if…” into the future, making the
audience doubt both the conditions and essentiality of present circumstances.
Conspiratorial what-if-ism amplifies uncertainty towards a current situation by ascribing
secretive (and often destructive) motives to “hidden” entities and “masked”
organizations (i.e., “what if the government is secretly…” doing X). The former creates
uncertainty by modifying our vision of the future, the latter does so by altering how we
perceive present motives or actions.
Importantly, the accuracy or reality of what-if-ism is separate from its rhetorical
structure. That is, some conspiracy theories might wind up being true, and some
hypothetical futures might be better. However, the validity of a what-if-ism is not an
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important dimension of its aporetic operation. Whether or not a conspiracy theory is
true, or if a future situation would indeed be improved by doubting present
circumstances, the fact remains that uncertainty is deployed in both cases to alter our
present or future view of a situation.
Deploying these aporetic strategies, Scientology and the CCHR have turned their
attention to psychotropic drugs as they adapt to the modern conditions of psychiatry.
However, Scientology and the CCHR are by no means the only groups who have
criticized the increased use of psychiatric drugs. Some of these criticisms stem from
more skeptical camps, who worry about the over-prescription of drugs and the long
term negative effects they might have. Others take a more denialist stance, and deploy
both what-if-ism and what-about-ism to suggest that psychiatric drugs are a “scam”
perpetuated by either the government or major pharmaceutical companies (or both).
Thus, we can observe how the same strategies used to criticize the diagnosis, existence,
or severity of mental illnesses bleed into aporetic strategies used to criticize
pharmaceutical treatments of mental illnesses. At the bottom of these strategies rests
different modes of aporetic rhetoric.

6. Psychopharmaceutical Skepticism and Denialism
The rise of psychopharmacology can be traced back to the invention of
chlorpromazine in 1952. Until the 1950s, there was no such discipline as
psychopharmacology, and there were no effective drug treatments for mental illnesses.
Once chlorpromazine was released, this changed. Synthesized on December 11, 1951 by
109

a French pharmaceutical company, chlorpromazine was originally thought to be a
potentiator (a reagent that enhances the action of a drug) for general anesthesia when
it was clinically investigated in 1952. Its psychiatric use was first realized by Henri
Laborit, a French army doctor who was investigating artificial hibernation as an
alternative to shock treatment.
In the patients he experimented on, Laborit found that chlorpromazine produced
disinterest without loss of consciousness. Laborit persuaded two neuropsychiatrists to
try the drug on a 24-year-old, severely psychotic man in January 1952. After a sustained
treatment of doses of chlorpromazine, barbiturates, and electroshocks, the man was
ready to resume a “normal life” after 20 days. Due to these experiments and
observations, the psychopharmaceutical perspective underwent a tectonic and lasting
shift, from a purely electrical to an electro-chemical model of brain synapses. This
paradigm shift afforded physicians a pharmaceutical option for psychiatric treatment.
The meteoric rise of psychopharmaceuticals as a treatment for mental illness
was accompanied by a dedicated community of skeptics and denialists. Many of those
who doubt the validity of diagnostic instruments like the DSM were equally as likely to
dismiss the efficacy of these new drugs. After all, if a diagnosis is invalid, treatments for
a diagnosis will be excessive at best and fraudulent at worst. One of the strongest voices
in this community of skeptics and denialists is Robert Whitaker, whose Mad in America41
and Anatomy of an Epidemic42 stand as potent distillations of both skepticism and
denialism. In the latter, Whitaker sums up the problem of psychopharmaceuticals very
succinctly: “One the one hand, we know that many people are helped by psychiatric
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medications…And yet, at the same time, we are struck with these disturbing facts: The
number of disabled mentally ill has risen dramatically since 1955…”43
A skeptic/denialist sleight-of-hand expert, Whitaker is an unmatched case study
for analyzing how aporetic strategies function for both approaches. At times
straightforwardly skeptical, Whitaker will deploy balanced questioning accompanied by
familiar denialist rhetorical strategies: “Could our drug-based paradigm of care, in some
unforeseen way, be fueling this modern-day plague?”44 On the one hand, identifying the
tension between the effectiveness of psychopharmaceuticals and the increasing
prevalence of mental illness is a sound skeptical strategy. This line of thinking poses
penetrating questions about the effectiveness and appropriateness of our mental health
interventions. On other hand, using language like “modern-day plague” is reminiscent of
the strategies that the CCHR uses to scare the public away from psychiatric treatment.
Hence, Whitaker will be our central way in to understanding both psychopharmaceutical
skepticism and denialism.
Grounded in historical, statistical, and scientific evidence, Whitaker’s takedown
of psychopharmaceutical treatments demonstrates a potent aporetic strategy.
Whitaker’s Anatomy of an Epidemic is a thought-provoking and systematic investigation
of the psychopharmaceutical treatment of many well-known mental illnesses, including
bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. For instance, his criticisms of treatments for bipolar
disorder hinge on the long-term prognosis of those who use pharmaceutical treatments
and those who do not. The latter, based on his reading of multiple long-term studies of
treatment outcomes for bipolar/manic-depressive patients, tend to historically fare
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much better in the long run than the former.45 Whitaker also adeptly deploys narrative
to increase the efficacy of his argument, often interspersing personal and emotionallycharged stories between his analysis of scientific literature. These even-handed analyses
are in stark contrast to other sections of his book, like the chapter called “The Epidemic
Spreads to Children,” a transparent “think of the children” rhetorical strategy deployed
to induce a heightened sense of fear in readers.
In “The Epidemic Spreads to Children,” readers are immediately tipped off that
Whitaker will be deploying both skeptical and denialist tactics when he makes the
following remark early on in the chapter: “I realize that this frames our investigation of
the medicating of children in a rather cold, analytical way, given the frightening
possibility at stake here.”46 Reassuring the audience that his skeptical claims will drive
his argument, Whitaker nonetheless reinforces this assurance with a fear appeal. This
chapter continues by reviewing the historical roots of attention-deficit/hyperactivity
disorder (ADHD) and its treatment, and is sprinkled with fear appeals. For instance,
Whitaker tends to use words like “safe” in scare quotes when describing Ritalin.47
Balancing these denialist strategies with more skeptical approaches, he also deploys a
sophisticated (and accurate) critique of neurologists’ failure to identify ADHD in brain
scans.48 However, this balance is short-lived. Near the end of the first section of this
chapter, Whitaker launches into a jargon-laden comparison between Ritalin and
cocaine, explaining how they both “block dopamine reuptake.”49 He follows up this
comparison by using colorful analogies, like “the child’s brain dials down its dopamine
machinery,” mixed with unexplained bursts of neuroscientific jargon, like the “density of
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dopamine receptors on the postsynaptic neurons declines” and “the amount of
dopamine metabolites in the cerebrospinal fluid drops, evidence that presynaptic
neurons are releasing less of it.”50
This book is intended for a wide audience, thus, both the comparison between
Ritalin and cocaine and Whitaker’s propensity for neuro-jargon act less as convincing
evidence to an average reader, and more as a fear appeal masking as skepticism.
Whitaker is not wrong that Ritalin is closely related to cocaine. However, he makes this
comparison while simultaneously deploying jargon to obscure their differences. Cocaine
and Ritalin (also known as methylphenidate) have different pharmacokinetics, or they
both move through the body differently. The rapidity of drug delivery to the brain is an
important component to understanding the how drugs become addictive, and since
cocaine is usually snorted and reaches the brain quickly, while Ritalin is taken orally and
reaches the brain more slowly, there are significant differences in how these substances
affect the body. Whitaker is not wrong that Ritalin and cocaine are similar, but how he
frames this similarity tends to ignore important details and obscures the more skeptical
dimensions of his argument.
Whitaker deploys both skeptical and denialist aporetic strategies in Anatomy of
an Epidemic, and the latter tend to both bolster and inevitably obscure the logical limits
of his central claim. Or, Whitaker demonstrates how reasonable skepticism can be
occluded by his denialist strategies. Whitaker’s most convincing skeptical strategy is to
question the long-term effectiveness of psychopharmaceuticals, thus arguing that while
drugs can produce positive outcomes in the short term, the long-term effects of these
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drugs also tend to fare worse than if no drug-based intervention was used. This strategy
taps into trade-off uncertainty, or our inability to tell whether a decision’s consequences
will be favorable, especially in the long-term. This is sound logic. Yet, it is not his primary
skeptical claim. His primary claim is that the increase in drug use has resulted in an
increase of mental illness, and that the very solution to the problem only exacerbates
the problem.
This claim is limited by its reliance on correlation. It is difficult to demonstrate
that the rise in cases of depression is caused by a rise in drug treatments. For instance, it
could be the case that the number of people with depression is relatively stable, but the
number of people diagnosed with depression has increased. His argument glosses over
this critical problem. Not all people with mental illnesses seek treatment, if they do not
seek treatment, we can assume they have not been diagnosed, and this fact confounds
our ability to measure the rate of depression. In other words, rather than using
uncertainty to his advantage, Whitaker has opened himself up to criticisms that derive
from causational uncertainty, or the uncertainty attached to cause and effect
relationships, which lurks behind most explanations of human behavior.
As I argued earlier, denialists’ imposition of uncertainty, accomplished through
means like what-about-ism and what-if-ism, tends to obscure the nuance of more
skeptical claims. Whitaker’s work is no exception. Unlike other cases of this
phenomenon, however, Whitaker deploys both strategies, affording him legitimate and
though-provoking claims while undercutting the basis of these claims. His claims may
indeed be worth reflection, but detractors can easily deploy aporetic strategies to
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leverage these weaknesses. Importantly, Whitaker demonstrates how uncertainty can
be used to deploy specific arguments, and how this can expose an argument to
counterclaims.

6. An Aporetic Recap
In this chapter, I have tried to draw out a number of strategies that derive from
specific types of uncertainty. Skeptical claims often deploy uncertainty that addresses
our human limitations, but denialism amplifies the already-existing uncertainty that
hides behind all rhetorical situations. In this chapter, I identified the five types of
uncertainty that skeptical claims deploy:
•

Prudential: Uncertainty associated with both the value of an action and how the
timing of that action affects that value.

•

Conceptual: Uncertainty associated with the stability, value proposition, or
definition of a concept.

•

Scope: Uncertainty associated with how well a specific case is representative of a
general phenomenon.

•

Trade-Off: Uncertainty associated with whether a decision’s consequences are
favorable, especially in the long-term.

•

Causational: Uncertainty associated with cause and effect relationships.

The above list is a valuable addition to our catalogue of uncertainty, and as we continue
to unpack how uncertainty is rhetorically deployed in subsequent chapters, this list will
expand. Recall that in Chapter 1 we primarily investigated how spatial uncertainty
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complicated the activity networks for Agent Orange veterans. However, in this chapter
we identified different types of uncertainty and examined how arguments deploy them
for their advantage, or how they can open arguments to counterclaims. For instance,
humankind’s propensity for making predictions about the future value of an action,
including how the timing of this action affects its value, can be easily aporetically
deployed.
For example, the suggestion that immediately cutting back on fossil fuel use
needs to be done to prevent catastrophic environmental effects can be countered by a
skeptical detractor by addressing the specific value or timing of the proposed action. It
might be that cutting back on factory farms instead of fossil fuels is a much more
feasible method of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It might also be that
immediately cutting back on fossil fuel use, instead of slowly phasing out this use, might
not be the most prudent option. These are skeptical claims, which tap into prudential
uncertainty to be persuasive. This is very different from the three denialist strategies I
identified in this chapter:
•

What-about-ism: Amplifying uncertainty about a proposition by deploying an
unrelated counter-example.

•

Utopian What-if-ism: Amplifying uncertainty about a present situation by making
claims about a hypothetical future, in which the problems of the present have
been solved (regardless of the feasibility of this future).

•

Conspiratorial What-if-ism: Amplifying uncertainty about a present situation by
ascribing secret and often nefarious motives to organization or individuals who
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have some amount of power over the present situation, without sufficient
evidence to support these claims.
To continue with my example, the aporetic strategy of a climate-change denialist might
evoke conspiratorial what-if-ism by suggesting that “powerful forces” working for the
“green energy lobby” have “cooked up” climate change science to push forward their
“liberal agenda.” What this argument means, in practice, is somewhat unclear.
However, what it does is amplify uncertainty towards the government by ascribing
motives with little evidence or explication, in turn, challenging our ability to justifiably
combat climate change.
This strategy is more effective than skeptical criticisms. First, since conspiratorial
what-if-ism is both by nature ascribing clandestine motives while simultaneously
providing little signification (who are these “powerful forces?”), there is little room to
rebut this type of denialist argument. It is more of a rhetorical vacuum than an
argument, in this respect. What-if-ism often leaves no air for counterclaims. Second, by
making such a potent and unyielding claim, any skeptical criticisms of climate change
policies will almost immediately be caught in its intense rhetorical gravity.
Thus, denialist aporetic rhetoric has the peculiar effect of polarizing debate,
since criticisms of climate change policies (regardless of their reasonableness) will be
seen to “aid” the more extreme positions of denialism. In fact, denialists will frequently
deploy skeptical arguments in support of their claims, bolstering their credibility by
using reasonable claims as rhetorical cover for their more extreme positions. This tends
to cast legitimate skepticism in a poor light, since skeptical arguments are extended for
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exaggerated claims, in practice “aiding” the efforts of denialists. Thus, denialism
frequently trumps skepticism in an economy of attention by arguing in bad faith.
This brief excursion into climate change skepticism and denialism has been to
demonstrate that outside of the debate over mental illness, the ways in which these
aporetic strategies unfold is quite similar. This chapter has examined many of the
skeptical and denialists claims towards mental illness and mental illness treatments.
However, as I note early in this chapter, my goal is not to provide a value statement
about either the reality of mental illness or the efficacy of mental illness treatments.
These are problems far beyond the scope of this project. Rather, I have tried to illustrate
how different views on mental illness deploy and use uncertainty for their own unique
aporetic strategies, with identifiable consequences.
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Chapter 3
Aporetic Amplification in Patient Experience Design
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1. A Patient Experience Narrative
Wandering the building, I finally found what I was looking for. There was no
signage above or next to the steel door, no window to peek through. I had to trust the
information I was provided over the phone, and threw the heavy entrance open to
reveal the waiting room. Another patient sat in the corner looking at her phone as I
wandered to the front desk. After a few moments, a woman took my name and told me
to have a seat. A home improvement show was on in the upper corner. I watched and
waited. The magazines to my left were standard-issue. I was impatient. I had waited
three months to see this specialist for a chronic skin condition, and even then, I was only
able to get an appointment with the dermatologist’s assistant. The dermatologist’s
waitlist was around six months.
About forty-five minutes after my scheduled appointment time, I was led down
the hallway into a small examination room. In the middle of the room was the
examination chair, and off to the side, two smaller chairs rested against the wall. A stool
sat beside a small desk. The walls were barren; no pictures, no diagrams, no
illustrations. The cabinets were stark white, and their veneer was peeling at the edges.
The drop ceiling tile above me had a wide, brown stain. The fluorescent light brightly
hummed. I waited for another ten minutes until a nurse came in. She was friendly and
asked me questions about why I was there. I explained my problem. As she left, she told
me to disrobe. I did not know where to sit, but I plopped down on the examination chair
in the middle of the room, my gown on, unsure of when the doctor would come.
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Another ten minutes passed before the doctor came in. She asked what my
profession was. I explained my skin problem, an issue I had coped with for almost my
entire life, an issue I had tried to eradicate with dozens of different over-the-counter
ointments, creams, and gels. I made sure to explain the areas where the condition was
most problematic. The nurse re-entered the room with a clipboard and the doctor
examined me. The examination was over in roughly a minute, perhaps less. She told me
she was prescribing two kinds of medication without further explanation. I felt
unarmed, because she had not examined the area that was most problematic. I did not
feel like she had listened to my explanation. I said “no” when she asked if I had any
questions. I failed to think of anything to say. She spun around and left the room. I had
waited three and a half months to see the doctor. Her examination lasted five minutes.
I scheduled a follow-up before paying the steep cost of visiting the specialist.
Even with insurance, it was expensive. Later that day I called the pharmacy that was
supposed deliver both medications through the mail. One was only a few dollars, while
the other cost as much as the visit to the specialist and was not covered by my
insurance. The expensive medication was supposed to last a month. It lasted a week. I
discovered that the active ingredient in this expensive medicine was freely available in
an alternative, over-the-counter form. The only reason it required a prescription was
because it was a “foam.” This medication delivery system had not yet been approved for
public distribution. I purchased an alternative medicine with the same active ingredient,
for 1/5 the cost. It worked just as well. A week before my follow-up appointment, I
cancelled. The secretary did not ask why. Money was tight that month, and I couldn’t
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afford to go. I felt like a bad patient. The treatment had helped (mildly), which gave me
a rationale to cancel.
This chapter is about how patient experience design can amplify conditions of
uncertainty, creating negative emotional affects and perceptions, ultimately leading to
poor patient outcomes. The modern patient experience is rife with uncertainty, and the
systems that should be designed to mitigate, manage, and reign in this uncertainty fail
to do so or do not exist. Unlike previous chapters, where I have focused on how
different kinds of uncertainty shape the aporetic strategies of governmental agencies
and mental illness advocates or detractors, this chapter will examine the rhetorical
consequences of failing to address uncertainty in the design of healthcare systems.
These design features are not themselves aporetic, but they do amplify or mitigate the
effectiveness of aporetic rhetoric by altering how patients make healthcare decisions.

2. Uncertainty and Affect
The story of my visit to the physician should be familiar to most readers, and
illustrates many dimensions that have concerned healthcare design scholars over the
last three decades. For instance, there is abundant scholarship on appointment systems.
My inability to expediently find the entrance to the physician’s office has been an
interest of scholars who study “wayfinding,” or what factors contribute to locationfinding. The healthcare environment I described is also a topic of intense interest.
Healthcare design researchers have devoted significant attention to factors like the
lighting, flooring, furnishings, layout, and wall art of healthcare spaces. These different
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yet interconnected facets of healthcare experience either directly or indirectly
contribute to a patient’s level of uncertainty. Not being able to find the waiting room is
an obvious connection to uncertainty, but the sound level, light level, visual stimuli, and
spatial distribution of furnishings all contribute to the general emotional state of
patients. These emotional states, in turn, will affect how patients respond to
uncertainty, risk, and benefits in the context of healthcare settings.
For patients, emotional states and uncertainty have a two-way relationship.
Psychologists Yoav Bar-Anan, Timothy Wilson, and Daniel Gilbert have proposed an
“uncertainty intensification hypothesis,” which posits that uncertainty during an
emotional experience makes unpleasant experiences more unpleasant, and pleasant
experiences more pleasant.1 Since healthcare situations are often both emotional and
unpleasant, uncertainty would intensify these feelings of unpleasantness. On the other
hand, if a healthcare experience is pleasant, patients are more likely to feel that it is
more pleasant. Uncertainty amplifies emotional affects.
Alternatively, the “affect heuristic,” proposed by Paul Slovic et al., posits that the
general “goodness” or “badness” (what I refer to as “emotional affects” in this chapter)
a person feels affects their decision-making process. 2 In situations where someone
possesses a positive emotional affect, they are more likely to overlook potentially high
risks and low benefits.3 The opposite is also true: if someone has a negative emotional
affect, they are more likely to infer high risks and low benefits. Perceived risks and
benefits are another way of describing uncertainty in the decision-making process. A
patient who has a negative emotional affect is much more likely to assume the risks of a
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medical procedure are high, or the benefits of a treatment low. That is, perceptions of
risks or rewards are accentuated in the decision-making process by negative emotional
affects. Research on consumer marketing helps us further explain the connection
between negative emotional affects and uncertainty.
Since the 1960s, marketing researchers have framed consumer behavior as risktaking, and risk-taking is simply another way of describing uncertainty. Raymond Bauer
was the first person to formally propose this view in 1960, and a subsequent flurry of
marketing research substantiated and propelled his framework.4 As Richard Taylor
explains, marketing researchers view consumer behavior in terms of choice.5 Since the
value of a choice can only be known in the future, consumers are forced to contend with
risk or uncertainty. That is, for marketing researchers, there is no practical difference
between uncertainty and risk in the decision-making process.
Tying Slovic’s research to this framework, when we say that negative emotional
affects tend to increase perceptions of risk and positive emotional affects tend to
decrease perceptions of risk, we are simply stating that negative emotions amplify
uncertainty and positive emotions mitigate uncertainty. In making this connection
between uncertainty and risk, we are somewhat departing from Knight’s framework,
where risk and “real” uncertainty are almost completely distinct. Instead, we will
approach this chapter by addressing how negative emotions tend to affect the “known
unknowns,” which exist between the known and the unknown unknown. In doing so, we
stand to gain a much deeper understanding of how negative emotional affects in the
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patient experience have impacted perceptions of medicine in the United States more
broadly.
In other words, the steadily declining trust in medical leadership in the United
States over the last forty years might be explained by examining how medical
experiences produce negative emotional affects. Robert Blendon et al. examined trust in
the leadership of the Unites States medical profession over the past half century, and
were dismayed to find out that in 1966, 73% expressed great confidence in the medical
profession while in 2012, only 34% expressed this view.6 Curiously, Blendon et al. found
that trust in physician’s integrity has always remained high. Even more interesting, only
23% of respondents expressed “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the
medical system. The United States is tied for 24th place in terms of how many adults
agree with the claim, “All things considered, doctors can be trusted.”7 Even though, on
average, healthcare outcomes in the United States have improved, attitudes towards
the healthcare system have degraded.
There are contradictory elements to these findings. On the one hand, United
States citizens seem to trust the integrity of physicians, but are not confident in both
medicine’s professional leadership or the medical system. Patients were satisfied with
their own medical treatment, but they were not trusting of physicians more generally,
an unusual combination of attitudes. Factoring in the income level of patients provides
some insight. Low-income patients were far less satisfied with their treatment than
high-income patients. Blendon et al. initially suggest that these contradictory views are
related to “the lack of a universal health care system in the United States.”8 However,
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they also note that “countries near the top of the international rankings and those near
the bottom have varied coverage systems, so the absence of a universal system seems
unlikely to be the dominant factor.”9
Thus, patients’ contradictory views of the medical profession in the Unites States
remain somewhat of a mystery. Surely, cost is a major factor in these attitudes.
However, the entire patient experience, from scheduling an appointment, to visiting the
doctor, to getting billed, might also be a major factor. This would explain why patients
tend to have negative attitudes towards the medical system but not towards the
medical practitioners they use. Patients’ ire is not focused on discrete objects or agents,
rather, it bubbles to the surface because of the overall flawed patient experience design
of healthcare in the United States.
To show how the patient experience design is flawed, I want to briefly
triangulate my argument in the literature, providing a backdrop for my claims. Then, I
will walk through each stage of the patient experience process, from scheduling, sitting
in the waiting room, examination by a physician, to billing. As we progress, I will return
to the central claim of this chapter, that patient experience design has aporetic
consequences, by addressing how healthcare environments either indirectly or directly
contribute to the mismanagement of emotional affects, and thus, uncertainty.

3. The Intersections of Patient Experience Design
This chapter finds itself at the intersection of three bodies of work:
environmental psychology, healthcare design, and patient experience design (PXD).
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There is significant overlap between these fields, and their connection can be framed as
a genus-species relationship. Environmental psychology is the widest umbrella,
healthcare design is a species and offshoot of environmental psychology, and PXD is a
sub-species of healthcare design. To understand how these different fields intersect, we
need to understand how healthcare spaces, and spaces in general, became a topic of
interest to psychologists and designers. Environmental psychology, or the study of how
environments impact mental states, can be traced back to the work of three twentieth
century psychologists: Kurt Lewin, James Gibson, and James Barker.

Environmental Psychology
Lewin’s foray into environmental psychology helps establish this field as
legitimate, while providing some practical limits and defenses of studying the
psychological impact of environments. In the 1940s, Lewin theorized about the “lifespace” or “field” that psychological researchers have in mind when they refer to the
motivations, moods, goals, anxieties, or needs of a subject.10 Lewin argued that the
sensorial field and motivations of a research subject are not only important to
psychological research, they are intimately bound with how that subject is responding
to experiments.
One early criticism of environmental psychology is that it lacked a restricted
scope, or boundary. For instance, how much of the environment affects a person? Is it
just the immediate surroundings? Or does the building or space where the surroundings
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are located affect the person as well? Lewin provided a preliminary answer to this type
of question:
The food that lies behind the doors at the end of a maze so that neither smell
nor sight can reach it is not a part of the life space of the animal. In case the
individual knows that food lies there this knowledge, of course, has to be
represented in his life space, because this knowledge affects behavior. It is also
necessary to take into account the subjective probability with which the
individual views the present or future state of affairs because the degree of
certainty of expectation also influences behaviors.11
Lewin helps solve the problem of environmental boundaries by suggesting that the
limits of the environment are, first, what the subject can sense, second, their
motivations, and third, their expectations. This helped environmental psychology cope
with boundary criticisms, and gave environmental psychologists a paradigm they could
use to assess environmental impacts on human psychology.
Gibson reiterated what Lewin tacitly asserted: the environment is an impactful
dimension of behavior, cognition, and affect. Gibson’s contribution to the foundations
of environmental psychology is his rejection of the standard stimulus-response methods
in optics research.12 Before Gibson, the equipment psychologists used only tested
narrow visual processes, such as aperture vision. Gibson believed these tests did not
capture “natural vision,” or the kind of vision processes we use in everyday life. To
capture these vision processes, Gibson set up life-like labs, where research subjects
would perform optical tests under conditions that more closely resembled reality.
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Gibson brought validity to environmental psychology by suggesting that the
environment in the lab can affect the outcomes of experiments. Gibson understood how
the environment of the lab needed to match “life-like” situations in order to collect
useful data on vision. In addition, he demonstrated the value of simulating real-world
conditions while still maintaining control over lab experiments.
Finally, Barker helped environmental psychology develop by pushing
psychologists to perform fieldwork. In his 1968 work Ecological Psychology, Barker
pointed out how psychologists tended to use the lab as a self-imposed limitation on
their research.13 Psychologists had gleaned useful insights from lab settings, but they
knew very little about how these insights functioned outside the walls of the laboratory.
Barker’s solution was to record and analyze psychological behaviors outside of the lab,
and he established the Midwest Psychological Field Station in Oskaloosa, Kansas,
towards this end. Here, Barker conducted studies from the 1940s through the 1970s,
generating a substantial amount of empirical data. Interested in developmental
psychology, Barker recorded the day-to-day actions of a seven-year-old boy called
“Raymond,” and published his findings in the book, One Boy’s Day.14 Barker took
psychology out of the lab, arguing the only way to understand human psychology was to
examine human behaviors “in the wild.” Barker’s approach was a vital element in
getting psychologists to recognize the psychological impact of the lived environment.
Together, these three psychologists established a foundation for what would
become environmental psychology. What sets environmental psychology apart from
other types of psychological inquiry is a simple and intuitive notion: the environment
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affects human psychology. Rather than try and limit research subject’s exposure to
outside stimuli, these pioneers embraced these complicating factors, arguing that they
were not so much confounding as constitutive to human behavior, thought, and
motivation. Today, environmental psychology is an interdisciplinary subfield of
psychology that encompasses researchers in geography, economics, architecture,
sociology, anthropology, education, and design. For our purposes, it is important to
understand how environmental psychology plays a major role in healthcare design.

Healthcare Design
Environmental psychology is the basis for healthcare design, which for the last
three decades, has used the methods and approaches of environmental psychologists in
the context of healthcare environments. What sets healthcare design apart from other
approaches is not only its subject matter, but its research methodology. Imitating the
shift towards evidence-based medicine, healthcare design practitioners deploy
evidence-based design, the brain-child of healthcare design researcher Roger Ulrich.
Ulrich’s research on the impact of windows on patient recovery in the 1980s,
which we will discuss later in this chapter, set a precedent in healthcare design towards
testing and data-driven design. In contrast to other approaches, healthcare design is less
interested in aesthetics and more interested in how design impacts patient psychology –
and by extension, patient outcomes and attitudes – in healthcare environments. Thus,
healthcare design has attempted to mirror the scientific practices of both psychology
and medical science, and base design decisions on gathered data. Their research has
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revealed that lighting, flooring, pictures, and even waiting areas all factor into the
experiences of healthcare practitioners and patients. Design choices in these areas have
real and measurable impacts.

Patient Experience Design
Patient experience design (PXD) is a term that rhetoric of health and medicine
scholar Lisa Meloncon has advocated for. She argues that a “new term was necessary
because our existing terminology (e.g., user experience, usability, participatory design)
was not adequate to capture the necessary attitude that researchers and practitioners
need to do user experience and usability work in healthcare contexts.”15 A cross
between user experience, patient-centered medicine, and technical communication,
PXD is a “participatory methodological approach centered on contextual inquiry to
understand the relationship between information…and human activities in health
care.”16
This chapter is not an example of PXD because it does not build up a theoretical
position from usability testing and contextual inquiry, but it is a broadly theoretical
overview of the kinds of environments, situations, and processes where PXD research is
relevant. Or, my overview of the theories and literature on healthcare design are
centered on the patient experience, not the experience of practitioners or healthcare
providers. Most healthcare design research has no such emphasis, and as I will argue,
what makes a healthcare environment design adequate from the perspective of a
physician or medical staff is sometimes in direct conflict with what makes it adequate
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for the patient. Thus, PXD is an invaluable lens through which to view uncertainty in
healthcare design, since it can tease out these conflicts, sometimes contradicting or
overturning assumptions in traditional healthcare design.

4. Mapping the Patient Experience Process
Together, environmental psychology’s recognition of the importance of lived
spaces, healthcare design’s emphasis on empirical and data-driven research, and PXD’s
focus on the experience of patients establishes a foundation for my description of the
patient experience process. Rather than focus on the general experience of the patient,
however, we are primarily concerned with how uncertainty factors into this synthesis of
psychology, healthcare, and design. My claim is that both the affect heuristic and the
uncertainty intensification hypothesis play a vital role in understanding how uncertainty
factors into the patient experience process. From the initial decision to schedule an
appointment, to paying your bill, uncertainty is either directly implicated or indirectly
colors the experience of being a patient, and often to the patient’s detriment.
To capture this process, I have broken up the patient experience process into six
discrete phases. Admittedly, more or less phases could be used to map the process of
the patient experience, and how I have approached describing each phase will vary
depending on the type of patient experience we have in mind. I have tried to describe
an “average” outpatient experience, meaning an experience of someone who is not
chronically ill. I will mention how the experiences of the chronically ill and inpatients
factor into certain patient experience design failures, but these experiences are not a
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central focus. Along the way, I will ground my analysis of each phase (more or less
directly) on uncertainty’s connection to affect, design, and decision-making. In other
words, we will investigate aporetic environments.

Stage 1: Deciding to Call a Physician
Patient experience often commences with uncertainty, especially when an
appointment is not an annual, regular, or mandated visit. Unless it is an emergency,
patients first have to decide if they can identify their health issue themselves or whether
they need the help of a professional. Looking up health information online has become
a popular component of this process, and a Pew center survey of 3,014 adults in the
United States found that 35% of respondents have gone online to figure out what
medical condition they or someone they know might have.17 Although this fact might
alarm some in the medical community, pre-internet patients likely engaged in the same
decision-making processes without the aid of online tools to help guide them. In fact,
this same Pew survey found that 46% of respondents sought the assistance of a medical
professional after locating online information on their health problems.18 The evidence
does not suggest that patients are replacing their physicians with an internet search.
There are many factors that go into the decision to seek professional help or not,
but epistemologist Jason Stanley’s notion of “practical interest” can helps us better
understand how uncertainty is an important component of this decision-making
process. As I will argue in the next chapter, the relationship between stakes and
uncertainty has distinct rhetorical effects. Stanley develops a thought experiment with
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two scenarios, a low-stakes case and a high-stakes case, which demonstrates how stakes
affect knowledge.19
In both cases, two interlocutors are unsure if a bank is open on Saturday. In the
high-stakes case, the main characters will be evicted if they do not deposit a check in
the bank on Saturday. In the low-stakes case, there is little consequence if they do not
deposit the check on Saturday. Stanley’s question is this: is the proposition “the bank is
open on Saturday” epistemologically different in either of these cases? In the highstakes case, is it harder for our interlocutors to know that the bank is open on Saturday,
since the stakes of knowing are so high? Stanley, and other fellow epistemologists who
call themselves “contextualists,” believe so. They claim that in the high stakes case it is
harder to know about the proposition “the bank is open on Saturday,” and in the lowstakes case it is easier to know the truth of this statement, all other things being equal.
Thus, the urgency of knowledge acquisition, what these epistemologists call stakes,
affects our relative certainty. If we take this claim seriously, whether or not a patient
contacts a physician – whether or not their uncertainty persuades them to seek
professional assistance – will likely depend a great deal on how high their perceived
stakes are.
This process of patient decision-making is neither straightforwardly logical nor
easily predictable. Instead, it depends on the patient’s perceived stakes, which can be
confounded by multiple factors. Fear of the physician’s office, the belief they are unable
to afford care, or even thinking they do not have the time to visit a physician are all
reasons a patient might decide to avoid calling a professional, regardless of the validity
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of these beliefs. Importantly, we must be wary of general claims concerning what drives
a patient to avoid (or visit) a physician. The “calculus” of patient decision-making is not
necessarily rational, as some decision theorists might have us believe. Rather, we are
much better off understanding how uncertainty is rhetorically accentuated or stifled,
accelerated or mitigated, as a means of better understanding this decision. Stakes are
one major factor amongst a complex network of confounding variables. Although not
directly related to patient experience design, which factors contribute to the decision to
become a patient in the first place are vital to our understanding of patient experience.

Stage 2: Scheduling an Appoint with a Physician
Patient scheduling has a ripple-like effect on the functioning of a physician’s
office. Surveys of patients have shown that excessive waiting times are a major
contributing factor for negative attitudes towards outpatient care, and many patients
associate reasonable waiting times with clinical competence.20 As Tugba Cayirli and
Emre Veral have suggested, the objective of scheduling is to find a system in which
performance in a clinical environment can be optimized, which offers hope that
excessive waiting times are reduced.21 The optimal conditions for performance in a
clinical setting are beset by uncertainty. In a perfect world, patients would show up on
time and visits would last as long as they are scheduled for. In reality, late patients, noshows, walk-ins, and emergencies complicate physicians’ ability to schedule their work.
Most appointment systems try to account for a range of variables to optimize
the patient wait time, however, there are unexpected variables that make such
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optimization difficult. For instance, while arriving late is an undesirable behavior for a
well-tuned appointment system, arriving early is as well, since this can create excessive
congestion in the waiting room.22 No-shows are also more complicated than they seem.
No-show probabilities range from 5 to 30 percent, with this variance partially accounted
for by difference in medical specialty.23 However, the higher percentage of no-shows,
the shorter the wait times for patients. This design problem from a physician’s point of
view is a windfall for the patient. Although not often considered, the presence of
companions can also affect the arrival process for appointments, since this causes
additional congestion in the waiting room. This factor is not accounted for in most
appointment systems.
“No-shows,” or patients who fail to show up for scheduled appointments
without forewarning, are a particular problem for appointment systems. Some
physicians have instituted “no-show” penalties, which charge patients for not cancelling
at least 24-48 hours in advance. These have been effective in reducing instances of noshows and reducing lost revenue for physicians.24 However, offsetting this lost revenue
by charging it to patients is poor patient experience design.
From the patient’s perspective, this is not an equitable exchange. Physicians face
no discrete penalty for showing up late for (or canceling) a patient’s appointment, even
though patients might use a precious vacation or sick day to visit the doctor. A family
emergency or other unpredictable contingency that forces a patient to miss an
appointment means their medical issue remains unresolved, a new appointment will
need to be scheduled, and they will be charged for receiving no product or service. This
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does not describe a process that elicits positive emotional affects. Some physicians have
deployed more creative methods, like putting chronic no-shows on a “probationary”
schedule,25 using telemedicine and cloud-based, same-day appointment solutions,26 or
using automated reminder systems to reduce the number of no-shows. These are all
more patient-friendly design choices than no-show penalties.
Any appointment system that cannot account for, manage, or cope with
uncertainty will inevitably produce negative emotional affects in patients. To date, no
practical solution for long wait times, unpredictable patients, or unexpected events has
been developed. Technological advances like telemedicine are promising developments
in this arena, but widespread adoption of these advances has yet to occur. If a patient
enters into a healthcare decision-making process burdened by negative emotional
affects, the affect heuristic suggests they will treat this process with more skepticism. In
practical terms, if a patient undergoes a poor scheduling experience with a physician,
their willingness to listen to the physician’s medical advice might become compromised.
Scheduling system design is thus an important factor in mitigating or exacerbating
aporetic conditions.

Stage 3: Finding the Physician’s Office
Web-based technologies have shifted many expectations about how, and how
fast, services or products can reach the hands of consumers. These expectation shifts lag
in the healthcare sector, but the desire for rapid, on-demand, and digital access to
physician services grows. Speed is a tradeoff, however. Loyalty to a single physician will
137

likely decline as appointment systems and patient experience design catches up to
contemporary trends. Since many physician appointments require an in-person
presence, this means that patients will need to navigate different healthcare spaces
more frequently. If a patient is changing physicians based on their availability, it is only
natural that patients’ wayfinding in healthcare spaces will be tested.
Wayfinding is an underappreciated dimension of environmental design, and is
often an afterthought in healthcare environment design.27 Despite this lack of attention,
poor wayfinding can contribute and exacerbate problems in healthcare spaces. Yona
Nelson-Shulman’s research on hospital signage found that the absence of orientation
aides and staffing contributed to the general chaos and confusion of healthcare
environments.28 Nelson-Shulman found that many patients struggled to find the
admitting office in her study, and once they did, did not realize that they needed to
register at the front desk to receive their paperwork. Since the admission process at this
particular hospital was not spelled out, procedures that patients needed to complete
before going to their examination rooms often “came as unpleasant surprises.”29 Finally,
patients frequently interrupted staff to ask where the restrooms, telephone, or cafeteria
were, and how to find them. The simple lack of signage in the healthcare space that
Nelson-Shulman studied contributed to increased crowding, confused patients, and
distracted staff.
From a patient experience perspective, poor wayfinding contributes to preexisting anxieties and frustrations, increasing dissatisfaction with the hospital and wait
times.30 The longer patients were kept waiting, the more likely they were to be angry
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and feel “abandoned by the institution.”31 The more likely they were to feel abandoned,
the more likely they were to seek out front-desk staff and demand explanations. Since
this interrupted the staff’s attempts to manage patient visits, wait times became even
longer, producing a chain reaction of delays, frustration, and poor patient experiences.
Nelson-Shulman’s study incorporated improved signage to see how it affected
the patient experience of wayfinding, and the results were positive. Patients were less
stressed and required assistance less often. Staff members were equally pleased, since
their time was not spent answering repetitive wayfinding questions by patients. In fact,
personnel from other areas in the hospital approached the researchers in NelsonShulman’s study, asking if they could perform similar interventions in their operations.32
These findings support the claim that uncertainty can have distinct affective impacts on
patients. Since negative emotional affects can alter the decision-making process for
patients, something as simple as providing clear signage can have a profound impact on
how a healthcare experience unfolds.
From a universal design perspective, many healthcare environments also fail to
consider different wayfinding needs. For instance, recent research on dementia
patients’ wayfinding abilities suggests that most healthcare environments are
unprepared for the specific challenges of this disease.33 Dementia symptoms that
conflict with poor wayfinding design include limitations on cognitive abilities, wandering
or restless walking, agitation and aggression, and temporal disorientation. Environments
that mitigate these conflicts take account of five dimensions: legibility, familiarity,
autonomy, sensory stimulation, and social interaction.34 For a population whose very
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illness can affect their relationship with navigational certainty, using these dimensions
as part of the healthcare design process is invaluable.
Wayfinding is a small element in healthcare environments, but this small
element can mean the difference between a positive and negative experience with
physicians and staff. Many healthcare situations are stressful, time-consuming, and
unnerving. After all, most of us do not see a physician because we feel particularly
vigorous or are certain what ails us. Being unable to find the waiting room, being
uncertain where important facilities are, or simply being lost in a maze of bustling
healthcare workers can easily exacerbate an already-tenuous emotionally affective
situation. Drawing on the uncertainty intensification hypothesis, emotional affects are
accentuated under these conditions. Thus, poor wayfinding experiences create
conditions of uncertainty, and since most poor wayfinding experiences produce
negative emotional affects, patient decision-making processes will tend to amplify
perceptions of risk, and mitigate perceptions of reward.
Even though Nelson-Shulman’s research is several decades old, her findings are
as relevant then as today. Importantly, her research shows how even small changes to
signage, small clarifications about process, and small tweaks to the environment can
overcome poor healthcare building layout and architecture. For patients with special
needs – like the needs of dementia patients – these small additions and tweaks become
invaluable components in overcoming the uncertainty of foreign spaces. A healthcare
environment can be modified to mitigate aporetic effects.
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Stage 4: The Waiting Room
There is no lack of irony in a patient showing up to an appointment on time, only
to sit in a “waiting room.” Yet, waiting rooms are nearly ubiquitous components of the
patient experience, and function to offset issues that arise from a combination of dayto-day uncertainties and appointment system failures. Research on waiting room
environments has shifted in recent years, from a focus on the negative factors that
beset the waiting room experience, to what healthcare designers call a “positive
distraction,” or an “environmental feature or situation that elicits positive feelings,
holds attention and interest, and eventually fosters beneficial changes in physiological
systems.”35 For instance, quality furniture, warm color hues, decorative artwork, and
plentiful lighting all function as positive distractions in the waiting room environment.
These different elements work in concert to sooth patients’ feelings and increase their
satisfaction with perceived care.36
A good portion of research on waiting rooms is influenced by Roger Ulrich’s
theory of “supportive design.”37 This concept is developed in Ulrich et al.’s 1991 article
“Stress Recovery During Exposure to Natural and Urban Environments,” which is one of
the most widely cited articles in healthcare design and one of the most popular pieces in
environmental psychology published in the last three decades. In this piece, Ulrich et
al.’s research centers on the positive emotional states that are elicited by nature.
A pioneer in healthcare design research, Ulrich’s work in the 1980s found that
hospital patients recovering from surgery who were positioned by windows that
overlooked trees had better recovery outcomes, including shorter inpatient stays, lower
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intakes of narcotic drugs, and more favorable evaluations by nurses.38 These findings
parallel research on prison settings, which suggest that cell windows facing views of
nature were associated with lower prisoner stress symptoms, such as digestive
problems and headaches, and correlated with fewer sick calls.39 The basic takeaways of
Uhlrich’s theory of supportive design, based on his study of nature views on patients,
suggests that healthcare facilities should 1) foster a sense of control, 2) enhance social
support, and 3) provide access to positive distractions and limit exposure to negative
distractions.40
In other words, the view from waiting rooms can produce measurably positive
emotional affects, which are correlated with positive patient outcomes. Jiang et al.’s
application of Uhlrich’s research to waiting rooms found that the optimal design for
these spaces includes: 1) “floor-to-ceiling windows or larger window-wall ratio with
maximum natural views,” 2) “bountiful natural light and perceivable warmth,” and 3)
“abundant views to the external therapeutic landscapes/healing gardens.”41 Jiang’s
team also found that furniture arrangement was an important factor.
Arranging furniture in “noninstutitional ways,” or in ways that promote social
interaction and interpersonal communication were highly preferred. Lines of chairs in
rows are not conducive to these effects. Additionally, people preferred furniture
arrangements that intentionally guided patient’s views to meaningful external scenes.
Internal components, like fireplaces, stone, brick, wooden decorations, and home-like
interior designs with lamps and comfortable seating produce a sense of familiarity that
patients also preferred.
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From a patient experience perspective, Jiang et al.’s research is an invaluable
contribution to understanding how healthcare environments can be optimized to
produce positive emotional affects. Our earlier discussion of the connection between
uncertainty and emotional affect, based on Slovic’s affect heuristic, works two ways.
Negative emotional affects can lead to uncertainty and distrust, but positive emotional
affects make people more likely to think that benefits are ample and risks are minimal.
In healthcare settings, when tensions can run high, producing positive emotional
affects in patients produces a domino effect, contributing to physicians’ ability to do
their job effectively. Some healthcare design elements put patients and physicians in
conflict, like appointment systems, but waiting room environments pose no such
problems. The only barrier to reducing uncertainty in the patient-physician relationship
via environmental design is forethought and will on the part of designers, at least as it
concerns waiting room spaces.

Stage 5: The Physician Consultation/Inpatient Experience
The physician consultation phase is arguably the most important dimension of
the patient experience, meaning the design elements in this phase will be particularly
vital to understanding how impactful uncertainty can be in healthcare contexts.
Examining the literature on healing environments, Eliane Schreuder et al. found that
there are six themes that matter to patients: safety and security, social comfort, spatial
comfort, sensory comfort, privacy, and autonomy.42 In the context of the physician
consultation or an inpatient stay, these factors are crucial in managing the levels of
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uncertainty and the emotional affects of patients. If one of these factors contributes to
higher levels of uncertainty, we know that negative emotional affects are likely to be
intensified. If negative emotional affects are intensified, we know that perceptions of
risk (and thus uncertainty) will be amplified. Hence, how consultation environments
manage the tendency for healthcare environments to be aporetic will have a significant
impact on the relationship between physicians and patients.
Safety and security are associated with feelings of prospect, refuge, and
escape.43 Prospect refers to the ability for the patient to have clear lines of sight to
detect potential dangers. Refuge refers to the patient’s ability to have their belongings
kept safe. Escape is associated with the ability of staff to call for support in the case of
an emergency. Thus, concerns over safety and security are transparently about the
mitigation of uncertainty in the healthcare experience. The desire to know how to
escape in case of an emergency, the desire to know that your belongings are safe, and
the desire to know that help can arrive all assume a deep connection between design
and states of uncertainty.
Social comfort is associated with the support of other patients, friends, family,
and staff.44 In particularly stressful conditions, the need for social support increases,
even though admission to the hospital tends to decrease access to these networks.45
Factors that impact patients’ perception of social support include the number of beds,
the interior design (specifically, the use of carpeting and the placement of chairs around
tables), and several forms of media that can provide “positive distractions” (although
they can also prove to be negative, in some instances).46 Social comfort reproduces
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conditions of social connection and familiarity inside healthcare settings. Here too,
uncertainty lurks in the background. Familiarity denotes the absence of uncertainty; to
feel socially comforted within the context of healthcare settings, patients need to feel
that their connection to established social networks is not uncertain, tenuous, or
precarious.
Spatial comfort refers to the physical features and use of space in an
environment.47 For patients, a space is comfortable if it is functional (allows a patient to
do what they want), it fulfills personal needs (the patient finds it personally pleasing),
and it is perceived to support social interaction. Factors that determine spatial comfort
include the size of the room, which should be big enough to allow patients to easily get
in and out of their bed and allow space for visitors. Allowing patients to personalize the
room is also a contributing factor, as are factors that influence the perceived quality of
waiting rooms, such as views of nature and the style of walls, floors, and ceilings. Even
the mere presence of houseplants or pictures of natural environments demonstrate
measurable effects on a patient’s perception of spatial comfort.48 Again, familiarity is a
primary component of a patient’s perception of spatial comfort, suggesting that
mitigating the uncertainty and foreignness of environments can produce positive
emotional affects.
Sensory comfort is associated with the general comfort provided by
environmental factors like light, air, scent, temperature, and noise. Appropriate lighting
has been found to reduce symptoms of depression, the length of inpatient stays, patient
stress, and errors committed by staff.49 Good ventilation (fresh air) is also a contributing
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factor to sensory comfort, as are appropriate temperature settings and vent
placements. However, the most investigated dimension of sensory comfort is sound.
Music has been found to be stress-reducing, but elevated levels of noise are associated
with abrupt awakenings and poor sleep.50 Minimizing the number of beds and using
sound-absorbing materials for walls and floors can contribute to higher levels of sensory
comfort for patients. Uncertainty is not directly implicated in these factors, but
emotional affects are. Based on the affect heuristic, these emotional affects can
increase or reduce how uncertainty affects patients’ decision-making processes.
Schreuder et al. define privacy as the ability for patients to shut out information
about others and the need for one’s own space.51 The number of beds in a room is an
important dimension of patients’ perceptions of privacy, with single rooms increasing
feelings of dignity, privacy, and satisfaction.52 Other factors, like building materials that
absorb sound, places for private consultation, and bed partitions also contribute to
feelings of privacy. Again, we find that the desire for privacy is implicated in a parallel
need for uncertainty management. Patients wish to keep their private medical
information to themselves, and privacy-inducing design can mitigate uncertainty about
this facet of the patient experience.
Finally, autonomy is best understood as the ability for patients to control their
environments through their own actions or behaviors. A significant amount of patient
experience lacks autonomy, since patients are often reliant on staff who control both
monitoring and treatment. From a design perspective, the ability to open windows,
adjust lighting and temperature settings, close doors, or otherwise use the environment
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around them contributes to patient autonomy. Feelings of a loss of autonomy are
deeply interwoven with sensations of uncertainty. The sensation of losing one’s
autonomy induces feelings of helplessness, especially when faced with unexpected
situations. Thus, feeling a loss of autonomy can make a patient feel more incapable,
depressed, or frustrated with the inherent uncertainty of medical treatment.
Viewing patient experience design from the vantage point of uncertainty
provides a strong sense that most, if not all, design decisions in the consultation or
inpatient area of a healthcare environment can exacerbate or mitigate uncertainty.
Patients’ perception of the spatial aspects of the environment – where things are
positioned, how controllable the environment is, etc. – plays an important role in
influencing their emotional affects and behaviors, which in turn can disrupt this phase of
the patient experience.
For instance, research by Vanessa Okken, Thomas van Rompay, and Ad Pruyn
has found that when a room “feels” less spacious to a patient, it “not only invokes less
positive judgments, but also decreases self-disclose intentions.”53 The commonplace
notion that the “walls are closing in on me” is not trivial, but a deeply revealing design
statement. In addition to Okken, Rompay, and Pruyn’s findings, research by Stuart
Albert and James Dabbs in the 1970s found (at least in the context of American culture)
that a reduction in interpersonal space arouses resistance to persuasion.54 As Albert and
Dabbs speculate, “As distance decreases, the speaker appears to focus his attention
more intently upon the listener, and gives the impression of trying to influence him. As a
consequence it is difficult for the listener to relax.”55 Small patient spaces, or even the
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perception that a space is small, is enough to limit self-disclosure (a rather large
problem for the practice of medicine), produce negative emotional affects, and thus
reduce the persuasiveness of a speaker.
To put Okken et al.’s and Albert and Dabbs’s research in another way,
environmental perceptions of the consultation environment can exacerbate negative
emotional affects. Slovic’s research has also demonstrated how negative emotional
affects tend to amplify perceptions of risk and mollify perceptions of benefits. Since risk
is nothing other than a certain type of uncertainty, we can suggest that unpleasant
consultation environments amplify perceptions and feelings of uncertainty.
Thus, unpleasant environments contribute to aporetic environments, or
environments where there are elevated levels of uncertainty affecting decision-making.
A negative aporetic environment makes attempts to persuade patients to overlook
uncertainty more difficult, while positive aporetic environments make it easier for
physicians to deploy these same tactics. When factoring in the six themes that
Schreuder et al. finds in the literature on healing environments, we find that many
dimensions of the overall inpatient or consultation phase of the patient experience are
vulnerable to poor design decisions, which can directly alter the emotional affects of
patients. These emotional affects, in turn, have measurable outcomes on interpersonal
interactions and general attitudes towards physicians.
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Stage 6: Billing and Cost
The cost of medical treatment is an important dimension of the patient
experience because of the observable association between emotional affect and value.
Slovic has applied the affect heuristic to this dimension of decision-making, with
fascinating results. For instance, Slovic sees the work of Christopher Hsee as
demonstrating an instance of the affect heuristic in action.
In Hsee’s experiment, he provides a joint-evaluation condition where
participants are shown two dictionaries and asked how much they would be willing to
pay for them.56 Dictionary A has 10,000 entries and is pristine, while Dictionary B has
20,000 entries but has a torn cover (but is otherwise like new). When compared
together, participants were willing to pay more for Dictionary B. However, when only
one group was asked to price A and a separate group was asked to price B, B was given a
lower value than A. Hsee calls this phenomenon the “evaluability principle.”
Without a direct comparison between the 10,000-entry dictionary A, and 20,000entry dictionary B, participants were uncertain how much each dictionary should be
worth based on their utility, and instead based their valuation on the attractiveness of
the dictionary. Under simultaneous scrutiny, a buyer is more capable of seeing that
dictionary B is superior to dictionary A where it counts, mainly, the number of entries it
contains. Thus, the evaluability of entries only becomes available through the
comparison process. This finding has import for understanding the relationship between
cost, emotional affect, and uncertainty in patient experience.
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If the evaluability principle is applied to the context of patient experience, then
patient experience design takes on a new level of priority. Patients have little access to
the evaluability of their experience at a physician, meaning their ability to compare
experiences is clouded by uncertainty. If a patient attends a physician’s office that
provides a poor patient experience design, Slovic’s affect heuristic suggests they will be
more inclined to think they are getting less value from the experience than if this same
environment was well designed, even if the care they received is better in the poorlydesigned patient experience case. This is the most important insight of Hsee’s and
Slovic’s research for patient experience design. Because patients, on average, are
uncertain of the quality of the care they receive, and likely unable to know what
constitutes “good” care in the first place (outside of outcomes), patient experience
design becomes a critical dimension of both perceived care quality and value. We can
take this argument one step further.
Slovic’s and Hsee’s work on the affect heuristic and evaluability principle do not
address a corollary phenomenon: willingness to pay. Imagine if in Hsee’s original
experiment, participants were not told to price dictionary A and dictionary B, but
instead given a price and asked how willing they would be to pay that amount. This
question, a measure of what researchers call “willingness to pay,” is exactly what
Kampfer et al. explore in packaging design, a different but related area of research.57
Kampfer et al. rely on the theory of sensation transference, or how a product’s
sensory experience transfers over into seemingly unrelated attributes of this product.
For instance, the perceived sturdiness of a cup can affect the evaluation of the beverage
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it contains, or potato chips in hard-to-open bags are perceived as fresher.58 However,
Kampfer et al.’s research is centered on product weight, and connects this sensory
dimension to value expectations in a way not often considered in research on sensory
transference. Interestingly, Kampfer et al. found that willingness-to-pay is mediated by
both flavor intensity and flavor evaluation, which are in turn influenced by product
weight. A higher product weight increases the desire for food and beverages, which in
turn increases a consumer’s willingness to pay for a product.
Applied to our case of patient experience design, we can extrapolate the findings
of Kampfer et al. to theorize that the sensory conditions of a healthcare setting are likely
to affect a patient’s attitude towards the quality of care they are receiving. In turn, the
perception of care quality likely plays a role in patients’ willingness to pay for a
physician’s services. Based on Hsee’s evaluability principle, this is only the case when
few comparisons of quality are accessible. Patients with chronic illnesses, for instance,
are probably less likely to be affected by patient experience design when it comes to
perceived value, because they frequent the physician more often.
We can tie together these different psychological strands together by suggesting
that uncertainty is a primary factor in the perception of value. Patients who are
uncertain about the quality they receive will be more affected by the overall patient
experience design than those who are more familiar with the healthcare system.
Patients who only attend the physician when they are sick, for instance, are probably
going to be much less willing to pay steep healthcare costs if they have negative
emotional affects towards their experience. Thus, the cycle repeats itself. Patients who
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fail to go to the doctor are more likely to have poor patient outcomes, which means
they will require more expensive interventions, which raises the total cost of healthcare.
In addition, physicians are mostly unaware of how much their treatments cost, meaning
they are likely unable to effectively intervene in this unfortunate situation.
From a patient experience design perspective, the fact that physicians and
patients are both uncertain about the cost of treatments is problematic. In a systematic
review of the literature on physician awareness of drug costs, Allan et al. found
physicians’ median estimate for drug costs was 243% away from the true cost, implying
that many physicians make wild guesses when asked how expensive the drugs they are
prescribing are.59 Allan et al. also found that country, level of training, specialty, and
other factors have little to no impact on how much physicians were aware of drug costs,
and that this awareness has not improved in the 25 or so years that their review
covered.60
Taking account of Slovic’s, Hsee’s, and Kampfer’s findings, this means that while
patients may be uncertain about the quality of care they are receiving, physicians are
unaware of the cost of the care they are delivering, causing a striking disconnect
between patient and physician concerns. Thus, from a cost perspective, patient
experience design is both paramount to perceived costs, while costs are unknown to the
physicians who construct and manage patient experiences. This is a destructive mix of
priorities.
Perhaps more alarming, this effect is recursive. Interestingly, perceptions of the
cost of medicine contribute to higher drug costs. In a survey of 10,000 patients, Aurel
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Iuga and Maura McGuire found that 17% of patients did not take their prescribed
medicine because of perceived cost.61 In another survey of nearly 15,000 Medicare
beneficiaries, 55% of respondents did not fill at least one prescription because they
thought it would cost too much.62 Non-adherence to medications inevitably leads to
poor patient outcomes, which then increase the use of healthcare services, thus
increasing the total cost of healthcare across the board. Combined with our previous
discussion, we can begin to see a wider picture of how uncertainty, cost, and patient
experience have a tenuous and ultimately toxic relationship.
Based on Slovic’s and Hsee’s findings, we can surmise that negative impacts of
healthcare design are amplified in conditions of uncertainty. Without the ability to
reasonably compare different healthcare experiences, how patients feel about the
experience will be more impactful. In terms of aporetic rhetoric, we can simply say that
comparative uncertainty amplifies the pathos of design. Or, the affective dimension of
design is more likely to affect our decision making in situations where comparisons are
difficult to make, or value is hard to ascertain. Extending this premise, Kampfer’s work
takes this affective amplification and applies it to cost.
If the perceived quality of a healthcare experience is poor, thus producing
negative emotional affects, it follows that cost expectations will be lower. Because
healthcare costs have on average risen over time, we can see why the connection
between poor patient experience design and cost will only increase negative emotional
affects. These negative emotional affects, in turn, have a recursive effect on cost. Thus,
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again we find that uncertainty is a vital component of the patient experience, arousing
increasingly negative affects while increasing costs in the healthcare system.

5. Healthcare’s Conceits
Patient experience design, uncertainty, and emotional affects are all interrelated
components necessary for understanding how environments can induce or mitigate
aporetic effects. The notion that environments can be “rhetorical” is not novel. Thomas
Rickert’s theoretical work on “ambient rhetoric” is nothing other than a philosophical
probing of the connection between environmental psychology and rhetoric. 63 My
argument differs from Rickert’s notion of “ambience,” however. In this chapter, my
point was not to illustrate how healthcare environments are themselves rhetorical, or
how objects are rhetorical. Instead, I wanted to illustrate how environments and objects
contribute to certain emotional states – or general “moods” of negativity or positivity –
which in turn can affect decision-making processes. Decision-making is the fully-realized
product of a rhetorical process, and if this process is affected by certain kinds of
emotional affects (as Slovic hypothesizes), we can rightfully say that an environment is
“rhetorical” in this sense.
As Slovic suggests, if we feel good we tend to overlook high risks and low
benefits, and if we feel bad we tend to become suspicious of low risks and high benefits.
To think of this formulation rhetorically, when we experience positive or negative
emotional affects, we become susceptible to persuasive attempts to overlook or amplify
uncertainty, respectively. The vital bridge between aporetic rhetoric and design is
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emotional affect. When we begin to examine how these effects mingle with the
experience of environments – a highly affective dimension of experience – the patients’
place in an affective ecology becomes more striking. How patients experience
healthcare is not a trivial dimension of being healthy. In fact, the complex ecology of
patient experience is inseparable from patient decision-making, which in turn is a major
component of patient outcomes.
It is tempting to reduce the experience of patients to the functional, to the
immediate materials that “work” to make the patient healthier like drugs, but doing so
risks overlooking the bigger rhetorical picture. Whether a patient follows a treatment
plan is in no small way affected by a series of seemingly unrelated calculations,
emotional affects, and encounters. How these calculations are made, emotional affects
are felt, and encounters are experienced will lean heavily on how uncertainty is
managed throughout a patient’s healthcare journey.
Poor patient experience design is a reflection of modern medicine’s most
disappointing conceits. The notion of “patient-centered treatment,” which more often
than not functions as empty verbiage, is toothless without a deeper understanding of
patient experience design. Efforts to implement more “patient-centered treatment”
often disregard dimensions of environmental psychology and healthcare design.
Instead, patient-centeredness usually focuses on treating patients as “persons in
context of their own social worlds, listened to, informed, respected and involved in their
care – and their wishes are honored (but not mindlessly enacted) during their health
care journey.”64
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This sounds well and fine, but it only considers a marginal portion of the overall
patient experience. If a patient does not believe the expensive medical treatment they
have been prescribed is worth it, we can safely assume that having their wishes
“honored (but not mindlessly enacted)” will not count for much. If a patient must wait
for hours in a waiting room, after having waited months to get an appointment in the
first place, only to be examined for a few moments, acknowledging their “social worlds”
and being “listened to, informed,” and “respected” helps. However, without further
change, such reassurances do not go far enough in “centering” on the patient.
The problem with “patient-centeredness” is not the “patient,” but the
“centeredness.” Considered conceptually, “centeredness” is at best an empty promise
and at worst a bad-faith appeasement. Healthcare cannot (and arguably should not) be
“centered” on any particular component or agent. Focusing solely on reducing
healthcare costs will come at the expense of other important dimensions of healthcare
experience. Focusing solely on the patient, a well-intentioned notion, tends to discount
the potential utility of population-level findings and outcomes. Focusing solely on the
physician has the inverse problem, and tends to discount the potential utility of a
patient’s personal preferences and decisions.
The first step in overcoming the conceptually myopic connotations of
“centeredness” is to admit that there is no center to the healthcare system experience.
This chapter’s point-of-entry was the patient, but it was impossible for us to tarry along
this path without recognizing the various different agents, entities, and components of
the patient experience that have little to do with patient wishes or decisions. Instead,
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patient experience design is not about sticking with the patient, so much as it is about
starting with the patient and moving outwards and inwards, understanding how the
entire healthcare system continuously reinforces and mitigates aporetic effects.
Unlike the previous chapters, this chapter examined aporetic environments
instead of discrete types of uncertainty that lend themselves to distinct aporetic
strategies. In Chapter 2, we examined how spatial uncertainty influences the activity of
Agent Orange veterans. In Chapter 3, we looked at how mental illness skeptics and
denialists tend to deploy competing aporetic strategies. Skeptical strategies tend to rely
on prudential, conceptual, scope, trade-off, or causational uncertainty. Denialist
strategies tend to use what-about-ism and what-if-ism to accomplish their aporetic
goals. In this chapter, we have taken a markedly different approach to thinking through
aporetic rhetoric.
In the introduction to this project, I argued that aporetic rhetoric can be more
than epistemological, or it can function outside the parameters of verbal or visual
communication between one agent and another, affecting their cognitive states. This
chapter has latched on to this distinction by positing an aporetic environment, or the
kind of environment that amplifies or mitigates the flow and structure of aporetic
rhetoric. When in Xenophon’s Anabasis Hecatonymus describes the trip through
Paphlagonia as being “impassable,” aporia acts as a description of a place as well as how
the structure of that place produces certain cognitive states. Many healthcare
environments are “aporetic” in this sense. They are both confusing and difficult to
navigate, like when they are designed without wayfinding in mind, and they are the sort
157

of spaces that produce a heightened sense of risk or uncertainty. As we turn to our next
chapter, we will return to the epistemological dimensions of aporetic rhetoric. However,
understanding how environments can be aporetically inflected is an important piece of
understanding the rhetorical functions of uncertainty.
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Chapter 4
Addiction Theory, Urgency, and Aporetic Rhetoric
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1. A Brief History of Addiction
The phrase, “to blow smoke up one’s ass” derives from the ancient practices of
the Aztecs and Incas, who first engaged in the rectal use of tobacco smoke. The practice
died out until eighteenth-century Europe, when the exercise was rediscovered and used
to rouse people from “suspended animation” or those who had drowned.1 Soon after, a
bellows-like device which a physician inserted in a patient’s posterior was invented,
increasing the therapeutic force of the “treatment” over the more traditional and gentle
syringe method. There is arguably no more horrifying application of nicotine to privates
than France’s Doctor Buc’hoz, who testified to the effectiveness nicotine smoke
treatment for women suffering “hysteria,” administered vaginally. Coming in close
second, however, is Adelaide’s Hollingsworth’s 1893 The Columbia Cook Book, which
advocated that women who became poisoned should induce vomiting by literally
“blowing smoke” into their anuses.2
Such creative methods of “getting high” span many substances across the entire
length of human history. The most common and socially accepted of these include
alcohol, nicotine, and caffeine, which all stimulated incredible civilizational changes,
including the opening of trade routes and the development of shared social spaces like
pubs and bars, smoking parlors, and tea rooms. Researchers located the oldest
cultivated grape vines in Georgia, and carbon dated them to around 7000 to 5000 BCE.3
Coffee was popular in the Islamic world at the end of the fifteenth century, but tea’s
history is longer, since the Chinese people have been widely using the drink since at
least the third century BCE. The Aztecs, setting aside their more colorful applications of
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tobacco, practically worshipped the plant. They mixed it into their food and water and
taught their young that the goddess Cihuacoatl was made of tobacco leaves. The Aztecs
even used tobacco ritually during governmental proceedings, lighting their pipes before
the meetings began and keeping them lit throughout the discussion, believing it allowed
them to work longer and more efficiently.
Long accompanying the potency and importance of these substances have been
official laws, regulations, and taxes, a vital method of extracting revenues for states and
empires. Rulers in Babylon and Ancient Egypt created monopolies on drug production to
maximize how much they could receive in state profits. In contrast, movements decrying
the horrors of drug use are evident in most points in history, the United States’
prohibition in the 1920s and the modern day “war on drugs” being only recent
examples. Earlier and more brutal cases are ample, however. Tobacco users had their
lips cut off under the first tsar, while Ottoman sultan Murad IV beheaded them.4 In the
late fourteenth century, the Ottoman emir in Egypt eliminated the use of hashish and
imprisoned or executed farmers who grew the crop. Citizens found smoking the herb
had their teeth removed.5 The imposition of these policies, harsh as they were, are a
direct response by states and empires to abnormal patterns of drug use.
Historians credit modern addiction medicine to Calvinist theologians, who
offered basic explanations for compulsive alcohol consumption later adopted by
medical practitioners. For instance, in 1641 Dutch physician Dr. Nicolaes Tulp relied on
theological models to explain the loss of control associated various behaviors, giving
“sinful” habits a medical explanation. One of Tulp’s colleague, Cornelius Bontekoe,
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applied Tulp’s basic theory to the progressive loss of control over alcohol consumption
only a few decades later.
The development of psychiatry as a scientific discipline had a profound influence
on the development of addiction medicine as well. American physician Benjamin Rush
wrote in the eighteenth century about compulsive drinking, attributing the behavior to
the innate characteristics of the drink, as opposed to the drinker.6 Additionally, in the
nineteenth century, physicians first introduced medical journals dedicated to the study
of addiction. Interested parties first published the Journal of Inebriety in the US in 1876
and the British Journal of Addiction in 1884. The founder of modern psychiatric
medicine, Emil Kraepelin, published psychometric data on alcohol and tea consumption
in the 1890s, concluding that chronic alcoholism led to permanent cognitive decline.
Kraepelin’s work laid the groundwork for Freud’s psychological approach to addiction,
an important marker in addiction history. Until Freud, addiction as a monolithic category
was unheard of, especially as an expression of a single psychological malady.7
Addiction research in the twentieth century further developed the study of
compulsive and chronic behaviors by introducing new diagnostic classificatory systems,
engaging in increasingly sophisticated neurobiological research, and incorporating largescale animal studies that examined the physical effects of addiction on the brain. The
modern view is that addiction is caused by a “rewiring” of the brain’s reward system,
conditioning it to see drug intake as mimicking reward cues from more biologically
advantageous activities such as food and sex. Additionally, addiction research has
revealed that genetic factors play a role in addiction, which interact with the
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environment and other substances in incredibly complex ways. Despite humankind’s
long and storied experiences with intoxicating substances, we have yet to settle critical
questions on what addiction is, what causes it, and why it is such a difficult behavior to
alter.
Based on this long and complex history, it makes sense that addiction
researchers have consistently struggled to define the term, let alone unravel its
mysteries. Historically, the term “addiction” entered the English language in the late
sixteenth century, indicating an inclination for repeated habits or actions, holding both a
positive and negative sense. In the nineteenth century the term appeared in medical
discourse, taking on a discrete pathological meaning. This pathological meaning has
remained, despite the shift towards terms like “dependence,” which the medical
community implemented to prevent the stigmatizing associations that have developed
around addiction and “addicts,” as well as to provide a more broadly applicable term to
describe a wide range of chronic behaviors. Additionally, psychological researchers
often use the term “addiction” to indicate a compulsive motivational drive. Therefore,
as a neutral inclination or habit, as a pathology, or as a compulsive drive, different
scholarly perspectives conflate the meaning of addiction.8 The lack of an agreed-upon
“general” theory of addiction, which could explain the mechanisms in play across any
given addictive behavior or substance, is a strong indication this phenomenon is deeply
entrenched in uncertainty. By extension, how addiction theories treat this uncertainty
will lend them different aporetic virtues and vices.
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2. Expeditious and Fastidious Theory-Building
This leads us to ask, what makes for a good “general” theory, and what sorts of
questions should a general theory of addiction ask? A good general theory should be
able to explain a collection of related observations, be internally consistent,
understandable, parsimonious, generate testable hypotheses, and when tested, not be
contradicted by observations. Applied to addiction, a general theory should answer
some of the following questions: what is the difference between an addict and a nonaddict, or between a chronic abuser and merely a habitual or recreational user? How do
we classify which potentially addictive substances are more valuable than dangerous? Is
drug addiction more easily explainable in terms of properties of an external chemical,
substance, or behavior, or an internal biological, psychological, or social predilection for
addictive behaviors? How do we classify levels of craving, withdrawal, or other relapsing
effects? Perhaps most importantly, how can we commingle the variety of individual
theories of addiction, making sure that different insights from different fields work
together to produce a comprehensive explanation for addiction?
These questions have characteristics that define almost any attempt to produce
a general theory, however, medical researchers often build up healthcare theories from
empirical observation, and then use them diagnostically to match up a perceived
medical condition or state to a pre-conceived category of severity, progression, or to
identify the existence of a medical condition in the first place. Addiction theories are no
exception, as they often help physicians determine the existence or extent of someone’s
addiction.
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In healthcare settings, we can distinguish between two different “styles” of
theory. The first and most commonly used style is to create a simple, parsimonious,
abstracted theory that can fit multiple specific cases with ease, or an expeditious theory.
For instance, the popular Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) is an expeditious
personality inventory comprised of four either/or categories that describe sixteen
“types” of personality. Taking a MBTI “test” is quick and easy, the categories are
relatively intuitive and straightforward, and there are a narrow range of personality
types. This indicates that the structure of the test largely mitigates individual differences
within each personality category. MBTI personalities are relatively isolated from other
types of personality inventories, and there are clear and distinct explanatory limits on
how well the MBTI can measure personality.
An “inventory” is a classic example of an expeditious theory in medicine, and
medical practitioners often use inventories to determine the type, existence, or
intensity of a condition or state. For instance, the DSM 5 uses a “Substance Use
Disorder” inventory, where meeting a certain number of conditions on the list translates
into a certain intensity of addiction. Like all expeditious theories, inventories are
generally easy to use, common, and in most circumstances accurate and useful in
medical situations.
Theories based on stages are another type of expeditious theory. Medical
practitioners often used stage-based theories to help locate the progression of an illness
or disease. The most well-known of these is probably the stage system associated with
cancer, which moves from stage 0 to stage IV, each stage indicating the increasing size
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and spread of cancer cells. Like other expeditious theories, phase or stage-based models
are easy to use and apply and help physicians make quick and generally accurate
diagnoses, depending on the situation. Also like other expeditious theories, stage-based
models tend to “flatten out” individual differences, or differences that straddle multiple
categories. This ambiguity can make it difficult to determine which exact category an
observed condition or state currently occupies. Later, we will examine a stage-based
model of addiction.
There is a second and less-commonly used style of theory, often characterized by
interconnected, highly representative, complex, and nuanced abstractions that can fit
multiple specific cases accurately, or fastidious theories. Fastidious theories tend to
synthesize multiple theories, approaches, or concepts to explain a phenomenon.
Because they are unwieldy, complex, and confusing, fastidious theories are more
difficult to find “in the wild,” because they are not easily taught, explained, or built upon
by medical researchers. Like expeditious theories, fastidious theories in healthcare
settings can be both inventory or stage-based, however, while expeditious varieties of
these approaches are often simple and easy to use, fastidious versions are punishingly
intricate, complex, and often require a high level of expertise and experience to use
correctly.
For instance, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) is in stark
contrast to the more simplified MBTI. The most recent version of the MMPI, the MMPI2-RF, has only 338 items, which is a significant drop from earlier versions based on 567
items. The test is wide-ranging and captures potential personality and
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psychopathologies like depression, anxiety, paranoia, alienation, self-esteem issues, and
family problems. Unlike the MBTI, which has only 93 forced-choice questions (meaning
there are only two options to choose from for each question), the MMPI is more
complex and must be interpreted by a highly-trained expert. The test takes anywhere
from 30 to 60 minutes to complete in its entirety. This intricate measure of personality
may be elaborate and difficult to use, but it is also a highly valid, reliable, and thorough
examination of multiple dimensions of the human psyche, and unlike the MBTI, tends to
retain individual differences to produce a more representative diagnostic picture. Both
expeditious theories like the MBTI and fastidious theories like the MMPI are
characterized by how they contend with uncertainty.
Since humans act in complicated ways, embed themselves in complicated
cultural and physical systems, and act in accordance with a complicated and wide
variety of motivations, fears, and desires, there will always be an uncertainty gap
between theory and reality, especially as it pertains to human behavior. Uncertainty is
thus an innate feature of any theory of human behavior. Attempts to manage, constrain,
or “wrangle with” this uncertainty tends to be expeditious. Expeditious theories are
rhetorically potent because they are comprehensible, easily tested, and allow quick
categorization (and thus rapid comparison). However, expeditious theories are
susceptible to aporetic strategies that deploy counter-examples, point out how these
theories tend to “flatten out” specifics for the sake of categorization, and claims that
they produce representations of reality that are intuitive but inaccurate.
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On the other hand, attempts to embrace, precisely describe, or “lean in” to the
uncertainty between theory and reality tend to be fastidious. Fastidious theories are
rhetorically efficacious because they are exhaustive, applicable with high levels of
accuracy, and tend to draw on the strengths of multiple perspectives. However,
fastidious theories also tend to be susceptible to aporetic claims that they are unwieldy
and difficult to explain, tend to get lost in the details and specifics, tend to be difficult if
not impossible to test quickly, and tend to make it difficult to compare specific
situations, since the details of each situation are preserved for the sake of
representativeness.
Expeditious theories usually buy efficiency at the cost of accuracy, while
fastidious theories usually buy accuracy at the cost of coherence. My hedge of “usually”
is important, because under certain conditions expeditious theories do not lose any
practical amount of accuracy, nor do fastidious theories significantly suffer from a lack
of coherence. In other words, both styles of theory-building are more or less effective
depending on the situation in which they are applied. Both expeditious and fastidious
theories attempt to contend with uncertainty in different ways, and the style of
engagement with this uncertainty leads them to possess specific aporetic virtues and
vulnerabilities.
Addiction scientists often use expeditious theories, but offer very few fastidious
theories. As addiction researchers Robert West and Jamie Brown explain, the field of
addiction studies does not lack for theories.9 The problem, however, “is that each
theory seems to stem from an idea or a set of ideas that accounts for a part of the
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problem but does not account for other features that were previously addressed by
other theories.”10 The sociology of addiction can tell us a great deal about how addiction
functions in social networks, rational addiction theory can explain addiction in terms of
economic costs and benefits to drug users, while biological theories can identify markers
that are correlate certain populations as vulnerable to addictive substances. Yet, these
theories rarely communicate with one another. This makes many expeditious theories
of addiction vulnerable to valid and powerful aporetic critiques, based on their failure to
account for how addiction affects different people, the differences between addictive
substances or behaviors (usually, addictive behaviors are completely ignored), or why
some addictive substances are more socially permissible than others. In other words,
most expeditious theories of addiction are vulnerable to criticisms of
“oversimplification.”
On the other hand, fastidious theories of addiction are both rare and difficult to
produce. Rare, because studies of addiction usually subscribe to the “incremental”
philosophy common in modern scientific endeavors, where super-specialized
researchers and research studies are justifiable because they “fill in” the “bigger
picture” of addiction, inch-by-inch. Thus, given the limited scope and disciplinary
commitments of addiction scientists, a fastidious theory of addiction that accounts for
the wide variety of approaches to the subject is impractical. Creating a fastidious theory
of addiction is difficult, in part because of this variety of perspectives, and in part
because of the sheer volume of addiction research. Synthesizing the disparate, siloed,
vast amount of highly technical research done on addiction is outside the purview of any
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one discipline, making any attempt at a fastidious theory of addiction vulnerable to
critiques of “overreaching” the expertise of its authors, or simply being too unwieldy to
generate useful insights.
The point of this chapter is not to argue that expeditious theories are better or
worse than fastidious theories, or vice versa. Both styles of theoretical modeling, of
generating representations of reality, come with advantages and disadvantages which
make both useful in certain circumstances. Rather, this chapter will argue that either
style of theory building comes packaged with a set of aporetic virtues and
vulnerabilities, weaknesses and strengths.
Addiction is the medium used to make this argument, in part because of its
contemporary importance, in part because the distinction between expeditious and
fastidious theories in this field is so stark, and in part because healthcare (thus,
addiction) is fundamentally wedded to uncertainty. In turn, this fundamental
uncertainty located at the center of healthcare is equally inextricable from rhetoric, an
argument that I will be develop in the conclusion. Regardless of the reality a theory
seeks to model, however, expeditious and fastidious theories are distinguished by the
way they interact with uncertainty, which has identifiable rhetorical consequences.
To better demonstrate this claim, this chapter will examine one expeditious
theory and one fastidious theory and point out the aporetic consequences that come
from these different approaches to modeling addiction. Positioning these consequences
with respect to urgency, I will then suggest which situations expeditious and fastidious
theories are best suited for. The first theory is Pier Piazza and Véronique Deroche170

Gamonet’s “multistep” theory of addiction, a simple and powerful model of how
addiction shifts from casual use to full-blown addiction.11 Comprised of three steps and
limited in scope, this general theory of addiction is an exemplary expeditious theory.
Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet intuitively and efficiently describe the phenomenon while
entirely oversimplifying it, making their theory highly vulnerable to counter-examples
and other aporetic strategies.
The second theory this chapter examines is Robert West and Jamie Brown’s
“synthetic” theory of addiction, one of the only book-length and wide-ranging theories
of addiction. Fastidious, West and Brown’s complex and all-inclusive theory is novel, fits
a wide range of specific differences between addictions, and is so unwieldy and complex
that it was difficult summarizing even the basic tenets of the theory in this chapter.
What unites these different styles of theory is nothing other the uncertainty that rests
at the heart of all theoretical models, an echo of the gap between reality and
representation. The hope of overcoming this gap is not naïve. Rather, it is imperative if
we are to develop an effective and accurate picture of what addiction is, who it affects,
and how we should think of the large population of people addicted to a variety of
substances and behaviors. Management of this “uncertainty gap” can never be
completely realized, but the conclusion of this chapter will provide strategies for limiting
our inability to assess what “addiction” is.
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3. Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s Multistep Theory of Addiction
Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s wide-ranging and novel “A multistep general
theory of transition to addiction” is a prime example of an expeditious theory. In this
essay, they offer what they believe is the foundation for a first general theory of
transition to addiction. They qualify it as general because it weaves together current
addiction research, and transitional because it does not attempt to address the
phenomenon of relapse. They identify three steps in the addiction process: 1)
recreational, sporadic drug use, 2) intensified, sustained, escalated drug use, and 3) loss
of control of drug intake and full addiction.12 Furthermore, they describe these phases
as consecutive but independent of one another: “entering one phase is necessary but
not sufficient to progress toward the next phase.”13
This three-phase system is a cornerstone of their general theory of addiction,
and attempts to address uncertainty between the recreational or nonpathological use of
substances from more dangerous chronic misuse. In other words, their theory is simple,
easy to understand, and applicable to a wide variety of situations quickly and efficiently.
Frameworks that use a minimalized set of “steps” or “stages” to describe a process are
usually expeditious, as they often try to keep a process to five or six coherent,
understandable, and memorable central “phases.”
Having established a multistep framework, Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet ask a
question usually left out of psychopharmacological discussions of addiction: if drugs are
so risky, why do economic drives often overrule the associated dangers? Or, if addiction
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is so dangerous, why are addictive substances like coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco legal
and easily accessible? They provide two central responses to this line of questioning.
First, they argue that getting “high” is “one of the major goal-directed activities
of the human species,” or, the “consequence of a large number of recreational activities
is to alter brain activity.”14 We could easily classify watching or playing sports, listening
to or playing music, dancing, or watching films as pursuing this goal. Taking drugs is
different only because it does not require sensory or physical activities, and instead
achieves brain activity modification through the direct use of pharmacological
compounds.
Second, they suggest that addiction “is something believed to be happening to
others.”15 Around 15% of drug users move from the recreational stage to the substancerelated disorder stage of drug abuse.16 The relative distance between those who use
and those who abuse lulls people into a false sense of security. Those who are addicted
become unseen “others.” Because of these two factors, millions of people develop
addictions. Due to the severe health consequences of chronic drug abuse, this also
makes it one of the costliest health problems worldwide. Their two-pronged argument is
a plausible explanation for why some substance use is socially and legally prohibited by
governments, while others are encouraged: drugs imitate one of the central goals of
human activity, while the relatively low incident rate of addiction blinds us from the
associated risks of addiction.
With some sense of why addiction is a widespread phenomenon, they then turn
to attempting to define a distinction between pathological and nonpathological drug
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use, another critical barrier towards developing a general theory of addiction. For
example, how can we differentiate the withdrawal behaviors of someone using
prescribed opioids from someone abusing heroine? Why is one a drug addict, while the
other is not, even though their symptoms and experiences are essentially the same?
Using the Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM), they suggest that the current
criteria for Substance Abuse Disorders (SUDs) in the DSM-5, in practice, matches up with
their three-step theory of addiction. As we can see in Figure 4.1, many of the DSM-5
criteria align with both step 2 and 3 of their multistep theory, where drug use transitions
into drug abuse. Importantly, their general theory centers on a transition to loss of
control, of which almost every item in the DSM-5 inventory represents. Their thinking
goes that because someone receiving prescription opioids is under medical supervision,
they are therefore still in control, thus making their use nonpathological. Addiction is a
pathological loss of control.

Figure 4.1 – DSM-5 SUD Criteria
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Notably, Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet do not try to synthesize the DSM criteria
for their own purposes, uniting the standards for SUD with their own theory. Rather,
they use this alternative standard as a point of contrast and comparison, to show that
while their theory is different, the criteria they propose can still fit neatly into this wellunderstood model. That is, expeditious theories like Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s
tend to speak to other theories, as opposed to engaging in a sustained synthesis with
alternative viewpoints. They do so to aid in their efficiency and expediency, thus making
such comparisons a vital rhetorical technique for positioning their theory within a
broader conversation.
A critical component of their model is a commitment to an individual as opposed
to drug-centered theory of addiction. Drug-centered theories posit that addiction
emerges from the psychopharmacological changes that occur from chronic drug use.
Studies in this camp are often interested in specific changes brought on by chronic drug
use, such as increased tolerance, withdrawal, or cognitive changes. Supporting this
perspective are numerous studies that find clear neurobiological alterations in chronic
drug users.17 Individual-centered theories, per Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet, posit that
“addiction results from a pathological response to a drug that is generated in a few
individuals by a vulnerable biological phenotype.”18 This explains how some casual drug
users become addicted, while others do not: some have a drug-vulnerable phenotype,
or colloquially, an “addictive personality.” Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet provide ample
details to support their position, often centered on rat-based studies, but their central
argument is that while taking drugs is a sufficient condition for addiction, it is not
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necessary. Drug vulnerability is necessary to understanding why addiction consumes
some and not others.
Individual-centered theories have broad implications for policy-based solutions
to addiction. Predominantly drug-centered positions support social and legal policies
that are representative of the current drug laws in the United States. That is, if exposure
to drugs is the primary cause of addiction, then preventing exposure to drugs in any
amount, at any cost, will be the predominant societal solution. Applying this model to
contemporary circumstances, the best way to deal with the current opioid crisis in the
United States is to limit access to prescription opioids, perhaps even forbidding their
use, and engage in a long-term effort to communicate their dangers to the public. The
drug-centered model is an all-or-nothing position.
On the other hand, an individual-centered solution follows a disease-based
model, somewhat like how we treat psychiatric diseases. For example, a particularly
contentious divorce might cause PTSD in a child. However, many children caught in the
middle of difficult divorces do not get PTSD. As Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet explain
their analogy: “We do not forbid divorce, moving, and wars or eradicate spiders, snakes,
and elevators, although such measures would probably substantially decrease the
prevalence of depression, anxiety, and PTSD.”19
Since many addictive drugs (like opioids) have legitimate medical uses, and since
only a portion of people who use these drugs become addicted, it makes sense to these
theorists that we should focus on identifying and assisting those who have particularly
drug-vulnerable phenotypes, as opposed to the wholesale prohibition of potentially
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useful substances. As Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet argue, drugs “have an important
role in helping individuals function in most human societies that are largely very
demanding, often unjust, and practically never egalitarian.”20 Despite their seeming
artificiality, under such conditions it is arguably natural and rational to use drugs.
How well does Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s take on addiction fare as a
general theory of addiction? As Aldo Badiani argues, not well.21 For instance, Badiani
points out how they end their essay by making the following claim: “The reader will
notice that we call this not just a theory but a general theory – the first of its kind in the
field of addiction research.”22 However, Badiani notes how Piazza and DerocheGamonet’s theory is far from the “first” general theory, and most “theoretical models of
addiction are not even taken into consideration” by Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet.23 For
instance, there is no mention of addiction as a psychiatric condition or a rational choice.
Even limiting their perspective purely to neuroscience, they fall short. They lean heavily
on animal studies in their theory, yet completely eschew any discussion of relapse, a
critically important dimension of addiction studies in animals.24
Exasperated, Badiani’s simplest and most powerful critique of Piazza and
Deroche-Gamonet’s “general” theory of addiction is that “it lacks a critical prerequisite
of any general theory of addiction, that is, its applicability to different addictive drugs.”25
Most of their evidence is derived from data on cocaine, thus their multistep theory may
not apply to other drugs. They are not the only to fall prey to this problem, since many
studies on addiction purposefully limit themselves to single, substance-specific effects of
drug reward and drug addiction.
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In many respects, their failure to produce a general theory of addiction is less an
issue with the force and convincingness of their arguments (although this plays a role),
and more of an issue contending and competing with increasingly potent forms of
uncertainty that underlie any attempt to produce an expeditious theory of addiction.
The more general a theory, the more likely it is to intersect with exponentially complex
uncertainties. More specifically, Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s expeditious theory
wrangles with process-based uncertainty.
Process-based uncertainty is associated with difficulty locating which stage a
given entity is in relation to a process, trouble determining which events are vital for the
continuation, reversal, or stoppage of a given process, or issues determining how an
isolated process relates to other interconnected or tangential processes. Or, there are
three species of process-based uncertainties working behind the scenes of Piazza and
Deroche-Gamonet’s argument: uncertain states, movements, and foci. These subspecies
of uncertainty present specific rhetorical vulnerabilities and virtues.
For instance, uncertain states provide visible aporetic strengths or weaknesses in
Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s arguments. Because addiction is a process that unfolds
in real-time, with contested demarcations between the status of user and abuser,
cutting up this dynamic activity into digestible components is good rhetorical practice. It
allows addiction researchers to find a drug user, examine their condition, and neatly fit
them into a preconceived model. It also allows addiction researchers to flatten out the
particularities of individuals to make comparisons between and amongst drug users,
thus allowing rapid comparison. Taking a complex situation and fitting it into a
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preconceived model satisfies the all-too-human desires for order and expediency. The
longevity of process-based models of composition, classical and Rogerian models of
argumentation, or variants of the Shannon-Weaver model of communication are all
testament to the rhetorical potency of managing uncertain states.
The aporetic weaknesses of this strategy are equally potent. For instance, all
divisions of a process are vulnerable to critiques of arbitrary enumeration. Why are
there only three steps to becoming an addict? Why not four or five? Why not eleven, or
seventeen, or so on? The division of a dynamic process into discrete states presents a
tradeoff. In many cases, the more discrete steps that are identified and codified, the
closer a model will be to reflecting the reality it intends to represent. However, the
more theorists add steps to a model, the less generalizable, comparable, and expedient
a model becomes. This is likely why very few sixty-seven step models survive the test of
time. Uncertain states provide both rhetorical opportunities and aporetic vulnerabilities.
Uncertain movements in a process can also be a rhetorical tradeoff. In Piazza and
Deroche-Gamonet’s case, their decision to ignore drug relapse is critical for
understanding this exchange. Their model is simple, as expeditious models tend to be:
drug use begins casually, escalates, and finally becomes drug dependence. This process
moves in only one direction. Its simplicity allows it to accurately capture a vast range of
addictive behaviors. Just as breaking down and codifying the inherent uncertainty
associated with uncertain states is rhetorically justified, producing a process model that
is simple, unidirectional, and unburdened by recursive or recalcitrant effects is alluring.
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This also provides opportunities for aporetic criticisms. For instance, Badiana
rightly picks up on Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s eschewing of relapse, arguing that by
ignoring important research on the subject, their general theory falls short of its goals.
Siloing their general theory from recursive effects, like relapse, has the unfortunate
consequence of limiting the generality of their claim. At bottom, arguments that reduce
the complexity of movement in a process increases the likelihood of translatability,
comprehension, and cohesiveness, all while aporetically opening an argument to the
ever-present vulnerabilities associated with uncertain movements, like increasingly
complex processes that fold in on themselves, making classification, theorization, and
general arguments increasingly less likely. What expeditious theories gain in clarity, they
lose in representativeness.
Finally, uncertain foci are also a difficulty and strength of Piazza and DerocheGamonet’s general theory of addiction. Unlike uncertain states and movements,
uncertain foci create openings for aporetic criticisms that have less to do with the
composition or movement of a process model, and more to do with what aspects or
dimensions of the process a theorist is trying to model. Uncertainty of this type is what
allows Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet to characterize addiction models as either drug- or
person-centered. A drug-centered model of addiction is not inseparable from people,
just as a person-centered model of addiction cannot exist apart from drug-centered
model.
Selecting a focus, often contrasting the selected focus with another related but
“insufficient” alternative, is a well-known and effective rhetorical strategy. The classic
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speech and debate maneuver of using gravitas to counter an opponent who is taking a
topic too lightly, or levity when they are being too serious, is a perfect example of this
effect in practice. Here, Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet have tapped into the rhetorical
logic of contrast in the context of addiction science, making their case for a personcentered theory of addiction compelling by comparing it to an “insufficient” alternative.
As with all species of process uncertainty, however, there are aporetic
downsides to this strategy. For instance, in practice, utilizing uncertain foci results in
binary claims. Addiction becomes either drug-centered or person-centered. Hence, this
strategy can fall into an either/or trap, misrepresenting a debate as only having two
starkly contrasted positions. Related, contrasting the selected foci with the weakest
possible alternative leaves their theory open to strawman claims. The rhetorical use of
contrast, impossible to leverage without the pretext of uncertain foci, has both
rhetorical strengths and aporetic weaknesses.
Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s theory, predicated on a process-based model
that contends with uncertainty at an aporetic loss and uses uncertainty for rhetorical
gain, illustrates several key lessons. First, their model creates “steps” or “divisions” to
frame a dynamic process as static, a technique used to manage the complexity of realworld situations. This maneuver has demonstrable practical and rhetorical upsides, like
making their theory applicable to a wide variety of cases, making its application
expedient and efficient, and making it as simplistic and elegant as possible.
Second, modeling a complex process in terms of static “steps” comes with
certain practical and rhetorical risks. Badiana’s criticisms of their piece effectively
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leverage these vulnerabilities, drawing from the same pool of uncertainty that Piazza
and Deroche-Gamonet have painstakingly tried to manage. By concretizing the dynamic
process of addiction into discrete phases, they open themselves up to critiques of
arbitrary enumeration. Why not four stages? Why not five? Likewise, Piazza and
Deroche-Gamonet’s reluctance to include relapse into their model again opens them to
the kind of aporetic critique that Badiana levels, mainly, that their “general” theory of
addiction has ignored vital aspects of the process they sought to model. Alternatively,
Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s preference for a person-centered as opposed to drugcentered model taps into foci uncertainty, opening them up to well-worn aporetic and
logical criticisms.
None of this is to say that Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s general theory of
addiction is insufficient. Rather, the point in analyzing both the strategies and
vulnerabilities of their claims is to emphasize how uncertainty rests at the core of their
rhetorical endeavor. Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet try to manage this uncertainty by
making a tidy theoretical model. This is a wise tactic. However, uncertainty is difficult to
manage.
Hence, Badiana’s aporetic strategies are not only effective but entirely
predictable. Irrespective of one’s knowledge of the situation, it is relatively
straightforward to produce counterarguments of Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s claims,
not because their approach is insufficient, but because they use ubiquitous and wellknown argumentative strategies which implicate equally widespread aporetic counterarguments. For instance, if someone claims they have a “general” theory of anything, let
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alone addiction, it is easy enough to dispute their claim of generality by finding a single
instance where their theory does not apply, thus deploying uncertainty to cast doubt on
their claim. The more expeditious a theory is the more vulnerable it will be to this
aporetic strategy. The easy back-and-fourth that this debate (and many others) rests on
is a substrate of uncertainties.

4. West and Brown’s Synthetic Theory of Addiction
West and Brown’s ambitious attempt at a general theory of addiction takes a
different approach than Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet.26 Indicative of a fastidious
theory, West and Brown propose “a synthetic theory of addiction that draws into a
single system the mechanisms underlying it: learning through reward and punishment
by associations; feelings of compulsions and desire; the exercise of self-control, beliefs,
decisions and plans.”27 Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet try to manage the uncertainty
between theory and reality, but West and Brown actively embrace it. For instance, their
theory is based on “moment-to-moment control of actions through causal pathways of
varying lengths of complexity from simple reflexes, through impulses and inhibitory
forces, then desires, drives, and emotional states, to evaluations and plans.”28 Rather
than focus on specific phenotypes that are vulnerable to addiction or specific drugs that
are particularly addictive, they emphasize the immediacy of addiction, or addiction as it
appears via impulses and inhibitions functioning at a given time. Additionally, they see
the motivational system as unstable, like an “aircraft with built-in instability that
requires constant balancing input to keep it ‘on the straight and narrow’.”29
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They frame this instability using two concepts: Conrad Waddington’s notion of
the “epigenetic landscape” and chaos theory. Waddington’s epigenetic landscape is a
representation of cellular “decision-making” that occurs during cell development.
Imagine a ball rolling through hilly terrain. Some valleys and ridges will compel the ball
to move in one direction, but with enough momentum and a little chance the ball can
go “off track” into alternative pathways and ridges. According to West and Brown the
motivational process of addiction is well-represented by this analogy: we are driven
more often than not into “deep” or “well-worn” parts of the motivational landscape, but
with enough force, we sometimes take alternative paths.
The second concept they use, chaos theory, is a mathematical approach to
modeling unpredictable phenomena like weather patterns. As West and Brown explain
it, in chaos theory “systems can descend into particular states…but still switch
apparently unpredictably to other states or even move in a pseudo-random fashion
between them.”30 Both Waddington’s epigenetic landscape and chaos theory are
examples of how a theory can “lean in” to the uncertainty that innately exists between
reality and models of reality. Rather than try and manage this uncertainty, West and
Brown incorporate uncertainty as a component of their system. This is an attempt to
cooperate with the gap between a general model of events and how events dynamically
unfold in reality.
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Having incorporated uncertainty as a component of their fastidious theory, West
and Brown meticulously cover every major theory of addiction currently discussed,
separating these disparate theories into two categories: those that address individual or
population-level addiction. Figure 4.2 below is an illustration of their system of
categorization, which provides a useful sense of how many disparate theories West and
Brown are attempting to synthesize in their general theory of addiction.31

Figure 4.2 – Addiction Theory Chart
Reprinted with permission from Wiley
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For instance, automatic processing theories include approaches that understand
addiction from the perspective of classical conditioning models, the disease model of
addiction, inhibitory brain circuitry models, and social learning theory. Alternatively,
reflective choice theories encompass models like prospect theory, the theory of rational
addiction, cognitive bias, and affect heuristics. Despite the visual hierarchy depicted in
Figure 4.2, West and Brown admit that their classification system tends to “flatten out”
some differences between theories for the sake of visual appeal.32
Nevertheless, a simple examination of Figure 4.2 illustrates the vastly different
approach that fastidious theories take compared to expeditious theories. Both will
inevitably “flatten out” specifics to generate categories, but the former tends to try and
“capture” the complexity of a situation while the latter generalizes and simplifies
specifics. Both fail to completely represent specific cases that fall within a model, but
the style in which they fail is markedly different, due to their respective attempts to
cope with uncertainty. The style in which a model fails to capture reality, premised on
the uncertainty between representation and reality, simultaneously opens and closes
rhetorical pathways. In this case, we could accuse West and Brown’s synthetic model of
being overambitious in its goals. Fastidious theories will always be susceptible to claims
of overcomplexity and convolution, a by-product of overambition.
Before we evaluate the full scope of West and Brown’s argument, we should first
examine how they devise their synthetic theory of addiction. Interestingly, West and
Brown adopt the well-known and simple “COM-B” model. As they describe it, the COMB model does the following: “it recognizes that for any BEHAVIOR to occur, three
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conditions must be present: the person must have the physical and psychological
CAPABILITY to perform it; they must have the physical and social OPPORTUNITY to
engage in it; and they must be more MOTIVATED to engage in it at the relevant moment
than some other behavior.”33 As they note, the COM-B model is embedded in the
United States legal system, where we ascribe guilt based on capability, motive, and
opportunity.
All behaviors (not just criminal behaviors) exhibit these basic constituent parts,
according to West and Brown. As they see it, the great benefit in using the COM-B
model is its capacity to generate analysis of ongoing patterns of behavior dynamically,
since it is malleable enough to identify what would need to change to redirect a pattern
of behavior. The COM-B’s applicability at any scope of analysis, including populations,
communities, or individuals also makes it appealing for West and Brown’s purposes, as
many general models fail to adapt to changes in scope.
To put it another way, the COM-B model is highly contextual and adaptable to
different situations because it incorporates the dynamism of real situations and contexts
as a vital component of interpreting behavior. Of the three central components of
behavior, motivation is the most problematic. Physical and psychological capability is
easy to account for, as is physical and social opportunity, but what motivates addictive
drug use over other behaviors is trickier to ascertain. In practice, it is not clear how this
motivational system works. However, West and Brown attempt to elaborate and clarify.
Their motivational model, called PRIME for short, is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3 – The PRIME Model34
Reprinted with permission from Wiley
Responses (r) are the lowest level of this nested model of the motivational
system, and relate to the starting or stopping of an action. For instance, smoking a
cigarette, eating ice cream, or having sex are discrete actions with a beginning and an
end. For West and Brown, the response system is “the brain structures and mechanisms
that underpin” these activities.35 The response system receives inputs from internal and
external stimuli reflexively, thus responses do not arise from learned associations. They
are quick, immediate, and “gut-level” responses to either internal or external stimuli.
Most animals can prioritize certain behaviors based on competing demands, hence,
responses are in some part controlled by impulse/inhibitory functions, the next step up
the PRIME system.
Impulses and inhibitory (i) forces are more “flexible” than responses, and can be
best thought of as forces that “compete” or “combine” with responses to produce
modifications to an action. For instance, if I tend to smoke cigarettes when stressed,
being in that emotional state can modify a response to smoke a cigarette, combining
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with the original reflexive act of pulling out a smoke to start the activity of smoking.
Essentially, an impulse is an “urge.” West and Brown suggest that urges have the quality
of immediacy and urgency, making them distinct from desires. Furthermore, drives
influence urges, which include internal and external stimuli that signal physiological
needs (like thirst), and emotional states, which directly influence urges (like wanting a
cigarette in response to being stressed). Thus, impulses and inhibitions function at the
level of stimulus-response, which in turn contribute to the next level of PRIME, motives.
Motives (m) are where we can take account of potential consequences of
actions, and come into conscious awareness when responses and impulses/inhibitions
draw our attention to them.36 For West and Brown, motives are at the center of
purposeful behaviors. The ability to express what one wants or needs, for instance, is a
direct consequence of motivational experience. Drives, emotional states, and past
experiences affect these expressions. Revisiting our example of smoking, I pull a
cigarette out of the pack (response), a behavior reinforced by my poor emotional state
(impulse), and I turn to my friend and say, “Boy, I really need a cigarette” as I flick my
lighter on (motives). I would perform none of these actions, however, if there were not
some evaluative component of my decision to smoke, the next level of the PRIME
model.
Evaluations (e) are beliefs about the world expressed in language as
propositions.37 These propositions about the reality of the world have varying levels of
likelihood, thus beliefs have greater or lesser levels of “confidence.” Per West and
Brown, evaluations influence motives either directly or indirectly.38 Directly, they
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generate representations that we find repulsive or attractive. For instance, if I witnessed
my beloved grandfather died of emphysema from a lifetime of smoking, that experience
might influence my very “identity,” thus making the act of smoking seem repulsive. As
West and Brown argue, evaluation affects motives directly by altering our commitment
to an activity.39 Indirectly, evaluation can affect motives by altering our emotional
states. For example, if I feel that I suffered unfair treatment at work, I might find myself
increasingly stressed and frustrated, positively influencing my decision to smoke a
cigarette. As West and Brown add, evaluations are also the level at which analytical
reasoning and cost-benefit analysis are applicable, which can explain how we resolve
conflicting evaluations. Plans, the final level of the PRIME theory, directly influence
evaluations.
As West and Brown describe them, plans (p) “arise when thought or forethought
is required for an action to occur.”40 Plans thus come in two varieties: immediate and
delayed. The former occur quickly, but are “sufficiently complex that it requires at least
some self-conscious reflective thought to construct it or get it going.”41 Alternatively, we
construct delayed plans when a situation that makes an action appropriate are not in
place, other actions have taken priority, or there is some uncertainty about starting
conditions or an appropriate course of action. External events do not usually dictate the
conditions for forming plans. We can, for instance, decide to quit smoking at any time,
regardless of external stimuli. Additionally, specific discrete actions or steps with
immediate objectives do not make up plans. If I plan to stop smoking, that does not
necessarily entail a specific set of actions that I need to immediately take to fulfill that
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plan. Finally, plans can persist even if actions contradict these plans. If I plan to quit
smoking, I may remain committed to my plan to smoke but nonetheless smoke a
cigarette. Thus, we can see the PRIME model envisioned by West and Brown in its
totality in Figure 4.4, or as they refer to it, the “HEAD” model.

Figure 4.4 – The HEAD Model
Reprinted with permission from Wiley
Figure 4.4 further validates the argument that West and Brown’s theory is
fastidious. The HEAD model attempts to capture the intricate and interconnected
factors involved in addiction, including both internal and external forms of stimulation.
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 are also characterizations of the same model, but the former
illustrates the relationship between elements of PRIME, while the latter takes those
elements and shows how they function more clearly with respect to reality.
Rather than simply throw out innumerable separate elements working together,
West and Brown use a rhetorical strategy of hierarchy to help mitigate the complexity of
191

their theory. Fastidious theories like West and Brown’s sometimes generate complexity
and representativeness by using a “nesting doll” approach, where each aspect of a
theory contains sub-theories, with each sub-theory containing sub-sub-theories, and so
on. The HEAD model, PRIME model, and COM-B model are no exceptions to this
strategy. The rhetorical effect of the “nesting doll” approach borrows from the clean,
parsimonious theories of more expeditious theories. However, instead of creating highly
abstract and simplified representations of reality, the “nesting doll” strategy approaches
the issue of complexity by embedding increasing nuance into each element of relatively
straightforward aspects of the larger theory.
For instance, they begin by describing the COM-B model, which on its surface
appears like an expeditious explanation for addiction. They then note how motivation is
an unclear dimension of this model, and thus introduce their PRIME system, a subsystem of the COM-B model. Each dimension of the PRIME model, in turn, has distinct
sub-sub-characteristics. For example, there are two varieties of plans, immediate and
delayed, and each has different effects and influences on addiction. The “nesting doll”
approach blurs the lines between fastidious and expeditious theories for rhetorical
effect, making an otherwise over-nuanced amalgam of ideas more digestible. West and
Brown go to great lengths to both create a theory of addiction that is highly
representative and nuanced, but also one that can resist claims of overcomplexity.
What, then, is West and Brown’s final word on their theory of addiction? In the
last chapter of their book, they offer an answer: “According to the proposed theory,
addiction can be usefully viewed as a chronic condition involving a repeated powerful
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motivation to engage in a rewarding behavior, acquired as a result of engaging in that
behavior, that has significant potential for unintended harm.”42 As they explain,
addiction is essentially a social construct with “fuzzy boundaries,” and “in this respect, it
is no different from other taxonomies in biology and social science.”43 Instead of trying
to capture exactly what addiction is, West and Brown skirt the question by proposing
three interacting types of “pathologies” that underlie addiction:
1. Motivational abnormalities independent of addictive behaviors, “such as a
propensity to heightened sensitivity to reward, low ability to learn from
punishment, anxiety, depression, or impulsiveness.”44
2. Motivational abnormalities that derive from addictive behaviors themselves,
“such as acquisition of a strongly entrenched habit or an acquired drive.”45
3. Motivational abnormalities in an individual’s physical or social environment,
“such as the presence of strong social or other pressures to engage in the
activity.”46
Again, these categories of motivational abnormalities are good evidence of a fastidious
theory at work. Each type of abnormality is networked with every other type, and all
work in tandem to represent the conditions under which addiction occurs. This is in
stark contrast to an expeditious theory like Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet, whose
multistep approach tries to capture addiction as a process with a discrete beginning and
end, as opposed to a networked series of conditions.
West and Brown’s fastidious theory also presents the same rhetorical upsides
and aporetic vulnerabilities that we would expect. Their model of addiction is highly
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sophisticated and can be applied to very specific circumstances while retaining the
nuance of these specific cases. Alternatively, their model of addiction is extremely
difficult to summarize, contains an unwieldy amount of information, sub-categories, and
details, and this make comparisons between different types of addictions difficult and
applications of their theory arduous. My above summary of their basic ideas is both
cursory and tedious, a clear sign that their system is both detailed and unwieldy, a
feature of fastidious theories.
Unlike Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s expeditious general theory, West and
Brown do not struggle to contend with different varieties of uncertainty. Rather,
because West and Brown initially account for uncertainty in their theory, their final
characterization of addiction is the theoretical equivalent of a shrug. The notion that
addiction has “fuzzy boundaries,” or that it is “socially constructed” is indicative of the
critical vagueness and confusion left in the wake of fastidious theory-building. Their
interconnected system of concepts is clever, novel, and sophisticated, but how this
theory can be usefully applied to situations is difficult to ascertain. They spend the last
chapter of their theory providing examples of how the theory can be applied, but they
focus primarily on nicotine addiction, skirting the differences between types of
addiction. As I have argued in this chapter, making comparisons between specific cases
using a fastidious theory are difficult because we retain details in each specific case.
It is important to emphasize that this does not mean their theory is insufficient,
useless, or extraneous, just as Piazza and Deroche-Gamonet’s multistep theory is not
necessarily an oversimplification. Rather, I wish to suggest that the way in which both
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theoretical styles contend with uncertainty lends each a rhetorical valence. On the one
hand, expeditious theories can claim parsimony and efficiency, while they struggle to
contend with accusations of oversimplification or lack of nuance.47 On the other hand,
fastidious theories can claim accuracy and representativeness, while they struggle to
fight against accusations of overcomplexity and unwieldiness.
Importantly, these general rhetorical features of expeditious and fastidious
theories are not necessarily true of the theories themselves. Some expeditious theories
are sufficiently complex to capture a phenomenon accurately, while some fastidious
theories are parsimonious enough to be easily applicable and useful. In other words,
both expeditious and fastidious theories have means of rhetorically combatting their
deficiencies and excesses. We can discover how by identifying which level of uncertainty
and urgency of a given situation lend each style more rhetorical force.

5. Aporetic Rhetoric and Urgency
In the best-case scenario, if there is a low level of urgency and high level of
uncertainty, a fastidious theory will possess more rhetorical leverage. Alternatively, if
there is a high level of urgency and a low level of uncertainty, an expeditious theory will
be highly defensible. Figure 4.5 below gives a sense of the different rhetorical strategies
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that are workable in different conditions of urgency and uncertainty. When deployed in
favorable rhetorical conditions, expeditious and fastidious theories gain resistance to
aporetic critiques. In unfavorable conditions, the opposite occurs.

Figure 4.5 – An Uncertainty/Urgency Matrix
In the high uncertainty and high urgency and low uncertainty and low urgency
scenarios, both expeditious and fastidious theories have about the same persuasive
opportunities, albeit in substantially different ways. In the high-high scenario, a
workable expeditious strategy is to double-down on kairos by playing up the importance
of urgency and efficiency to defend a more streamlined theory. In the same scenario, a

196

fastidious strategy will instead emphasize the importance of “getting it right,” because
the stakes are high.
Kairos has two faces: time and stakes. Expeditious theories rely on the former for
persuasive force, while fastidious theories rely on the latter. In the low-low scenario, a
reasonable expeditious strategy is to emphasize the low levels of uncertainty
surrounding the details of the theory, thus playing up how little we gain by elaborating
on every granular idiosyncrasy of a theory. Alternatively, the fastidious theory-builder
will double-down on the lack of urgency, thus reiterating the benefits of attending to
the details. What does this mean for a general theory of addiction?
A general theory of addiction may not be a goal worth pursuing, at least not in
the sense that addiction researchers should develop a theory that describes any kind of
addiction of any substance in any person. It is unclear if such a theory is possible, given
the wide range of variance between different addictions. Instead, a much more
defensible (rhetorically and conceptually) route is to assess which style of theory is the
best fit for a given case of addiction. For instance, researchers are well-versed in the
addictive properties of opioids. There is also a massive, urgent, devastating crisis of
opioid addiction currently sweeping the United States. This is a low uncertainty, high
urgency scenario where an expeditious theory of addiction is a more suitable theoretical
tool. Focusing on the specific substance and narrowing the research scope is thus a
more defensible approach to opioid addiction. From a legislative perspective,
emphasizing the overwhelming dangers of such an addictive substance by examining the
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narrow neurobiological effects it has is a rhetorically feasible route for policy-makers
wishing to create legislation.
In contrast, addiction to video games is not a well-understood or particularly
medically urgent phenomenon. We are not entirely sure what mechanisms are at work
in addiction to video games, nor is there evidence that this addiction is spiraling into a
full-blown health crisis. Thus, we have a high uncertainty and low urgency situation,
making a more robust, nuanced, and fastidious theory of addiction far more persuasive
in this case. Focusing on broad sociological, psychological, and neurobiological factors
that might contribute to video game addiction is a more defensible approach to
studying the phenomenon than only focusing on one narrow dimension. Combining
these dimensions, as West and Brown attempt to do with their synthetic theory of
addiction, also has distinct rhetorical and conceptual upsides in the case of video game
addiction.

6. An Aporetic Overview
Before concluding our analysis of aporetic rhetoric in healthcare, it is helpful to
review our catalogue of uncertainty. The conclusion of this project will not leave these
concepts behind, but it will alter the argumentative trajectory of this project,
repositioning the aporetic dimensions of our case studies within a different framework.
Thus, reviewing the different types and sites of uncertainty acts as a soft conclusion to
my claim that healthcare contexts are permeating with aporetic rhetoric, while priming
us for the final claim of this project. So far, we have examined how aporetic rhetoric
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plays an important and impactful role in healthcare debates and environments. This
argument began by examining the experiences of Agent Orange Veterans.
In Chapter 1, we examined how spatial uncertainty characterized the spraying of
Agent Orange. There are few ways of recognizing where, how, and to what extent this
dangerous chemical was sprayed on soldiers. This uncertainty caused a chain of
subsequent uncertainties to emerge, when it became clear that neither the VA nor CDC
performed research on Agent Orange exposure in a timely or accurate manner. By the
time the Agent Orange Act was passed in the early 1990s, many Agent Orange veterans
had already been severely affected by their exposure. VA regulations, the spatial
uncertainty associated with spray patterns and troop locations, as well as the natural
health effects of aging provide the U.S. government with a robust aporetic arsenal used
to arbitrate remuneration for Agent Orange-related injuries. However, veterans
organizations like the VFW offer a way for Agent Orange veterans to combat these
aporetic conditions by providing a high-rapport space that encourages disclosure and
provides a hub for communication and social support.
In Chapter 2, we explored how mental illness skeptics and denialists deploy
different types of uncertainty in different ways. Here, I identified five kinds of
uncertainty associated with the aporetic strategies of mental illness skeptics:
•

Prudential Uncertainty: Uncertainty associated with how the value and timing of
an act affect the perceived value of that act.

•

Conceptual Uncertainty: Uncertainty associated with the stability, value
proposition, or definition of a concept.
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•

Scope Uncertainty: Uncertainty associated with how well a specific case is
representative of a general phenomenon.

•

Trade-Off Uncertainty: Uncertainty associated with whether a decision’s
consequences are favorable, especially in the long-term.

•

Causal Uncertainty: Uncertainty associated with cause and effect relationships.

In contrast to the uncertainty deployed by the United States Government in Chapter 1,
which was used to limit the capacity of Veterans receive remuneration for injuries, the
above of types of uncertainty are deployed to disrupt monolithic categories of mental
illness. However, many of these types of uncertainty can also be deployed by denialists,
who use a similar but more aggressive approach.
Unlike their skeptical cousins, mental illness denialists deploy emotionallycharged aporetic strategies that amplify or artificially inject uncertainty into a situation:
•

What-about-ism: Amplifying uncertainty around a situation by using a
misleading, extraneous, or disingenuous counterexample.

•

Utopian What-if-ism: Amplifying uncertainty about a present situation by
presenting a hypothetical future free of current problems (regardless of the
feasibility of this future).

•

Conspiratorial What-if-ism: Artificially creating uncertainty about a present
situation by ascribing secret and nefarious motives to organization or individuals
who have some amount of power, without sufficient evidence to support these
claims.
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Denialists have the benefit of intensity, and those we might otherwise characterize as
skeptics become “pulled in” by the gravity of denialism. Despite their conceptual
proximity, skepticism and denialism are very different aporetic styles of engagement.
Both skeptics and denialists would argue they deploy aporetic strategies for the greater
good, but skeptics’ aporetic style is more probing and nuanced than dismissive, while
denialists’ approach is more caustic and impactful than properly supported by evidence.
The former question how our concepts of mental illness are constructed, the latter
question if our concepts of mental illness should exist at all. The former offer a nuanced
take on mental illness, the latter overshadow this nuance with aporetic force.
Departing from an emphasis on how different types of uncertainty offer different
aporetic opportunities, Chapter 3 examined how design influences our experience with
uncertainty. Rather than focus on different types of uncertainty, this chapter relied on
two psychological hypotheses: Bar-Anan et al.’s “uncertainty intensification hypothesis”
and Slovic et al.’s “affect heuristic.” The former describes how uncertainty during an
emotional experience makes unpleasant experiences more unpleasant, and pleasant
experiences more pleasant. The latter posits that in situations where someone
possesses a positive emotional affect, it is much easier for them to overlook high risks
and low benefits. The opposite is also true. If someone has a negative emotional affect,
they are more likely to infer high risks and low benefits. Thus, positive emotional affects
tend to push people to overlook the risks of uncertainty, while negative emotional
affects tend to accentuate the risks of uncertainty.
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Both the uncertainty intensification hypothesis and affect heuristic contribute to
aporetic environments, which alter how a patient assesses risks and benefits. Walking
through the various stages of a “typical” patient experience, I examined how poor
design choices can lead to negative emotional affects and states of uncertainty, which in
turn affect patient decision-making processes. The consequences of these affective
influences are consequential for patient outcomes, and often result in a recursive effect,
whereby negative emotional affects and uncertainty contribute to poor decisionmaking, which coalesce into further negative emotional affects and states of
uncertainty.
Rounding out our case studies, this chapter has examined how theories become
more or less vulnerable to aporetic strategies, and which kind of aporetic strategies
work best in different conditions of uncertainty and urgency. Examining Piazza and
Deroche-Gamonet’s expeditious theory of the transition to addiction, we identified
three kinds of uncertainty that open up their theory to aporetic dispute:
•

State Uncertainty: Uncertainty pertaining to how well a given case “fits” into
a model based on stages, steps, or states.

•

Movement Uncertainty: Uncertainty relating to how a case moves within a
model with multiple phases, points, or progressions.

•

Foci Uncertainty: Uncertainty about which aspect of a phenomenon is the
“central,” “most important,” or “starting point” of that phenomenon.

Expeditious theories tend to offer simplified representations of reality, which open them
to aporetic critiques deploying the three types of uncertainty listed above, but fastidious
202

theories tend to fall into a different trap. Fastidious theories are not as susceptible to
aporetic strategies because of their expansive and exhaustive approach to representing
reality. However, because of their size and complexity, fastidious theories tend to be
difficult to use and develop, and offer little in the way of generalizable conclusions
about a phenomenon. Using West and Brown’s theory of addiction as an example, we
got a first-hand look at how complicated and convoluted a fastidious theory can be. By
way of conclusion, I offered a matrix of uncertainty and urgency which offers insight into
when fastidious and expeditious theories are most and least capable of contending with
aporetic strategies. In cases with high urgency and low uncertainty, expeditious theories
can be used more justifiably. In cases with low urgency and high uncertainty, the same
can be said with fastidious theories.
The best strategy for theory-building in addiction and beyond is to understand
both the upsides and downsides of expeditious and fastidious theories, and use these
characteristics to model reality in flexible ways that neither glosses over details nor gets
lost in theoretical labyrinths. Combining expeditious and fastidious styles of contending
with the uncertainty that lies at the heart of all theories creates opportunities for new
ways of engaging with reality. Instead of focusing on whether a theory “gets it right,” or
is “accurate,” or “nuanced,” we should instead focus on what a theory should do for us.
I have attempted to show how two styles of theory-building contend with
uncertainty in this chapter, and instead of suggesting that one is better than the other, I
wish to suggest that both are useful for different circumstances. This is an argument
deeply entrenched in both a pragmatic and rhetorical perspective, both useful
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approaches for tackling how uncertainty works, and not simply what it is. As we turn to
our last chapter, I wish to push our argument one step further. It may seem that the
study of healthcare is tangential to our treatment of aporetic rhetoric, but just the
opposite is true. Understanding how aporetic rhetoric is used in healthcare settings is a
vital bridge for understanding the functioning of uncertainty, because aporetic rhetoric
is a pharmaceutical.
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Conclusion
Aporia’s Pharmakon
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1. Flipping the Script
Each chapter of this project has examined a different site in the field of health or
medicine, and explored the ways uncertainty is rhetorically deployed. In other words,
this project has classified how different forms of uncertainty contribute to different
aporetic strategies or environments. This chapter views the connection between health,
medicine, and rhetoric from an entirely different perspective. Instead of focusing on
how aporetic rhetoric is an important dimension of healthcare settings, this chapter will
instead focus on how healthcare is implicated in the study and practice of rhetoric. The
goal of this focus is to establish the necessary groundwork for a final claim: aporetic
rhetoric is a pharmaceutical.
This claim is significant for both scholars of rhetoric and medical practitioners
and theorists. For rhetoricians, it imbues the study and practice of rhetoric with
renewed importance and gravity. Aporetic rhetoric is a potent drug; it can heal, harm, or
intoxicate a field of debate or situation. For healthcare researchers and practitioners,
this aporetic potency reinforces the importance of rhetoric in healthcare settings. If
aporetic rhetoric is a potent drug, then medical professionals need to carefully consider
how they deploy that drug, just like any other kind of therapeutic intervention. We have
spent a great deal of time setting the groundwork for this latter claim, and now, we
need to establish the footing for the former.
The connection between healthcare and rhetoric runs deep, both historically and
conceptually. Tracing rhetoric and medicine’s shared historical backdrop, we will briefly
examine the life of Galen of Pergamum, the famous 2nd century physician and
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rhetorician who embodies the practical connection between these two seemingly
disparate disciplines. From Galen, we will step back in time and look at how Plato and
Aristotle often speak of rhetoric and medicine in the same breath, often for very
different ends. Rewinding to the pre-Socratics, we will then turn to Gorgias, whose
Encomium of Helen provides a literal connection between medicine and rhetoric
through the notion of “pharmakon,” which can mean “cure,” “poison,” or other related
significations, and is the origin of our modern term “pharmaceutical.” Having developed
the concept of pharmaceutical rhetorics, we will then revisit our case studies in this
project, demonstrating how aporetic rhetoric is in fact a species of pharmaceutical
rhetoric. Finally, we will turn to the implications of this argument. If aporetic rhetoric, or
more broadly pharmaceutical rhetoric, is taken seriously by rhetoricians and healthcare
theorists, then rhetoric should be treated as seriously as any other type of drug. The
first character on this journey, Galen, certainly understood the impact of rhetoric as a
practicing physician.

2. Rhetoric and Medicine’s Shared Historical Foundations
Historically, philosophy, rhetoric, and medicine shared a relatively close
relationship. Galen of Pergamum embodies this relationship. Galen was a 2nd century
physician, rhetorician, and philosopher who had a major impact on the theory and
practice of medicine. Born in modern day Turkey, Galen’s hometown was a popular site
for the Roman aristocracy. Galen's father, Nicon, would often bring his son to
philosophy lectures around town, hoping that Galen would become a politician or
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intellectual. However, fate intervened when Asclepius, the god of healing, visited Nicon
in a dream and told him that Galen was destined to be a physician. Galen entered the
profession of medicine at his father’s behest, and even though he was only sixteen years
old, his entrance was considered late compared to his peers.
Despite his delayed entrance into medicine, Galen played a significant role in
early developments in human anatomy and physiology, and did so by tapping into the
anatomical theories of ancient philosophers. Combining the ideas of Aristotle and Plato
with an understanding of anatomy, his writings are a bizarre journey into early empirical
and scientific conceptions of the body. With rhetorical skill, he conjured a number of
fascinating anatomical conclusions based on his readings of Plato: “It is quite easy for
blood to become flesh; for, if Nature thicken it to such an extent that it acquires a
certain consistency and ceases to be fluid, it then becomes original newly-formed flesh;
but in order that blood may turn into bone, much time is needed and much elaboration
and transformation of the blood.”1 Galen believed his skills as an anatomist were
bolstered by a reverence of Plato. This was not unusual, as Plato’s Timaeus was an oftused resource for Greek and Roman physicians interested in physiology and biology.
At the time, anatomical theories presented by both Plato and Aristotle were
being put to the test by ancient physicians. Again, showing his preference for Plato,
Galen disagreed with Aristotle’s claim that the heart was the center of consciousness
(Plato cited the brain as the most likely source). In one instance, Galen was even
challenged by the Peripatetics and Stoics to prove that the brain was responsible for
respiration and speech functions. A demonstration was scheduled and a public lecture
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lasting several days was held. Using live animals, Galen showed how modulations in the
larynx are directed by the brain, and respiration occurred through the contraction and
dilation of the thorax muscle through the signals originating in the brain.
Galen’s demonstration was a rhetorical spectacle. Galen, trained in the art of
philosophy and rhetoric, gave a public demonstration to a Roman audience, effectively
arguing that the physiological theories of Plato were superior to that of Aristotle. Shortly
after the event, Galen summarily dismissed Aristotle’s theory that the heart controlled
the body: “Aristotle! What a thing to say! For my part, I am certainly ashamed even now
to mention the subject.”2 Galen’s dispute with Aristotle is only one such example of how
ancient physicians tarried with philosophers and rhetoricians. Galen also initiated an
argument against the ancient Sophists, arguing against their theory of material
transformation in the body.
The role of transformation is a vital component of Galen's system, and ran
contrary to the position of the Sophists. As Galen characterizes the Sophist’s theory of
transformation, they did not believe in the transition of food into bodily fluids, since
such a change occurs in a reality they deny has any connection with the substance of
Nature. In one instance, Galen even chides a physician for engaging in the Sophistic art
of argumentation, scoffing at the practitioner’s careful and eloquent rhetoric on why
urine only flows in one direction. Galen insisted the physician should simply spend more
time “admiring Nature's artistic skill.”3 Both Galen’s and the Sophist’s theories would
not withstand medicine’s march of scientific progress, but their relationship is another
example of how medicine and rhetoric have a shared historical foundation and
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connection. Sadly, the increased isolation between academic disciplines have made the
physician/rhetorician largely extinct, but Galen demonstrates that the connection
between rhetoric and medicine we have made in each chapter of this project is neither
new nor foreign.
In each chapter of this project, we have explored situations where rhetoric and
medicine are deeply entwined in ways both similar and different from the historical
physician/rhetorician. We saw in Chapter 1 how the VA and CDC struggled to research
the effects of Agent Orange, and how this complicated Agent Orange veteran’s
rhetorical situation, a complication that likely mirrored medical mysteries in ancient
healing arts. In Chapter 2, we examined how mental illness skeptics and denialists
deploy rhetoric to undermine medical theories and practices, much like Galen did to
Aristotle’s medical theories. In Chapter 3, we looked at how environments, emotional
affects, and uncertainty have rhetorical effects, a connection Galen likely understood
when he performed in front of a massive audience, using the environment and the
spectacle of live experimentation to undermine Aristotle. Finally, in Chapter 4, we
learned about competing styles of addiction theory, which harken back to medical
disputes between ancient philosophers and Sophists. Healthcare and medicine have
been, and continue to be, rhetorical enterprises.
On the flipside of this historical connection, ancient rhetoricians and
philosophers deployed a wide variety of medical metaphors, examples, and analogies in
their work. Plato speaks of rhetoric and medicine on equal terms in the Gorgias, when
he makes the disparaging analogy that what pastry baking is to medicine, rhetoric is to
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justice.4 In the Phaedrus, Plato shows a different perspective on rhetoric. Here, Socrates
explains to Phaedrus that the method of medicine is similar to the method in rhetoric,
because in “both cases we need to determine the nature of…the body in medicine” or
“the soul in rhetoric,” otherwise we will lack “the basis of an art, a body with the
medicines and diet that will make it healthy and strong, or a soul with reasons and
customary rules for conduct that will impart to it the convictions and virtues we want.”5
Plato casts rhetoric as an insufficient medicine in this passage, because unlike
philosophy (as he claims), rhetoric does not seek to “determine the nature of the soul”
of the audience. Aristotle is more generous with his analogies between rhetoric and
medicine.
In Aristotle’s Rhetoric, he deploys medicine as an analogy at an early stage in the
text. In Book I, he describes rhetoric as an art that “discover[s] the persuasive facts in
each case,” like all other arts.6 He continues: “For example it is not the function of
medicine simply to make a man quite healthy, but to put him as far as may be on the
road to health.”7 In the Topics, Aristotle again positions rhetoric and medicine as
analogous: “…it is not every method that the rhetorician will employ to persuade, or the
doctor to heal: still, if he omits none of the available means, we shall say that his grasp
of the science is adequate.”8 In both cases, Aristotle is responding to Plato’s contention
that rhetoric is inadequate unless the rhetor has a complete knowledge of the
audiences’ soul. Aristotle contends that like medicine, a rhetorician may have an
incomplete knowledge of her audience and yet still perform adequately, just as a
physician may not fully understand a disease, but can still act to alleviate symptoms. Our
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overview of Galen’s interest in Plato and Aristotle shows that both ancient thinkers
were deeply interested in healthcare and medicine, sometimes directly like in Plato’s
Timaeus, and sometimes indirectly like in the instances cited above.
The most important historical connection between healthcare and rhetoric
comes from Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. Here, Gorgias deploys the term “pharmakon”
to describe speech or logos. According to Michael Rinella, the term “pharmakon” (plural
pharmaka) is commonly translated as either “remedy” or “poison,” but it also is “a
signifier for many other things that do not easily fit that binary.”9 Pharmakon is the
origin of the modern term, “pharmaceutical,” and ties together language and medicine
in a way that Galen, Plato, and Aristotle do not. Below is the passage from Gorgias’
Encomium, where Gorgias introduces the connection between logos and pharmakon:
The power of speech has the same relation to the disposition of the soul as the
application of drugs on the disposition of the body. For just as different drugs
draw different juices out of the body, and some end disease but others end life,
so also some speeches produce pain, some enjoyment, some fear; some instill
courage in hearers; some drug and beguile the soul with a kind of evil
persuasion.10
Unlike Aristotle or Plato, Gorgias’ connection between pharmakon and rhetoric is not
simply analogical or metaphorical, it is literal. For Gorgias, rhetoric (or logos) is not like a
medicine or drug, it is a drug. Deepening our understanding of the connection between
medicine and rhetoric, we will examine the connection between pharmakon (I will use
the term “pharmaceutical” interchangeably) and rhetoric.
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3. The Logos-Pharmakon Connection
In the beginning of this passage from the Encomium, Gorgias sets up the
relationship between speech (logos) and pharmakon as metaphorical, but near the end,
we find a semantic slippage between terms. As Debra Hawhee notes, this “slippage
combines Gorgias’ use of ‘drug’ (pharmakeusan) as the passage’s final verb with speech
as the implied subject – ‘some drug and beguile the soul’ – to suggest the metaphor’s
dissipation: logos becomes a type of pharmakon.”11 Hawhee uses the pharmakon-logos
pairing to elaborate on Gorgias’ Empedoclean theory of effluences, which posits that
elements literally enter through our senses, but other scholars have interpreted this
passage for alternative argumentative purposes. 12
For instance, Barbara Cassin suggests that Gorgias’ conception of logos as
pharmakon is strikingly like J.L. Austin’s concept of perlocutionary language, or language
that does something in the saying rather than merely signifying. This standpoint aligns
with the pharmaceutical capacity that Gorgias outlines in the passage above. The
analogy of how drugs “draw different juices out of the body” just like speeches produce
pain or enjoyment frames logos as a force that produces physiological (instead of purely
cognitive) changes in the audience. For Cassin, pharmaceutical logos is characteristically
perlocutionary. Cassin’s theory casts our examination of aporetic rhetoric in a new light.
If aporetic rhetoric is a pharmaceutical, and pharmaceutical rhetoric is
perlocutionary, then many of the aporetic strategies we have uncovered over the course
our inquiry are more potent than they first seem. For example, the aporetic strategies of
Scientologists (and by extension the CCHR) are not merely creating significations
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between psychiatry and danger, they are constructing deeply moving shifts in our
perceptions of psychiatry itself. We are swayed to do more than associate psychiatry
with danger after viewing the CCHR landing page video. Rather, this combination of
terrifying images and texts persuades us to feel psychiatry deeply embodies danger.
Cassin’s connection between pharmakon and perlocutionary language thus suggests
that aporetic rhetoric is more than associational.
An alternative and influential reading of this important passage comes from
classicist Charles Segal’s 1962 article “Gorgias and the Psychology of Logos.” Segal
suggests that Gorgias describes how a rhetor is interested in the techne of a “linguistic
pharmakon,” which draws on a “great reservoir” of emotional forces to persuade.13
According to Segal’s reading of Gorgias, rhetoric is a powerful and near-mystical
emotional techne (art or craft), and pharmakon describes a class of linguistic tools that
tap into this expressive force. Robert Connors’s take on Gorgias acknowledges Segal’s
masterful reading of the Encomium, but also notes how he “reaches no conclusions
about whether Gorgias’ claims for the power of logos were true.”14
Connors’s perspective is that Gorgias’ speaking abilities were so superior at the
time, his words took on an almost intoxicating ability, suggesting that Gorgias’
description of logos is historically literal.15 Citing the theories of Eric Havelock, Connors
suggests what Gorgias “is describing here is not the critical, analytical response of a
literate audience, but… [a response] which involved the whole unconscious mind and
probably the central nervous system, a total loss of objectivity as the audience gives
itself up to identification with the speaker and his goals.”16 This power is closely related
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to the “effect of poetry and poetically based rhetorical techne on an oral culture…
[which] must indeed have seemed magical to the majority of orally conditioned
people.”17In sum, Connors argues that Gorgias records a peculiar cultural confluence of
poetics and rhetoric, which produced discourse with literal pharmaceutical effects.
Jeffrey Walker makes a similar suggestion when he uses Gorgias’ famous
pharmakon passage as a lens for viewing Aristotle’s understanding of emotional
catharsis, providing a rather dynamic definition of Gorgias’ pharmakon:
[A] particular techne – such as the application of a particular rhythm or melodic
mode – that causes the soul of the hearer to be ‘put into a state’… or to have its
‘disposition’ (taxis) rearranged according to the ‘disposition’ of the pharmakon
or techne applied, and this ‘state’ is expressed behaviorally and physically as a
particular type of pathos…18
Walker’s conception closely resembles Cassin’s and Segal’s take on this important
passage. Pharmakon is described as a techne, but Walker takes one step further and
describes its application as rhythmic or melodic. Additionally, Walker makes note of how
this techne is directed towards taxis (one’s disposition, or the movement of an organism
in response to a stimulus), and that this shift in taxis is expressed as a kind of pathos.
Much like Connor, Walker infers Gorgias’ conception of the logos-pharmakon circuit as
powerful and emotional. We can extend Walker’s, Segal’s, and Connors’s formulation of
pharmakon to better understand aporetic environments.
Segal’s and Connors’s connection between pharmakon and emotion is evident in
our examination of patient experience design. Aporetic environments, or environments
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that lend themselves to distortions in our perceptions of uncertainty, function primarily
through emotional affects. Despite my knowledge and experience with my chronic skin
condition, I was nonetheless disarmed by the experience of visiting the dermatologist.
Impatient, upset, and frustrated, I not only had trouble locating the physician’s office, I
was deeply entrenched in an environment that exacerbated negative emotional affects.
In hindsight, my reluctance to reschedule an appointment, my skepticism towards the
physician, and my overall displeasure with the experience overruled my desire to find a
solution for my medical problem. If pharmaceutical rhetorics tap into emotional affects,
and aporetic environments are pharmaceutical rhetorics, then my negative emotional
experience pharmaceutically “intoxicated” me, amplifying my perceptions of risk and
mitigating my perceptions of benefits, contributing to my failure to seek further
treatment. Thus, aporetic environments take on pharmaceutical qualities similar to how
Cassin, Segal, and Walker describe Gorgias’ understanding of pharmakon.
The work of Hawhee, Segal, Cassin, and Walker comprise an increasingly rich site
for rhetorical scholarship more broadly, however, pharmakon took on its contemporary
importance because of Jacques Derrida’s reading of Plato’s Phaedrus in his 1968 piece,
“Plato’s Pharmacy,” which remains an influential and oft-cited analysis. In this piece,
Derrida offers numerous definitional iterations of pharmakon, like “the pharmakon
makes one stray from one’s general, natural, habitual paths and laws,”19 or “the
pharmakon is that which, always springing up from without, acting like the outside
itself, will never have any definable virtue of its own.”20 Derrida’s characteristic
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attention to minutiae helps build a platform for later analysis. In particular, Derrida sets
his sights on Plato’s myth of Theuth and Thamus.
Plato’s famous myth of Theuth and Thamus in the Phaedrus ends with Theuth
offering writing to make the Egyptians wiser and improve their memories. He calls this
invention a pharmakon; writing (graphein) takes on the character of pharmakon. As
Derrida explains
…the malleable unity of this concept, or rather its rules and the strange logic that
links it with its signifier, has been dispersed, masked, obliterated, and rendered
almost unreadable not only by the imprudence or empiricism of the translators,
but first and foremost by the redoubtable, irreducible difficulty of translation.21
Pharmakon can signify a poison, a cure, a cosmetic, and a psychotropic substance,
amongst other possible significations. Derrida is pointing to the untranslatability of the
pharmakon, whose signification is always on the move. Translations of pharmakon in
this passage as “cure” are not strictly accurate, nor is it accurate to translate the term as
“poison” (we could just as easily say that both are equally accurate as well). Instead, it is
often the translator’s context that bubbles to the surface when translating pharmakon.
As noted above, Derrida is entirely justified in picking up the fundamental
ambivalence located at the nexus of the pharmakon and logos. In fact, a genealogy of
the term pharmakon owes much to Derrida’s reading of Plato’s Phaedrus in “Plato’s
Pharmacy,” which brought the term out of relative obscurity. However, as Michael
Rinella notes, Derrida’s argument tends to “reproduce, not suspend, the very charm of
Platonic binary metaphysics the deconstructionist approach seeks to evade.”22 The
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practical consequence of Derrida’s reading is that pharmakon tends to be framed in one
of two ways: as either healing or poisonous, either good or bad, or as totally freefloating, acting as a signifier for nearly anything. This (mis)reading of Derrida has limited
our ability to fully examine the full scope of meanings contained within pharmakon.
Michael Rinella’s recent exhaustive analysis of Plato’s use of the term
pharmakon upends and synthesizes much of the contemporary scholarship on the
subject, and in doing so, helps resuscitate Derrida’s reading of the term. As Rinella
argues, while Derrida does briefly examine pharmakon as a pigment, cosmetic, and
perfume, he tends to subsume each of these alternative senses under the category of
poison, as he does when he notes how the enchanting power of writing and painting
rest in their cosmetic concealing of death, and in practice, this claim restricts the
meaning of pharmakon as a cosmetic only for the purposes of funerary traditions, when
it was also used for other purposes.23 Alternatively, Derrida almost totally glosses over
pharmakon as a ward or talisman, a sense of the term that references crystals worn
about the neck in ancient Greece (“amethyst” comes from the Greek amethystos,
meaning “not drunk.” This semi-precious stone was frequently worn around the neck to
ward off intoxication). Thus, pharmakon has many uses and values, depending on the
context of its use, much like aporetic rhetoric.
Aporetic rhetoric does not have a stable value, which further supports our
connection between aporetic rhetoric and pharmakon. In each chapter, aporetic
rhetoric has served a variety of purposes and ends. Aporetic rhetoric is deployed against
Agent Orange veterans who seek a corrective for a wrongdoing. Aporetic rhetoric is also
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deployed by mental illness skeptics, who wish to ensure those who manage mental
illnesses are understood as more than the sum of their neural activity. Aporetic rhetoric
is deployed by both expeditions and fastidious theory-builders, whose unique
approaches to uncertainty are neither universally good nor bad, but more or less
appropriate depending on circumstances. As a pharmaceutical, aporetic rhetoric can be
a medicine, a poison, or something outside of this binary altogether. The value of
aporetic rhetoric, much like any pharmaceutical, derives from how it used.
Instead of subsuming pharmakon under the banner of “poison” or “cure,”
Rinella wisely opts to circumscribe the meaning of pharmakon as having with capacity
for ekstasis, or displacement. Pharmaceutical rhetoric – much like drugs, medicines, and
intoxicants – has a capacity for ekstasis, the counterpoint to our contemporary
conceptualization of stasis. From Plato until roughly Hobbes, stasis was a term that
represented a civic and political world marked by strife. However, modernity
reconstructed the concept of stasis, where it acquired the positive valence that it has
today.24 As modern rhetoricians understand the term, to produce stasis means to
produce a common ground between two political stances. Our four-tiered system of
stasis, which appears in numerous rhetoric and composition textbooks (and was
originally developed by Hermogenes), demonstrates how this occurs: for example, we
can resolve an argumentative impasse by referring to conjectural (“Does X exist?”) or
definitional (“How do we define X?”) stases, using them as a method for finding
common ground.
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The connection between rhetoric and the pharmakon places our positive
evaluation and contemporary use of stasis in question. While Plato does not specifically
utilize the language of stasis, his concerns about the homonoia (literally “same mind,”
mutual agreement, or harmony) of civic life indicate that stasis is of the utmost concern
to his greater political project. The unraveling and unbinding of the harmony of an
organism (lusis) is a term that Plato and others projected into the political realm,
essentially creating a circuit between the status of mental states and the status of
political states. That is, the question of rhetoric’s place in civic and political life has since
Plato been intimately connected to the stasiazonta (inner stasis) of the individual mind.
As far as the pharmakon is concerned, throughout the ancient texts pharmaka stand as
prime examples of ekstasis, or of an unbinding of the harmony of the mind. In fact, we
can plausibly suggest that the conceptual thread that runs through each sense of
pharmakon (poison, cure, cosmetic, charm, etc.) is nothing other than ekstasis.
Following this logic, pharmaceutical rhetoric produces conditions of ekstasis, but
the connection between rhetoric and pharmakon does not end there. The pharmaka
also modify the efficacy, production, and reception of rhetoric itself. That is, rhetoric
and the pharmakon are two sides to the same coin: rhetoric’s effects produce external
ekstasis, while the pharmakon’s effects produce internal ekstasis. Following Gorgias’
claim that logos is a pharmakon, rhetoric thus functions to produce external and
internal modes of ekstasis. Laws that prohibit congregations of protesters have as much
to do with managing modes of external stasis (by limiting discourse), as they do
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managing modes of internal stasis (by preventing dense spaces of affective
transference).25
Attempts to “reign in” rhetoric run parallel to attempts to manage and control
the pharmaceuticals that we come in contact with, because the two concepts are
conceptually and practically similar. The link between rhetoric and the pharmakon is
ekstatic management and control. Since the connection between internal and external
modes of stasis is entwined, the ever-increasing prescription of psychoactive drugs is as
much a question of internal harmony as it is civic harmony. In turn, attempts to reign in,
manage, or constrain certain types of rhetoric are as much a question of managing
potent drugs as they are a question of internal and civic harmony. The connection
between rhetoric and pharmakon, between logos and ekstasis, has implications for our
understanding of aporia.
Aporetic rhetoric is a type of pharmaka that deploys uncertainty to produce
states of ekstasis. The near-ubiquitous attempts to reign in, control, and manage
uncertainty are an extension of society’s need to manage and control ekstasis.
Generating uncertainty, through speech, or image, or environment, produces neither
argumentative harmony or agreement. Instead, uncertainty has a curious way of
“intoxicating” debate, stripping argumentative positions of their signification and
redirecting them to the conditions for knowing. Responding to a claim with the
suggestion that “we don’t have all the facts, so we can’t say either way” can only lead in
one direction: dispute over whether we have all the facts. This is a rhetorical trap. A
rhetor need only reassert that more information is needed, that the situation is still
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uncertain, or that we need to understand what is happening in greater depth as a
rebuttal to claims of epistemic adequacy.
As I argued in Chapter 4, there are limits and contours to this strategy correlated
with the urgency and level of uncertainty in a given debate, however, the urgency and
level of uncertainty in a situation are capable of being rhetorically manipulated. When in
doubt, a motivated aporetic rhetorician can always fall back on uncertainty: “we need
more facts before we call the situation urgent, since we don’t want people to panic,” or,
“we need more time to determine what we know and don’t know about this situation.”
An aporetic system can be disingenuously deployed to sustain inaction, or continue a
harmful policy or action indefinitely. It can also be used to resist unethical action, or
produce ethical inaction. Framing the justness of laws as uncertain, like many advocates
for justice do, can produce moments of ekstatic realization and reflection.
Ekstasis literally means moving “away” from where one “stands,” and signals a
fundamental breakdown of homonoia, or order, unity, or “oneness of mind.” Aporetic
rhetoric has the capacity to produce an alteration in our cognition, providing the
conditions for us to “change our minds,” or “standing out” from our personal and
particular mode of understanding the world. Aporetic rhetoric has the capacity to
disrupt our mutual agreement on a situation, much like the mental illness skeptics we
examined in Chapter 2. As both a harmful rhetorical trap and a liberating force from
homogeneity, aporetic rhetoric is a potent pharmaceutical, or a potent type of
pharmaceutical rhetoric. In light of this claim, we will now reexamine the central points
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of this project, illustrating how the aporetic strategies in healthcare settings are
pharmaceutical.

4. Aporia’s Pharmakon
The aporetic strategies of the CDC and VA are pharmaceutical, because they
displace conflict between Agent Orange veterans and the U.S. government. Agent
Orange was liberally and haphazardly deployed to reign in dense jungle foliage, without
knowledge of the deleterious effects it would have on American soldiers. This
uncertainty creates conditions ripe for aporetic rhetoric. The status of Agent Orange
veterans’ bodies, their health, their very knowledge and experiences become displaced
rather than rebutted or reinforced. They must prove their illnesses are more likely than
not to have been caused by Agent Orange, or to prove that their exposure was both real
and prolonged enough to “count.” It is not surprising that Agent Orange veterans take
little issue with the United States government or military, since spatial uncertainty
displaces their illnesses. They do not seek justice against the United States government.
They seek it against uncertainty itself. They doggedly pursue the reality of their
exposure, an experience altogether difficult to substantiate. Drug-like, spatial
uncertainty acts to distort the field of debate, or to cloud the injustice of Agent Orange
use in Vietnam.
Mental illness denialists’ aporetic strategies, like what-if-ism and what-aboutism, function as a potent pharmaceutical, displacing the subtler aporetic strategies of
mental illness skeptics. Skepticism positions itself as medicinal, while denialism acts as
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an intoxicant. In truth, skepticism and denialism are cut from the same cloth: both
deploy pharmaceutical rhetoric, and both deploy uncertainty to further their rhetorical
goals. The difference lies in their pharmaceutical impact and effect. Skeptics tend to
attack the conceptual dimensions of mental illness with surgical precision, but denialists
waylay the foundation of mental illness haphazardly, deploying almost any rhetorical
means necessary to achieve their goals. Denialist’s haphazard and potent aporetic
strategy displaces potentially helpful criticisms of mental illness institutions and
practices, rather than disputing them or reinforcing them in good faith. Thus, the
pharmacological outline of mental illness denialism and skepticism is one of competing
drugs. In this situation, one drug overpowers another, the effects of the latter becoming
conflated with the potency of the former. The aporetic rhetoric of mental illness
skeptics and denialists is pharmaceutical.
Patient experience design is pharmaceutical, because much like other
intoxicants, it produces emotional affects and states of mind that distort decisionmaking processes. Walker’s reading of pharmakon, which emphasizes the dimension of
pharmaceutical language that ties to pathos, when viewed next to Slovic’s affect
heuristic, helps us locate how the design of appointment systems, waiting rooms,
examination spaces, and billing processes are drug-like. The confusion of poor
wayfinding acts as a pharmaceutical, because it distorts and displaces our assessment of
risk and reward. The pleasant atmosphere of a well-designed waiting room acts as a
pharmaceutical, because it encourages patients to self-disclose to physicians. A poor
overall patient experience acts as a pharmaceutical, because its high costs seem
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unjustified, regardless of treatment outcomes. Design is a pharmaceutical with aporetic
consequences for physicians and healthcare providers who wish to guide patients to
positive outcomes.
Addiction theories are pharmaceutical, because depending on their composition,
they will either successfully work to help us understand what addiction is, or fall short of
explaining this important health problem. We can think of expeditious and fastidious
addiction theories as different kinds of pharmaceuticals. The former is like a powerful
antibiotic, deployed in situations where the diagnosis is clear and urgent treatment is
needed. The latter is like a low-dose blood pressure medication, deployed in situations
where there is no immediate threat to life and diagnosis is beset by complex factors. In
turn, using an expeditious or fastidious theory in unsuitable situations lends them
aporetic weaknesses. For expeditious theories, claims of oversimplification and
theoretical shallowness will gain a foothold when used to explain non-urgent addictions,
where important causal mechanisms are still unclear. For fastidious theories, claims of
conceptual bulkiness and overcomplication will be viable when used to describe urgent
addictions, where the details of how addiction functions are clear and the need is great.
Fastidious and expeditious theories are pharmaceutical, and each provide aporetic
defenses and openings, depending on their administration.
Aporetic rhetoric, the rhetorical use of uncertainty, is pharmaceutical. Deploying
uncertainty in situations does not settle a dispute, reinforce a point, or decide the
outcome of an argument. Rather, it displaces argument. In some cases, the ekstatic
function of aporetic rhetoric is useful, as it allows us to constructively assess our
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assumptions and beliefs. In other cases, it is harmful, as it prevents us from defending
what is right or seeking justice for wrongdoing. In addition, some factors (like design)
can accelerate or stymy the pharmaceutical effects of aporetic rhetoric. In other
situations, how we account for the pharmaceutical effects of aporetic rhetoric will
change how our claims can be disputed or supported. Aporetic rhetoric is drug-like,
intoxicating, healing, and poisonous. Aporetic rhetoric is pharmaceutical and healthcare
settings are permeated with aporetic rhetoric. This claim has important implications for
both rhetoricians and healthcare researchers and practitioners.
If we accept the notion that aporetic rhetoric is a pharmaceutical – a pharmakon,
or drug – then aporetic rhetoric must be taken seriously by rhetoricians and healthcare
researchers and practitioners, just as any other intoxicating substance. For rhetoricians,
this means that aporetic rhetoric will need to be further investigated, its use and
deployment examined and probed. In addition, aporetic rhetoric is not the only kind of
pharmaceutical rhetoric. Identifying other forms of rhetoric that entrance, that produce
ekstasis, that beguile and disrupt argumentation, is critical to understanding how
motivated activists can resist injustice, and how powerful organizations and actors
perpetuate injustice. This project has only scratched the surface of pharmaceutical
rhetoric.
For healthcare researchers and practitioners, the potency of aporetic rhetoric is
also an important reminder that healing and illness is as affected by pharmaceutical
drugs as it is by pharmaceutical rhetoric. How healthcare scholars and practitioners
frame, manage, and communicate uncertainty is as important as the drugs they are
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administering. Efforts in health communication and the rhetoric of health and medicine
have grasped this importance, but medical training and scholarship has yet to fully
understand the implications of rhetoric in the practice of their art. In addition, the
design of healthcare environments also needs to be addressed and considered in-depth
by healthcare practitioners and designers. There is already recognition that verbal,
visual, and environmental rhetoric is important to healthcare, but the synthesis and
importance of these dimensions has yet to fully grip the interest or education of
healthcare practitioners.
By positioning aporetic rhetoric as a literal pharmaceutical, my hope is that the
diligent researchers and passionate scholars who already recognize the importance of
rhetoric in healthcare settings can gain a powerful and persuasive foothold for the
importance of their work. The implications and impact of this project are, like all
projects, uncertain. My hope is that readers have learned something about uncertainty
along the way, not just as a discrete mental state, but as potent rhetorical tool.
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